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Abstract 
In this thesis, I examined the relevance of dual-process theory to understanding 
forgiveness. Specifically, I argued that the internal conflict experienced by laypersons 
when forgiving (or finding themselves unable to forgive) and the discrepancies between 
existing definitions offorgiveness can currently be best understood through the lens of 
dual-process theory. Dual-process theory holds that individuals engage in two broad 
forms of mental processing corresponding to two systems, here referred to as System 1 
and System 2. System 1 processing is automatic, unconscious, and operates through 
learned associations and heuristics. System 2 processing is effortful, conscious, and 
ope~ates through rule-based and hypothetical thinking. Different definitions of 
forgiveness amongst both lay persons and scholars may reflect different processes within 
each system. Further, lay experiences with internal conflict concerning forgiveness may 
frequently result from processes within each system leading to different cognitive, 
affective, and behavioural responses. The study conducted for this thesis tested the 
hypotheses that processing within System 1 can directly affect one's likelihood to 
forgive, and that this effect is moderated by System 2 processing. I used subliminal 
conditioning to manipulate System 1 processing by creating positive or negative 
conditioned attitudes towards a hypothetical transgressor. I used working memory load 
(WML) to inhibit System 2 processing amongst half of the participants. The conditioning 
phase of the study failed and so no conclusions could be drawn regarding the roles of 
System 1 and System 2 in forgiveness. The implications of dual-process theory for 
forgiveness research and clinical practice, and directions for future research are 
discussed. 
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Introduction 
Lay experiences with and definitions offorgiveness are many and varied. It is 
therefore not surprising that these definitions are often in conflict with each other and 
with the definitions of scholars (see below for review). Moreover, lay persons' 
experiences with forgiveness often involve some degree of internal conflict. I will here 
argue that these experiences and definitions may be better understood through the lens of 
dual-process theory. Dual-process theory holds that individuals engage in two broad 
forms of mental processing corresponding to two systems: one that is automatic, 
unconscious, and operates through learned associations and heuristics, and a second that 
is effortful, conscious, and operates through rule-based and hypothetical thinking. The 
study described in this report attempted to test the hypothesis that processing within the 
prior system can directly affect one's likelihood to forgive, and that this effect is 
regulated by the latter system. 
For my Introduction, I shall begin by reviewing both professional and lay 
definitions offorgiveness. These definitions will then be related to lay experiences with 
internal conflict when forgiving or not forgiving. I will then provide an overview of dual·· 
process theory and how it may help to account for this conflict. Reviews of how the two 
systems of dual-process theory interact, and dual-process theory's treatment of affect will 
then be provided. Next I will discuss further applications of dual-process theory to 
forgiveness, before illustrating the potential roles of each system in forgiveness. I will 
then summarize the most prominent models of forgiveness in the literature, and indicate 
where aspects of dual-process theory can be found within these models, and which of 
1 
these aspects are never addressed by the models. Finally I will explain the reasoning that 
led to the design of my study. 
Disagreement and Internal Conflict Concerning Forgiveness 
2 
Defining forgiveness. What is forgiveness? Is it a feeling, a behaviour, or a 
decision we make? If I am to say "I forgive you" does that mean I have forgiven? There 
is currently considerable disagreement amongst psychologists and other scholars 
concerning the definition of forgiveness (Enright, Eastin, Golden, & Sarinopoulos, 1992; 
McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000; Rye et aI., 2001). Two of the most 
prominent defmitions place the core of forgiveness in different constructs, Enright and 
his colleagues claiming that forgiveness is a change in cognition, affect, and behaviour 
(Enright, 1996; Enright, Freedman, & Rique, 1998; Enright & The Human Development 
Study Group, 1991), and McCullough and his colleagues claiming that forgiveness is a 
change in motivations (McCullough et aI., 1998; McCullough & Hoyt, 2002; 
McCullough, Root, & Cohen, 2006; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). One 
may further question whether forgiveness can be just cognitive, just affective, or just 
behavioural, or if it must be some combination thereof. 
A third point of contention is whether or not forgiveness merely requires that an 
individual cease to hold negative attitudes towards the offending party, as is argued by 
some scholars (e.g., Thompson et aI., 2005), or if one must also build positive thoughts, 
feelings, behaviours in their place, as is suggested by Enright et al. (1991). Yet another 
question left: unanswered is whether or not forgiveness is a conscious choice or a gradual 
process that occurs regardless of one's will. These examples represent just some of the 
discrepancies amongst scholars' definitions of forgiveness that remain unresolved. 
Beyond disagreement amongst scholars, recent research has illustrated a gap 
between forgiveness as conceived of in the scientific literature and forgiveness as 
perceived by lay persons (DeCourville, Belicki, & Green, 2008; Kanz, 2000; Mullet, 
Girard, & Bakhshi, 2004; Stewart, DeCourville, & Belicki, 2010; Younger, Piferi, Jobe, 
& Lawler, 2004; Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). Lay persons' definitions offorgiveness 
reflect an even broader range of perspectives, and may include concepts such as 
reconciliation, excusing, and forgetting (DeCourville et al. 2008; Kanz, 2000; Stewart et 
aI., 2010), each of which have been widely excluded from the definition of forgiveness 
by academics (e.g. Enright et aI., 1991; 1992; 1998; Exline & Baumeister, 2000; 
McCullough, 2001; North 1987; Thompson & Snyder, 2004; Witvliet, 2001; 
Worthington, 2005; Worthington et aI., 2007). 
3 
DeCourville et ai. ' s (2008) study exploring lay definitions of forgiveness in a 
community sample illustrated many complex conceptions of forgiveness held by lay 
people that could converge or depart from expert opinions on topics such as the role of 
choice, the release of negative emotions, and the extent to which forgiveness is 
intrapersonal or interpersonal. Moreover, during the interviews referred to in this study, 
multiple participants explicitly stated that forgiveness had different meanings for them in 
different contexts (K. Belicki, personal communication, July 22,2011). Therefore, it is 
clear that the word forgiveness is used to mean many different things. 
Each individual's concept of forgiveness may include many different processes, 
each of which may occur simultaneously or in isolation, and which may be more or less 
relevant to the individual's perception offorgiveness in different situations. In order to 
understand what both lay persons and scholars wish to communicate when they say 
4 
"forgiveness" we must have a better understanding of the types of processes that underlie 
multiple conceptions of forgiveness, and whether or not these processes always occur 
together. 
Conflict amongst forgiveness processes. The relative independence of the 
various processes that may be included in one's definition of forgiveness is evident in lay 
persons' definitions and actual experiences with forgiveness, which appear to be more 
fragmented and variable than what is represented by the works of scholars. For example, 
Enright and his co-authors (1992) depict forgiveness as a congruent whole in which 
cognitive, affective, and behavioural components are in synchrony with the offended 
party's expression of whether or not they forgive. We see this in their assertion that 
forgiveness is a cognitive decision leading to "a change of heart" allowing the forgiver to 
enter into "loving community with others," as this assertion suggests that each 
component consistently gives way to the next. These three components of forgiveness 
reflect the common tripartite division of attitudes in which attitudes are also said to have 
cognitive, affective, and behavioural components (e.g. Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960). 
It should be noted that Enright's understanding of these processes is not entirely 
rigid; in 1996 he wrote: 
We do not imply that an offender is not receiving forgiveness until all six 
psychological components are completely given--cessation of negative affect, 
cognition, and behavior and the initiation of positive affect, cognition, and 
behavior. A forgiver may offer some degree of them with a commitment to at least 
cease the negatives. (Receiving Forgiveness, para. 1) 
However, his claim here is that an individual only needs to experience a moderate 
change, rather than a complete change, in each component (cognition, affect, and 
behaviour) to have truly forgiven, not that a change in some but not other components 
can be considered true forgiveness. Enright's use of the word "them" in this passage 
5 
binds these cognitive, affective, and behavioural components together, implying that each 
would happen in unison. This is indeed what we might expect if, as Enright contends 
(Enright, 1996; Enright et aI., 1991; 1992), forgiveness is a choice and, therefore, each of 
these components share a single decisive origin; the will of the forgiver. However, this 
does not appear to be how many lay people actually experience forgiveness. 
Several recent studies have found that forgiveness is often conceptualized or 
experienced as existing despite residual anger, continuing resentment, and a lack of 
positive affect (DeCourville et aL 2008; Kanz, 2000; Mullet et aL 2004; Stewart, et aI., 
2010; Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). For example, 76% of participants in Kanz's (2000) 
study answered "yes" to the question "is it possible to be both angry and forgiving about 
a situation at the same time?" Mullet et aI. (2004) obtained similar findings in a study 
using exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses with a large sample size (N = 1029) to 
examine lay conceptions of forgiveness. Participants indicated substantial disagreement 
with the "change of heart" factor, with a mean score of7.16 out of 17 on the four 
corresponding items (in which higher scores indicated agreement). 
Stewart et al. (2010) have provided a detailed examination oflaypeople's 
experiences with forgiveness using Q methodology. Q methodology is a research method 
that explores subjective viewpoints using a unique form of factor analysis in which 
factors are comprised of groupings of people who have sorted items similarly. Here 
participants were asked to sort 66 statements about forgiveness to indicate the extent to 
which each statement represented their experiences with forgiveness on a scale of -5 to 
+5. Participants' experiences with forgiveness yielded three factors, titled "Unresolved 
Forgiveness," "Compassionate Forgiveness," and "Forgiveness Motivated by Religious 
6 
Belief." Unresolved Forgiveness represented the experiences of the largest portion of 
participants (11 of the 21 who loaded on a single factor) and is characterized by strong 
agreement with such statements as "I forgave the person who hurt me, but I still have 
negative feelings about him/her" and strong disagreement with statements like "forgiving 
the person who hurt me meant trusting them again" and "now that I have forgiven the 
person who hurt me, I feel good about him/her - just as good as I felt before s/he hurt 
me." 
It is clear that these participants did not experience the affective transformation 
that is so prominent in the literature. Moreover, participants defIning the other two factors 
found the statement "forgiving the person who hurt me meant that I no longer felt anger 
or resentment" irrelevant to their experience with forgiveness. Participants in the 
Unresolved Forgiveness factor also had a mean score of -1, on the scale described above 
from -5 to +5, for the item "now that I have forgiven the person who hurt me, I treat 
himlher just as well as I did before slhe hurt me." This indicated that the behavioural 
component of forgiveness was largely absent for these participants as well. 
DeCourville et al. 's (2008) research has similarly shown that the layperson's 
forgiveness may refer to an idea, an action, or a decision, all of which may be 
independent of their affective response to thoughts of the transgressor. For others, it may 
be a spontaneous change in affect that is only afterwards recognized cognitively. For 
example, one participant claimed, "I was driving to work one morning and I went 'Ohh, 
[sic] I think I've forgiven him.' I really do, and it was like a weight lifted offme. I knew 
I'd forgiven him." (DeCourville et aI., 2008, pg. 9). This conception offorgiveness 
occurring at the affective level without a cognitive component is reflected again in 
7 
Brenneis's (2002) study of forgiveness amongst clergy who felt interpersonally hurt by a 
superior who had required them to enter residential psychological treatment. When asked 
to define what forgiveness meant to them only 3 of the 88 participants in this unique 
sample mentioned a cognitive component, the majority choosing to focus on emotional 
change instead. Further, only one participant mentioned a behavioural change. 
It is interesting to note that some lay persons apparently agree with Enright and 
his associates' opinion that each of the processes underlying forgiveness should always 
occur in synchrony, despite their experiences with forgiveness. Although there has been 
no systematic study oflaypersons' opinions on whether or not forgiveness refers to 
multiple processes, some individuals in the DeCourville et al. (2008) study reported being 
troubled by the experience of believing that they had forgiven only to discover that they 
still felt anger about the offense (K. Belicki, personal communication, September 2010). 
Similarly, it is common for offenders to express frustration when, after being told 
that they have been forgiven, the injured party repeatedly brings the offense back into 
their conversations. These accounts suggest that if psychologists succeed in teaching that 
authentic forgiveness means no longer experiencing conflicting thoughts or feelings 
about the transgressor, then those who would ordinarily be untroubled by this internal 
conflict may become frustrated that their own or others' attempts at forgiveness fall short. 
In conclusion, the defInitions of forgiveness and experiences with forgiveness that lay 
persons have reported in recent studies involve a broad range of processes; however, no 
single process is found in all defInitions or experiences. This suggests that these 
processes may be considered independent, and thus are able to occur in the absence of 
one another. 
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If we are to accept that these fmdings are accurate we are left with a few choices 
of how to interpret them. First we might claim that the forgiveness experienced by these 
participants was incomplete, or fragmented. This way of categorizing such experiences 
with forgiveness is reflected in Stewart et al.'s (2010) choice of the name "Unresolved 
Forgiveness" for the factor in her study that was constituted by participants who believed 
they had forgiven but continued to experience negative emotions about the offender. This 
way of understanding such experiences is also reflected in the use of the term 
"incomplete" by Enright and his colleagues (1992) in reference to theories that did not 
include a change in affect, accurate cognitive evaluation, or a clear choice. Alternatively 
we could take the stance that one of these processes is "true" forgiveness and that the rest 
are merely correlates that are at times confused with forgiveness. Worthingon et al. 
(2007) seem to take this stance when they claim "many acts reduce unforgiveness and are 
thus often confused with forgiveness" (pg. 2). 
Finally we could view each process as a different form of forgiveness, each 
equally valid. Worthington et al. (2007) supply a compelling example of this view when 
they write "making a decision to change one's behavior could be a sincere and permanent 
form of forgiving, and yet that decision must be differentiated from emotionally 
forgiving. Decisional and emotional forgiveness are different processes, likely with 
different sequelae" (p. 292). Although this third option is the most inclusive of lay 
perspectives, the definitional debate has been driven by scholars' claim that there is but a 
single concept that ought to be called "true forgiveness." This claim has been particularly 
apparent in the writing of Enright and his colleagues who frequently set aside a section in 
their papers and books specifically dedicated to calling out definitions of forgiveness that 
the authors deem incorrect (e.g. Enright et aI., 1991; 1992). This critique is similarly 
applied to the forgiveness claims of laypersons. Enright and his colleagues (1992) write 
of one client described in a case study by Forward (1989; cited in Enright et aI., 1992): 
"we must realize that it is not forgiveness that complicated Stephanie's life, but her 
distortion of what forgiveness is" (Works Discouraging Forgiveness, para. 3). 
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Although decisions regarding the correct definition of forgiveness and how we 
communicate about these defInitions may have real world consequences for researchers 
and clinicians (see the Discussion), it is not the purpose of the current paper to take a 
strong stance on how forgiveness should be defmed or if it should have a single defmition 
at all. Before scholars can make fully informed decisions regarding the defInition of 
forgiveness they must understand the potential underlying processes and be able to 
discuss them with colleagues and participants. It is the purpose of the current work to 
investigate what types of processes may be involved in both what scholars refer to as 
forgiveness, and in what lay persons refer to as forgiveness. In doing so we may provide 
critical insight into what lies beneath the definitional debate, begin to form a more precise 
language for discussing the construct, and gain a better understanding of common 
experiences, whether or not they are truly forgiveness. 
If we are to better understand the types of processes that may be included in 
forgiveness and how they coexist it may be wise to take a step back from forgiveness 
research and ask how mental processes have commonly been classifIed in general. What 
we can see from a distance is a common pattern of two types of processes that have been 
found to underlie nearly every aspect of human psychology. This way of classifying 
processes and the expansive literature that accompanies it has become known as dual-
process theory. 
Dual-Process Theories 
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Most people think of themselves as having a single mind that embodies their 
identity. When one says the word "I" it is thought to refer to something that is clearly 
singular. Dual-process theory, however, provides us with a very different account. At its 
most basic, dual-process theory simply puts forth that an individual mind is made up of 
more than one process or system; the number need not matter (Gilbert, 1999). 
Nonetheless, there is a general consensus amongst a diverse set of dual-process theorists 
regarding the existence of two distinct systems. The first system operates quickly, 
effortlessly, and largely outside one's awareness. The second system operates slowly at 
the conscious level using rule-based reasoning (such as logic) and hypothetical thinking. 
The systems have been described as implicit and explicit (Reber, 1993), heuristic and 
systematic (Chaiken, 1980), heuristic and analytic (Evans, 1984), associative and rule-
based (Sloman, 1996), associative and propositional (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), 
hot and cool (Metcalfe and Mischel 1999), Type 1 and Type 2 (Evans & Wason, 1976; 
Evans 1980), and affective and cognitive (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999), each model 
emphasising different aspects of the two systems and applications for our understanding 
of them. In the interest of neutrality, 1 will follow the example ofStanovich (1999) and 
refer to the prior system as "System I" and the latter as "System 2". 
Dual-process theories have now been developed to explain a diverse set of 
phenomena including learning (e.g., Reber, 1993), reasoning (e.g., Evans & Wason 1976; 
Evans 1980), self-regulation (e.g., Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Metcalfe & Mischel, 
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1999), persuasion (e.g., Chaiken, 1980), emotion (e.g., Smith & Neumann, 2005), 
memory (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000), and personality (e.g., Epstein, 1998). Reviews 
of dual-process theories focussing on social psychology, and reasoning, are provided by 
Chaiken and Trope (1999) and Evans (2003) respectively!. The range of applications for 
dual-process theory is so diverse that it may be appropriate to imagine that a dual-process 
model may exist for every major function of the human brain. It is natural to perceive 
conscious thinking, or System 2 processing, as the entirety of the human mind. However, 
if dual-process theory is as ubiquitous as the range of these models implies, then one 
cannot relegate System 1 to a few isolated processes. System 2 processing can be no 
more whole than System 1 processing, and so System 1 may be equally deserving of the 
term "mind." It is therefore appropriate that researchers like Evans (2003; Evans & 
Frankish, 2009a) and Stanovich (1999; 2004) have come to refer to dual-process theory 
as a theory of two minds. 
Part of what makes the sheer number of dual-process theories so impressive, is 
that a large proportion of them were developed independently, without knowledge of 
previous dual-process theories (Evans & Frankish, 2009a, 2009b). This aspect of the 
development of dual-process theories can be seen as a parallel to high inter-rater 
reliability amongst judges that are blind to each other's ratings and the hypotheses of the 
study for which the ratings are being made. This is because so many dual-process 
theorists have interpreted their data in the same way without the motivation to fit their 
data to a pre-existing dual-process theory. Researchers like Evans (2003; Evans & 
Frankish, 2009a; Evans & Over 1996) and Stanovich (1999; 2004) have worked to 
1 It should also be noted that at least one single-process model has been offered as an alternative 
(Kruglanski, Thompson & Spiegel, 1999). 
12 
organize these commonalities amongst dual-process theories into over-arching dual-
system theories (although the use of the term "systems" instead of "processes" predates 
these works, and the two terms can be used interchangeably; e.g., Reber, 1993; Sloman 
1996). With this idea in mind I find it most appropriate to relate forgiveness to the 
broader and most commonly shared principles of dual-process theory rather than to focus 
on a single dual-process theory. 
System 1 processing is thought to be evolutionarily older, shared with other 
species down the phylogenetic scale, whereas System 2 processing is considered uniquely 
human. As such, each system is believed to be adapted to achieve separate goals. System 
1 processing is thought to act under "short leash" control by the genes; it directs specific 
responses based on specific stimuli in accordance with what has led to the survival and 
proliferation of genes in the past (Stanovich 2004). System 1 itself can be split into many 
independent subsystems, referred to as The Autonomous Set of Systems (TASS), each of 
which evolved to serve domain specific needs of genetic proliferation (Stanovich, 2004). 
Thus, System 1 processing includes instinctive behaviour, and more broadly, processes of 
association facilitated by an associative network, which may be likened to neural 
networks (Sloman, 1996) allowing System 1 to learn from past success or failure. 
This specificity allows the functioning of System 1 to be closely tied to genetic 
proliferation, however, it is unable to create new adaptive responses to new situations. 
This is because, by definition, neither the individual nor past generations would have had 
past experience with this situation through which they could derive an appropriate 
response to this stimulus, generally achieved either by forming an association or through 
natural selection. System 2 processing is thought to have developed to amend this. Rather 
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than relying on a supply of specific responses, System 2 processing is capable of using 
rules (in the form of "if x then y"), logic, and hypothetical thinking to create new 
solutions to novel problems. For this it requires more resources, such as glucose, working 
memory, and time, as compared to System 1 processing. For this reason, System 1 is 
thought to act as the default system until an occasion arises in which System 2 processing 
must intervene (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Reber, 2003; Stanovich, 2004). 
In many dual-process theories System 2 is responsible for executive functioning, 
and acts to inhibit System 1 responses when they are considered inappropriate (e.g. De 
Neys, 2006; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Pollock, 1991; Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & 
West, 2000). Because System 2 processing does not work with a set of specific responses 
previously established by evolution and experience, it is more likely to implement goals 
that are unrelated to genetic proliferation. System 2 processing may therefore enact goals 
that benefit, not genes, but what Dawkins (1976) refers to as their "vehicles": ourselves 
as wholes. 
In discussing forgiveness I have reviewed discrepancies amongst definitions of 
forgiveness, and have taken note of how various processes thought to underlie 
forgiveness are often experienced as conflicting, an experience that is not well explained 
in the existing literature. Dual-process theories have traditionally been posited to explain 
such internal conflict (see Evans & Frankish, 2009b). As such, the presence of internal 
conflict regarding forgiveness is the primary piece of evidence that has motivated this 
thesis. How dual-process theory may help to explain internal conflict in forgiveness and 
how it relates to disagreement about the definition of forgiveness can be illustrated by 
dual-process theory's contribution to another debate in cognitive science. 
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There is evidence in hundreds of experiments that in certain reasoning tasks the 
majority of individuals will fail to choose what is determined by normative models to be 
the correct answer. A well-known example is Wason's (1966) selection task. Many 
variations of this task now exist; however, in its original form, participants are presented 
with an array of cards, each with a number on one side and a letter on the other. One side 
of each card is plainly visible. Participants are told that their task is to indicate which 
cards they would need to turn over in order to determine the veracity of the following 
statement: "if a card has a vowel on one side then it has an even number on the other 
side" (Wason, 1966, p. 146). The correct answer to this problem is any card with a vowel 
facing up, and any card with an odd number facing up, but no others, because only these 
cards can disprove the rule. However, the majority of participants in Wason's (1966) 
study selected cards displaying vowels, and cards displaying even numbers. In 
replications of Wason's selection task, typically, less than 10% of participants selected 
the correct answer (see Stanovich, 1999 or Stanovich & West, 2000, for a review of 
replications and interpretations of these findings). 
Findings such as these have stirred debate about human rationality (Evans, 1984; 
Stanovich & West, 2000). These poorer performances seemed particularly anomalous 
considering that the individuals who participate in these studies largely consisted of 
university students, often from prestigious institutions such as Princeton and Stanford 
University. Cognitive psychology had essentially demonstrated that "an awful lot of 
pretty smart people are doing some incredibly dumb things" (Stanovich, 2004, p. 149). 
Dual-process theory has offered a solution to this enigma by positing two minds, 
each capable of two levels of analysis, in one individual. The fIrst level of analysis is the 
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algorithmic leveL Algorithmic level cognitive capacities include perceptual speed, 
discrimination accuracy, working memory capacity, and other similar abilities. The 
second level of analysis, intentional level, is more broadly concerned with goals, beliefs, 
and how one chooses to behave based on these goals and beliefs. Individual differences 
in intelligence are largely attributable to individual differences in algorithmic level 
cognitive capacity within System 2 (individual differences in algorithmic level cognitive 
capacity within System 1 are largely absent) . . 
Rationality, however, can be considered more closely concerned with the thinking 
dispositions that may lead an individual to hold different goals and beliefs, and to make 
appropriate decisions at the intentional level of analysis. Given that the goals existing at 
the intentional level of System 1 may differ from those of System 2, and because they are 
assumed to be more closely tied to the proliferation of genetic material and the 
environment of evolutionary adaptiveness (EEA) than reflective desires in the world of 
today, the behaviour they generate may be inappropriate or irrationaL In these situations 
an individual must use System 2 processing to override System I processing at the 
intentional level. Some thinking dispositions (at the intentional level of System 2) may 
lead an individual to be more likely to override inappropriate behaviours initiated by 
System I (e.g. high need for cognition), whereas others will not. 
Thus, the mystery of "smart people acting dumb" quickly unravels. High 
intelligence (high algorithmic level cognitive capacity in System 2) allows an individual 
the potential to derive rational decisions and overcome inappropriate impulses, however, 
only those who are also in the habit of reflecting on and overriding inappropriate goals, 
beliefs, and actions rooted in System 1 will also behave rationally. 
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Turning back to forgiveness, an explanation that may be provided by a dual-
process outlook is that the incongruent thoughts and feelings described above are largely 
produced by, or originate from, separate systems. An individual who is intelligent but 
behaves irrationally is a paradox as long as one holds the perspective that the terms 
'intelligence' and 'rationality' refer to the same construct. Similarly, an individual who 
believes that multiple independent processes are a part of the same forgiveness may be 
surprised when these processes do not co-occur. If one can refer to each of these 
processes separately, and recognize that they may have separate antecedents, the 
confusion dissipates. 
Thus, by taking a dual-process perspective we can create an understanding of 
forgiveness that more closely reflects lay experiences offorgiveness as compared to 
Enright and colleagues' (1991) depiction of forgiveness in which all processes coincide. 
Again, this need not replace a scholarly definition of what psychologists consider "true" 
forgiveness, but may act as a model of what researchers may expect lay people to refer to 
when asked about forgiveness. 
This explanation of incongruence within forgiveness that is provided by dual-
process theory is just one example of how dual-process theory may be of use in research 
on forgiveness. In order to more fully understand how the study of forgiveness can 
benefit from dual-process theory it is necessary to frrst review several aspects of dual-
process theory. 
The Relationship Between System 1 and System 2 
Gilbert (1999) has illustrated four of the most common ways the two systems are 
thought to interact in dual-process theories, using the metaphor of how one might design 
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a machine (specifically, he uses the example ofa soda machine). In "selective designs", 
processes from different systems are triggered by different stimuli, such that processing 
within only a single system becomes active, and determines a response. Alternatively, 
"competitive designs" postulate that processing within both systems is triggered, but only 
one System's processing succeeds in determining the outcome. Selective designs are 
more popular than competitive designs amongst the dual-process theories of social 
psychologists, as social psychologists tend to be more interested in behaviour and its 
cause than mental events with no behavioural outcome (as would be the activity of the 
"losing" system in a competitive design). The opposite is true for the dual-process 
theories of cognitive psychologists. 
Unlike selective and competitive designs, "consolidative" and "corrective 
designs" afford processing within both systems some input on any outcome. In 
consolidative designs, processes within both systems respond simultaneously to a 
stimulus and the results of these processes are integrated. Finally, in corrective designs, 
processing within a single system may initially become activated; however if the 
response it generates appears to be deficient, processing within the second system may 
correct, or otherwise modify it. Thus, rather than working independently, in a corrective 
design processing within one system monitors and reacts to the responses of the other. 
Recall that some dual-process theories posit that System 2 processing acts as a central 
executive that inhibits inappropriate System 1 responses (e.g. De Neys, 2006; Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999; Pollock, 1991; Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2000). These dual-
process theories use or draw upon corrective designs. 
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Although these are the most commonly proposed models, there are many more 
ways the two systems could interact, and an infInite number of variations on these 
designs could be devised. I have tested the corrective design in the present study, not 
because this design typifies dual-process theories (although it is common amongst many 
of the most prominent dual-process theories of social psychologists, e.g., Devine, 1989), 
but because it is this design which I was capable of testing with the available methods. 
SpecifIcally, I have attempted to test whehter System 1 processing can have direct effects 
on forgiveness, and if System 2 processing can moderate these effects. However evidence 
for this corrective design will not preclude the possibility that System 2 processing may 
also have direct effects. It is possible that the actual nature of the mind resembles a blend 
of corrective and competitive, or corrective and consolidative designs. 
Of further interest is that the output of one system can become the input of the 
other system. That is to say, the decisions, beliefs, or behaviours that result from 
processing within one system can act as stimuli for processing within the other. Once the 
output of the prior system is processed by the latter, the latter may come to produce the 
same or similar output on its own. System 1 processing can come to give responses 
previously supplied by System 2 processing when a task that was learned through 
effortful processing is practiced until it becomes automatic (Stanovich, 2004). 
Stanovich (2004) has provided a demonstration of the strength of this process of 
automatisation through use of the Stroop Task. In this task the names of several different 
colours (e.g. "BLUE") are written in different colours than that which is named (e.g. 
"BLUE" written in red ink). Participants are instructed to state the colours that the words 
are printed in rather than the colours that the words spell, and to do so as fast as they can. 
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Despite understanding the instructions, participants have difficulty naming the colours 
rather than reading the words. Reading, once learned and practiced through conscious 
control, has become so automatic and autonomous that we cannot keep it from interfering 
with competing tasks once triggered. 
System 2 processing can also come to produce responses that were once provided 
by System I processing. System 2 processing works to weave perceptions, thoughts, and 
memories into a cohesive narrative. It is a story teller placing itself (or yourself) at center 
stage. This may provide us with a sense of order and control, but as System 2 processes 
search for meaning and causation where there is none, they are liable to fill in these gaps 
with false information in a phenomenon called confabulation (Evans & Wason, 1976; 
Gazzaniga, 1998; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
A vivid example of confabulation has been provided by the work of Gazzaniga 
(1998) with split-brain patients. Split-brain patients have had their corpus callosum cut 
such that the left and right sides of the brain can no longer communicate with each other. 
The brain functions contra laterally with the body; the left side of the brain controls the 
right arm and receives input from right visual field, whereas the right side of the brain 
controls the left arm and receives input from the left visual field. In the vast majority of 
cases the left side of the brain can process language whereas the right cannot. The left 
hemisphere of the brain of a patient was presented with a picture of a chicken foot, and 
the right hemisphere was presented with a picture of a snowstorm. When asked to choose 
the corresponding picture from a set of four the left hand pointed to a picture of a chicken 
and the right hand pointed to a picture of a shovel. 
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What is of interest to this paper is what happened when the patient's left 
hemisphere (the hemisphere that could speak), was asked to explain the behaviour of the 
left hand, information the left hemisphere could not possibly know. Without hesitation 
the left hemisphere responded that the shovel was to clean out the chicken coup. A 
similar occurrence is thought to happen between the two systems. Rather than the left 
brain mistaking the actions of the right for its own, System 2 processing will see itself as 
the cause of behaviour that is actually driven by System I processing, and create 
explanations for such behaviour that are consistent with this perception. Once System 2 
processing has created reasons for behaviour originally driven by System I processing, 
System 2 processing may continue to instantiate such behaviour even after System I 
processing has ceased to do so. In addition to physical behaviour, confabulation may be 
used to explain mental activities such as holding beliefs and having preferences. 
Output from System 1 processing may also act as a stimulus for System 2 
processing in the form of consciously recognized automatic thoughts or "gut feelings" 
(Stanovich, 2004). We can become aware of thoughts or feelings that were created 
through System 1 processing. These thoughts and feelings may then be taken into account 
in System 2 processing. For example, an individual who associates a potential mate with 
an unpleasant gut-feeling is likely to deduce that they should not date that person because 
one generally prefers to spend time with people who elicit pleasant feelings. Further, at 
times System 1 processing may provide information that is not directly available to 
System 2 processing. A student who can't explicitly remember which hallway leads to 
the classroom may have a better chance of finding the classroom by choosing the hallway 
that merely looks familiar. 
21 
It is important to understand that System 2 processing most likely never 
determines behaviour without some input from System 1 processing. System 1 processing 
is responsible for such a broad range of functions, from face recognition, to grammar 
acquisition, to social inferences, that the majority of System 2 processes require some 
input from System 1 processing. Take, for example, a university student attempting to 
determine the validity of a written syllogism. Although the formal logic of System 2 
processing is required to solve the problem, first System 1 processing would be used to 
read the problem, and perhaps even to determine the intentions of the teacher, or 
researcher, who presented the problem. These automatic processes would therefore 
determine much of the meaning and context assigned to the problem. In everyday life, 
which is much more saturated with the need to interpret social cues and determine the 
strength of personal preferences, the role of System 2 processing would be less clear, and 
one can be expected to rely more heavily on System 1 processes. 
This complex interplay between the two systems' processes may pose challenges 
for researchers wishing to distinguish which system's processing is responsible for a 
specific "real world" thought, feeling, or behaviour. This is of consequence to how one 
may investigate dual-process theory and so I will return to this subject as I discuss the 
design of the proposed study. 
Dual-Process Theories and Emotion 
Earlier I put forward the hypothesis that the incongruence between cognition, 
affect, and behaviour related to forgiveness that is experienced by lay people may be a 
manifestation of incongruence between conclusions reached by System 1 and System 2 
processing. Lay people, not having the vocabulary or knowledge of the two systems may 
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have no other way of communicating this incongruence than to express it in terms of 
conflicting thoughts, feelings, and behaviours. The most common form of conflict noted 
in my review was a conflict between affect and cognition. My argument is strengthened 
by the fact that conflict between processes within each of the two systems is particularly 
likely to be expressed this way. This is because the output of each system is differentially 
likely to be expressed as cognition versus emotion or affect. It must be kept in mind, 
however, that it is not my contention that incongruence between System I and System 2 
processing is always expressed as incongruence between affect and cognition, or that 
incongruence between affect and cognition always indicates incongruence between the 
two systems' processes. 
At times an incongruence between processes originating from each of the two 
systems may manifest as an incongruence between two thoughts, as in the case of an 
individual struggling between using a heuristic and using logical deduction, and at other 
times as competing or mixed emotions. Still another option is that an individual may 
think or feel one way, but behave another. However, competing impulses within the same 
mode, that is to say between two thoughts or two feelings, may be dismissed as 
''uncertainty'' or recorded as moderate ratings on scales. Differences between cognition 
and affect, however, have already become apparent in the literature. Incongruence 
between cognition and affect or emotion may therefore serve as a starting point for 
connecting dual-process theory and forgiveness. Future research may seek to illuminate 
the many ways in which competition between System I and System 2 processing may 
manifest. 
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Although some dual-process theories place affect and emotion clearly in System 1 
(e.g. Epstein, 1998; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999), this is not the 
only treatment of emotion by dual-process theories. Numerous dual-process theories of 
emotion exist that draw the line between the two systems across the center of emotion, 
such that emotion itself is a product of two systems (see Smith & Neumann, 2005 for 
review). Examining a few of these theories may allow insight into the origin and role of 
emotion in dual-process theories in general. 
Some dual-process theories of emotion place simple, "basic," or "primordial" 
emotions in the realm of the automatic, the equivalent of System 1 processing (though 
they do not use this language), whereas more complex, "elaborated," or "uniquely 
human" emotions are thought to require a conscious or controlled (System 2) component 
(Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992; Keltner & Haidt, 2001). In Keltner and Haidt's (2001) 
theory of primordial versus elaborated emotions, elaborated emotions refer not only to 
the experience of emotions themselves, but to the meaning, behaviours, and norms 
associated with them through culture. This conception of emotion seems to leave much of 
the core experience of emotion in System 1 processing. 
Similarly, Johnson-Laird and Oatley's (1992) theory of basic emotion posits six 
basic emotions elicited by "rapid and coarse cognitive evaluations" (p. 209) that prepare 
an individual physiologically, and that communicate socially. More complex emotions 
are simply the combination of basic emotions and culturally specific cognitive 
evaluations, such as recognizing the cause of the basic emotion, or its social connotation. 
The theory holds that basic emotions act independent of reasoning, but instead bridge the 
gap between rational thinking and automatic, or reflexive, action by predisposing an 
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individual towards what would otherwise be reflexive action, without completely 
undermining rational decision making. Thus, I would argue that emotion as described by 
this theory falls in the realm of System 1 processing. It is important to note that although 
this description is similar to Stanovich's (2004) explanation of "gut feelings," Johnson-
Laird and Oatley contend that the role of emotions is one of control, rather than 
communication between the systems. Specifically, emotions in their theory do not exist 
so that an individual who is engaging in System 2 analytic thinking may take this 
information into account, but to directly prime the corresponding behaviour. This is a 
function of emotion that is also accepted by Stanovich (2004). 
In their interactional model of emotion, Ochsner and Barrett (2001; Barrett et aI., 
2007) describe emotion as an interaction between simple, non-conscious, automatic 
processes, and conscious, controlled processes. Automatic processes detect the presence 
of threats and rewards creating "core affect" with a positive or negative valence. 
Automatic processing will then apply knowledge about the affect's meaning and 
causation to create an emotion. This emotion is only experienced consciously, however, 
once controlled processes attend to this emotion, and create a label for it. Top down or 
controlled processes may also regulate emotion, and determine if a change in behaviour 
needs to be made. 
In their dual-process model of emotion, Smith and Neumann (2005) build on 
previous dual-process theories of emotion by suggesting that after repeated pairings of an 
emotion with a stimulus, if any aspect of an emotion is cued, whether it be a 
physiological reaction, a subjective experience, or a cognitive appraisal, each of the other 
aspects will also become activated through the associative network. They argue that 
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System 2 processing may be used to attempt to reinterpret the stimulus or redirect 
attention; however, the speed of System I processing may render the controlled cognitive 
system unable to intervene once activation has begun. Over time, however, System 2 
processing may repeatedly pair the stimulus with a different affective response, 
effectively creating conditioned responses through System 1. The authors suggest that 
emotions that originate in System 2 processing may be more easily extinguished by 
processing within System 2 when it is rationally understood that the emotion is no longer 
appropriate. 
Consistent across these theories is that emotion requires an automatic component. 
Further, System 1 processing appears to playa more fundamental role in creating the 
emotional experience in and of itself, whereas System 2 processing is more commonly 
responsible for informing, provoking, and articulating emotion, to create a more nuanced 
experience. I would argue that much of the System 2 component described by these 
authors is not emotion in and of itself, but the behaviours and thoughts that typically 
accompany emotions. Although some theories emphasize the importance of cognitive 
processes, or what I would identify as System 2 processes, in creating the experience of 
emotion (e.g. Ochsner & Barrett, 2001), these accounts nonetheless appear to place 
System 2 processes in a less basic role, often taking place chronologically later. For the 
purposes of the current study the minor distinctions between emotions that would be 
made by System 2 processing would be of little consequence. It does not matter whether 
a person is angry, jealous, or resentful in determining forgiveness as long as it is known 
that the emotion has a negative valence rather than a positive one, or represents a threat 
rather than a reward. In models such as Ochsner and Barrett's (2001) interactional model 
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of emotion, this threat versus reward detection takes place automatically before the 
participation of controlled processing. It would therefore seem appropriate to see System 
1 processes as playing the primary role in creating that which will at least eventually 
become emotion. 
When I speak of emotion originating in System 2 processing, I mean this in the 
sense that the output of System 2 (e.g., the knowledge that a dangerous criminal is 
nearby) may act as a stimulus that evokes emotion in System 1 processing. However, the 
initial processes involved in the creation of emotion are most likely to be System 1 
processes. It is therefore likely that in cases where an individual experiences 
contradicting thoughts and feelings, that much of the processes underlying the emotions 
are System 1 processes, whereas many of the processes underlying thoughts are System 2 
processes. It is in this way that we may return to consider those participants in studies of 
forgiveness, who believe they have forgiven, and yet continue to feel negative emotions 
toward the transgressor (or who believe they have not forgiven but continue to feel 
positive emotions toward the transgressor). 
System 2 processes are believed to be conscious, thus, if a thought created by 
System 2 processing triggered an emotion, the individual who had that thought would be 
aware of it. Any second thought that was created by System 2 processing and that 
contradicted this emotion, would then also contradict the ftrst. Thus, incongruence 
between thoughts and feelings that are derived from System 2 processing, would likely 
also be expressed as incongruence between mUltiple thoughts. It is therefore probable that 
when an individual experiences forgiveness cognitively but not affectively, like the 
individuals who claimed to have forgiven but experienced continued anger and 
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resentment, there is a conflict between System 1 and System 2 processing. That is to say 
that forgiveness occurred as the result of cognitive System 2 processes, but was not 
accompanied by a change in emotionally relevant System 1 processing. 
Thinking About Dual-Processes in Forgiveness 
How might processing within each system contribute to forgiveness? Let us 
imagine the unlikely example of individuals using System 2 processing alone. Such 
individuals might take into consideration whether forgiveness would be just, and whether 
it would lead to positive outcomes. They would then proceed to review each of these 
lines of thought systematically, taking into consideration every possible outcome. They 
may then assign each outcome a value representing its relative importance and likelihood. 
Finally they could make the cognitive decision to forgive or not forgive based on the 
value and probability of the corresponding outcomes. This ability to construct 
hypothetical outcomes, to deduce their causal paths, and consider each possibility in turn 
may constitute System 2's contribution to the processes surrounding forgiveness. 
In actuality, System 2 reasoning would likely be mediated by System 1 processes 
in the form of heuristics, and the priming of particular responses. For example, a recent 
quarrel may make past instances of betrayal more salient leading an individual to think 
that the transgressor is likely to transgress again. Similarly, the halo effect may influence 
one's evaluation of another's worth and therefore how much they deserve forgiveness 
(e.g. she is beautiful, therefore she is good, therefore she deserves forgiveness). Many 
individuals, however, are unlikely to see forgiveness as a matter of choice. They may rely 
purely on introspection, not looking for reason, but to see if they feel as though they have 
forgiven. The majority of individuals may at least take emotion into account. They may 
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react to a sense of foreboding, a gut impulse, or a longing for reconciliation. Here System 
1 processing is likely to playa large role as discussed earlier. 
We may further consider System 1 processing's contribution to forgiveness in 
terms of the associative network from which System 1 draws (Sloman, 1996). 
Forgiveness may be affected by associations with three different subjects. First, an 
individual may have various associations with the transgressor. This would be likely in 
the case that the transgressor was someone with whom the individual had a pre-existing 
relationship, but an association may also be formed between a transgressor who was 
previously unknown due to the emotions the individual experienced during and after the 
transgression. An individual may also have strong associations with the nature of the 
transgression. For example, individuals who have a history of being betrayed severely or 
repeatedly may associate this history with more or less minor transgressions that 
resemble betrayal, and become particularly sensitive to this class of transgressions. 
This raises an interesting question; does one forgive a transgressor or a 
transgression? It seems that the majority of current literature focuses on forgiveness as a 
process that concerns people, rather than events (DeCourville et aI., 2008; Enright et aI. 
1992; Trainer 1981). For example, Trainer (1981) focuses in her definition of forgiveness 
on how an individual behaves toward and feels about the transgressor. However, it is also 
possible that an individual may forgive a person for some offenses, but not others. This 
question cannot be answered by the current study but may be pursued in future 
forgiveness research. 
Finally, an individual may have associations with the idea of forgiveness itself. 
For example, an individual who was raised to believe that forgiveness was an integral 
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part of their religion, may associate forgiveness with their positive, or negative, feelings 
surrounding their faith. 
Before discussing the design of the study, the extent to which the major elements 
of dual-process theory are already present in prominent theories of forgiveness will be 
reviewed. 
Models of Forgiveness 
Despite the universality of dual-process theory across many areas of psychology, 
dual-process theory has not yet been explicitly applied to forgiveness research. In this 
section I will describe where elements that are related to dual-process theory are present 
in the literature, and where they are notably absent. It makes sense that if the term "dual-
process theory" has never existed before in the forgiveness literature that researchers 
would use other terms to describe its key elements where relevant. One element clearly 
relevant to dual-process theory is multiple, parallel processes. 
Further, I will continue to take note as to whether or not these processes are 
viewed as potentially conflicting or as always unified. If multiple processes were to 
always result in the same conclusion it would be difficult to distinguish them from a 
single process model. However, when there is conflict between processes we can infer 
that these multiple processes exist based on their conflicting outcomes in the form of 
thoughts, feelings, or behaviours. Thus, in the following pages I will document the extent 
to which each model accounts for the possibility of conflict amongst the processes that 
lead to or comprise forgiveness. One form of conflict created by competing multiple 
processes that is well documented in dual-process literature is what Epstein (1994) refers 
to as a "conflict between the head and heart". Thus the level of congruence between 
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cognition and affect implied by each model is of particular interest. Further, core to dual-
process theories are the conceptions of consciousness and control or automaticity. Where 
we find references to consciousness or automaticity in the forgiveness literature we have 
found a place that may benefit from dual-process theories. 
Since a surge of research in the 1990s, many models of forgiveness have been 
formulated. It is beyond the scope of this review to describe every model of forgiveness 
that has been published. Instead, this review will focus on four of the most prominent 
models of forgiveness: Enright and his colleagues' decision driven process model 
(Enright, 1996; Enright, Freedman, & Rique, 1998; Enright & The Human Development 
Study Group, 1991), Worthington and colleagues' emotion driven model (Worthington, 
1998; 2005) as well as their distinction between decisional and emotional forgiveness 
(Worthington et aI. 2007), and McCullough and his colleagues' motivational model of 
forgiveness (McCullough et aI., 1998; McCullough & Hoyt, 2002; McCullough, Root, & 
Cohen, 2006; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). In addition, I will briefly 
describe Scobie and Scobie's (2002) multidimensional model of forgiveness because it 
provides a perspective of forgiveness that, though not recognized by its authors, in one 
manner resembles a dual-process perspective. Other, less influential models, describe 
alternative ways to understand forgiveness, but do not differ substantially from the more 
widely accepted models in their treatment of those aspects of forgiveness that may relate 
to dual-process theory. 
Enright and colleagues' decision driven process model of forgiveness. Based 
on North's (1987) philosophical work on defining forgiveness, Enright and his colleagues 
conceive of forgiveness as "the overcoming of negative affect and judgement toward the 
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offender, not by denying ourselves the right to such affect and judgement, but by 
endeavouring to view the offender with compassion, benevolence, and love while 
recognizing that he or she has abandoned the right to them." (Enright et aI., 1991, p. 126). 
In an early version of their decision driven process model, Enright and the Human 
Development Study Group outlined seven steps that they believed an offended individual 
would go through when they forgive. These steps included becoming aware of the 
negative psychological consequences of the offense, experiencing a need to resolve the 
conflict, choosing between a justice and a mercy strategy, being motivated to forgive, 
making a cognitive decision to forgive, using internal forgiveness strategies, and fmally 
becoming aware that "a behavioural response towards the other is necessary". By 1996 
Enright had extended this model to include 20 processes divided into 4 phases of 
forgiveness: the uncovering phase, the decision phase, the work phase, and the deepening 
phase. During the uncovering phase the offended person becomes aware of the 
consequences of the offense, including their emotional pain. In the decision phase, the 
individual considers and commits to responding to this offense with forgiveness. The 
work phase involves attempting to understand the offender and what caused their actions, 
and coming to feel empathy and compassion for them. The work phase also includes 
what Enright calls "absorption of pain" (Enright 1996) in which the offended person 
takes in the pain rather than casting it back at the offender. Finally, during the outcome 
phase, the offended person recognizes their changed feelings and perspective. 
In describing this model Enright and his colleagues never explicitly use the terms 
implicit, automatic, unconscious, or subconscious; however, they frequently reference 
psychological defenses that are fundamentally related to the psychoanalytic conception of 
32 
the unconscious (Enright, 1996; Enright et aI., 1991, 1998). For example, during the 
uncovering phase the offended person is said to examine their defenses such as denial, 
repression, projection, and reaction formation. Similarly, Enright et al. (1991) describe 
multiple forms of what they call "pseudo-forgiveness". In one form, that they label 
reaction formation, a person believes they have forgiven, but they have not because they 
continue to experience negative feelings such as resentment, mistrust, or blame. 
Although the authors make use of the psychodynamic conception of the 
unconscious, dual-process theory tends to be more closely associated with what is 
sometimes referred to as the cognitive unconscious as noted by Epstein (1994). Epstein, 
believing that both ways of understanding the unconscious have some advantage, 
integrated the two in his cognitive-experiential self-theory, a now well-known dual-
process theory. Other dual-process theorists have emphasized the distinction between the 
psychoanalytic and cognitive unconscious even more strongly. After reviewing Freud's 
conception of the unconscious and comparing it to System 1, Evans and Frankish 
concluded that the two bear so little resemblance that "Freud's taxonomies have little 
more relevance to contemporary dual-process theories than does Plato's tripartite division 
of the soul." (pg. 7.) If forgiveness researchers are primarily familiar with 
psychodynamic formulations of an unconscious they may benefit from recent cognitive 
models of the unconscious and the large empirical body on the unconscious that has been 
created through the study of dual-process theory. 
In the view of Enright and his colleagues, forgiveness involves affect, behaviour, 
and cognition. Yet, they strongly emphasize that forgiveness is a conscious decision. This 
implies that affect, cognition, and behaviour are primarily under the control of the 
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offended and, therefore, may be chosen. This would contradict the notion that many 
components of cognition, affect, and behaviour are System 1 processes and are, therefore, 
automatic. The apparent contradiction between this claim that forgiveness is a conscious 
choice and their implication that forgiveness involves a change in, or the absence of, 
feelings that may exist at the unconscious level may be resolved by the sequential nature 
of their model. The conscious decision to forgive happens during a separate phase from 
the ''work'' of forgiveness. Thus, it may be conceived that deciding to forgive is not 
synonymous with forgiving, or complete forgiving. Instead, in their view, true 
forgiveness may be preceded by an incomplete forgiveness, or "pseudoforgiveness". 
They write: 
[In one pattern of forgiveness] most people will consider forgiving another person 
when their emotional pain is so high that they must do something to change this 
uncomfortable situation. When they then decide to forgive, it is primarily a self-
interested activity; the person forgives in order to feel better. Only after a period 
of time does the forgiver understand the giftlike quality of forgiveness. Only after 
a period of time does the forgiver focus more on the other person than on the self. 
(Enright et aI., 1998, p.54-55). 
Thus, it is possible that after the decision to forgive is made at a conscious level, in 
System 2, the affective change may occur through unconscious processes in System 1. 
However, Enright and his colleagues do not provide a clear model of how such 
unconscious change may occur, often focusing instead on conscious cognitive processes 
such as reframing and attempting to understand the offender. These cognitive processes 
are said to foster empathy and compassion; however, it is unclear how these emotions are 
related to the negative feelings that may have previously existed at the unconscious level. 
Dual-process theory may help to account for this change by making explicit the 
difference between controlled and automatic processes and by providing models of how 
they interact. 
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Although Enright and his colleagues make it clear that they do not conceive of the 
process of forgiveness as completely linear, they do imply that only one of the 
components outlined in their theory happens at a time. Therefore, although their model 
contains multiple "processes," it does not contain multiple, parallel processes. For 
example, Enright et al. (1991) state: 
These processes are not considered rigidly inevitable or mechanical in that 
everyone who forgives necessarily passes through all. The sequence is logical, but 
not considered psychologically invariant. There will be both feedback and 
feedforward loops so that each component influences others (p. 140). 
The term feedback loop refers to returning to a previous step or process before returning 
to the later step. Assuming Enright shares this understanding of the term, then he 
imagines that if one encounters difficulty with phenomena related to an earlier step one 
may return in their entirety to this previous step, rather than struggling with this earlier 
step while simultaneously continuing to work through other steps. 
From a dual-process perspective, we would expect processes within System 1 to 
take place in parallel to each other and simultaneously with processes in System 2, 
whereas processes within System 2 would take place serially (i.e., one at a time). Thus 
Enright treats these processes as though they take place the same way as do processes in 
System 2, yet he insists that forgiveness contains an affective component, and affect is 
closely tied to System 1 in the dual-process literature. Thus, Enright et al. 's account of 
multiple processes within forgiveness differ significantly, and at times contradict, what 
would be expected from a dual-process perspective. 
Worthington and colleagues' emotion driven model of forgiveness. Another 
well-known model of forgiveness is provided by Worthington (1998). This emotion 
driven model of forgiveness consists of three components: humility, empathy, and 
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commitment. Humility occurs when an individual realizes that the feelings of the 
offender are feelings that they have had in the past when they have been equally wrong. 
They then realize that if they want mercy it is only fair that they reciprocate. 
Commitment takes the form of an overt behaviour such as crying, or telling a counsellor 
you have forgiven. Through various processes, such as cognitive dissonance and self-
perception, this behaviour allows the individual to keep to their commitment to forgive. 
As compared to the cognitive emphasis of Enright, Worthington believes affect to 
be the most critical component of forgiveness. He writes: 
In the model of forgiveness I am suggesting, cognition and behaviour are thought 
to be concomitant with a primary emotional wound [ ... ] Cognitive and 
behavioural techniques of marital counselling or family therapy will not easily 
heal the wound, though with persistence they may break through the cognitive and 
behavioural overlays and speak to the emotional wound. In contrast I suggest that 
forgiveness is initiated by empathy for the offender, furthered by humility in the 
person who was hurt, and solidified through making a public commitment to 
forgiveness. (Worthington, 1998, p.62-63). 
So we see that Worthington et al.'s emotion driven model holds that emotion, cognition, 
and behaviour will work together as a unified whole. However, in this view, effective 
forgiveness therapy acts through addressing emotion. Their emotion driven model's 
emphasis on emotion suggests that System 1 processing is at the core of forgiveness. In 
this case we may better understand the limited ability of cognitive and behavioural 
techniques by understanding the relationship between System 1 and System 2 processes. 
There appears to be little room in this model for inner conflict, and all other signs of dual-
processing are notably absent. 
Worthington and colleagues' decisional versus emotional forgiveness 
distinction. Without drawing a clear connection to his emotion driven model of 
forgiveness, Worthington (2005) has written of two different forms of forgiveness that 
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resemble System 1 and System 2 processes. What he titled "decisional forgiveness" (p. 
560) resembles System 2 processing. In decisional forgiveness one makes the decision to 
cease all negative behaviours towards a transgressor and (if in a continuing close 
relationship) restore positive behaviours towards the transgressor. Here, what 
Worthington calls the "experience of forgiveness" (p. 561) may only come later, if at all. 
Instead the focus is on making a choice to control one's behaviour. Such a choice, I 
would argue, can only be made within System 2. Worthington contrasts decisional 
forgiveness with what he calls "emotional forgiveness" (p. 560). By making this 
distinction he suggests that emotional forgiveness is not a choice and is therefore likely 
rooted in the System 1 processing. This is consistent with current dual-process 
perspectives on emotion discussed earlier. 
In a later paper (Worthington et aI., 2007), he and his colleagues elaborate on 
each form of forgiveness and their likely consequences. Here it is stated that emotional 
forgiveness involves changes in cognition, emotion and motivation. Each of these 
processes could take place in System 1. Further, in this paper the authors draw on 
previous research that seemed to distinguish between decisional and emotional 
forgiveness (though framed differently by the original authors), including the research by 
Huang and Enright (2000). This distinction is again reflected in the work of Trainer 
(1981), who differentiated between role-expected and expedited forgiveness, both of 
which are externally motivated by social and practical concerns, and intrinsic 
forgiveness, which involves an affective change (see Further Applications of Dual-
Process Theory to Forgiveness Therapy and Research for further discussion of this 
distinction in these authors works). It seems that several researchers have attempted to 
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depict the System 1 versus System 2 divide, without knowledge of the strong theoretical 
basis for such a divide that already exists. 
McCullough and colleagues' motivational model of forgiveness. Collaborating 
with Worthington and Rachal, McCullough presents a similar model to Worthington and 
colleagues' emotion driven model of forgiveness (McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 
1997). Forgiveness is here defined as a motivational transformation in which one 
attempts to inhibit relationship-destructive responses and behave constructively toward 
the offender. Proponents of the model hypothesize two forms of relationship destructive 
motivations: avoidance and revenge. In the past, motivation has been conceived of as 
both a conscious and an unconscious process (see Westen, 1998), speaking clearly to the 
dual-process literature; however, McCullough and his colleagues do not address this 
point. This is of particular importance considering that a now popular measure of 
forgiveness, called the Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory 
(TRIM), was developed out of this model (McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; 
McCullough et aI., 1998). 
The TRIM was originally formulated to contain two subscales that loaded on two 
factors: revenge and avoidance (McCullough et a1. 1998). In 2002, McCullough and Hoyt 
added a third subscale to measure benevolence. Subsequently, factor analysis revealed a 
two factor solution, with avoidance loading positively on one factor, benevolence loading 
negatively on the same factor, and revenge loading positively on the second factor 
(McCullough et aI., 2006). This gives the TRIM the capacity to measure multiple, 
simultaneous processes, in the form of multiple, resulting motivations. Further, it is 
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capable of capturing conflict within forgiveness as it allows an individual to score both 
high on revenge and high on benevolence. 
It must be noted, however, that the separation between revenge and avoidance / 
benevolence bears no relation to the conscious/reflective vs. unconscious/automatic 
divide of dual-process theory. Both of these factors could be the result of parallel 
processes within System 1, in line with the emphasis that Worthington places on emotion. 
Alternatively, each factor could reflect different aspects of an individual's circumstance, 
considered serially within System 2. 
McCullough et al. (2006) come close to citing dual-process theory when they 
state that: 
focusing on the benefits that one has gained (or might gain in the future) from a 
transgression could help to negate some of the transgression's psychological costs 
and, by doing so, encourage forgiveness. This proposition is consistent with other 
studies showing that one's attentional focus after negative life events (e.g., 
rumination vs. distraction, focus on 'hot' vs. 'cool' features of the event [ .... ] has 
implications for emotion, well-being, and social behaviour (p. 888) 
When McCullough et al. state that attentional focus after negative life events has been 
found to affect emotion, well-being, and social behaviour, they cite Ayduk, Mischel, and 
Downey's (2002) article on "hot" and "cool" focus in reacting to rejection. This research 
is based on Metcalfe and Mischel's (1999) framework for self-control, which is itself a 
dual-process theory in which "cool" corresponds to System 2 processing, and "hot" refers 
to System 1 processing. Given that neither this article nor Metcalfe and Mischel's (1999) 
article ever refers to dual-process theory by name, there is no reason to believe that this 
means McCullough and his colleagues were aware of this manner of classifying 
reasoning or believed it was important to forgiveness itself. 
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Rather than examining the components or stages of forgiveness, McCullough and 
his colleagues focus on examining factors that affect the likeliness of forgiveness, with a 
strong emphasis on empathy as a mediator (McCullough et aI., 1997; 1998). McCullough 
and his colleagues identify four broad categories of variables affecting forgiveness. The 
first category, called social-cognitive determinants, include such factors as affective 
empathy, rumination, and attribution of blame and intent. The second category represents 
offense related variables such as severity of the offense, and whether or not the offender 
apologized. Next the researchers take into account relational determinates such as 
relationship satisfaction, closeness, and commitment. The most distal set of factors 
outlined by McCullough and his colleagues are personality level determinants such as 
reasoning about forgiveness (based on Enright et at. 's 1989 developmental model), 
agreeableness, attitude towards revenge, and style of responding to anger. None of these 
variables have a clear relationship with unconscious processes or automaticity, and in 
testing their relationship to scores on the TRIM no attempt is made to measure 
unconscious aspects of any variable (McCullough et at. 1998). In addition, although the 
predictors of Revenge and A voidancelBenevolence are examined separately in 
McCullough and colleagues' studies, there is no attempt to conceptually or statistically 
consider the predictors of conflicted responses (i.e., individuals scoring high on both 
Revenge and Benevolence). 
Scobie and Scobie's multidimensional model of forgiveness. Scobie and Scobie 
(2002) offer what they term a "multidimensional" model of forgiveness. In order to create 
this model they made a list of components that they had seen frequently mentioned in the 
forgiveness literature and selected three phrases for each component that could be easily 
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associated with that component. These components included relationships, new 
beginning, guilt reduction, and condoning. An example of a phrase for new beginning 
would be "a new start." In two studies, they had participants rate the extent to which each 
of these phrases represented their understanding of forgiveness, both from the perspective 
of the forgiver and from the perspective of the forgiven. In a third study they added three 
more components (healing, religious, and legal), and then repeated the same basic 
process. The authors then examined the correlations between each component, but could 
not perform a factor analysis due to their limited sample size (for study 1, n = 39; for 
study 2, n = 63; and for study 3, n = 73). The relationships, healing, new beginning, and 
guilt release were determined to be core to forgiveness, and the religious, legal, and 
condoning components were designated non-core. 
I have taken note of this model because it is described as "multi-dimensional" 
suggesting that forgiveness may be conceived of as containing multiple parallel 
processes. Unlike the components described in Enright et al. 's model, Scobie and Scobie 
(2002) do not suggest any particular sequence through which each component takes 
place. Some of these components are clearly not processes, such as "relationships" and 
"religious"; however, it is possible that, for example, guilt release is seen as taking place 
before, after, or at the same time as healing or a new beginning. Thus, this model leaves 
open the possibility of forgiveness consisting of multiple parallel processes. However, 
Scobie and Scobie did not consider aspects of forgiveness processes such as 
consciousness and automaticity, and, because they provided the list of components 
themselves and the study was self-report, these aspects could not otherwise be 
discovered. 
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Concluding thoughts on current models of forgiveness. None of the models of 
forgiveness, including less influential models not described in this section, explicitly 
mention automaticity, consciousness, or parallel processing. Yet, authors describe 
relevant phenomena or processes that would be clarified if these concepts were made 
explicit. For example, Enright and his colleagues make reference to defense mechanisms 
in their description of what they call "pseudo-forgiveness." However, they do not 
explicitly acknowledge that this means that unconscious processes occurring parallel with 
consciousness must playa role in the likelihood of an individual forgiving. Given that 
this is not made explicit, there can be no attempt to apply a modem understanding of the 
unconscious to forgiveness. 
This is of particular concern because the concept of defense mechanisms was 
created based on a psychodynamic understanding of the unconscious which lacks many 
of the advantages of a modem understanding of the unconscious. Further, by referring to 
a psychodynamic understanding of the unconscious researchers neglect the body of 
research that has been conducted based on a modem understanding of the unconscious. In 
addition, each of the models described speak of multiple processes, but provide no model 
by which to understand how they interact. Further, the models specifically fail to 
acknowledge the possibility of engaging in multiple processes at the same time, either 
implying that only one process is undergone at any given time, or by not addressing this 
matter at all. 
It is clear that there are many ways in which dual-process theory may inform 
research in forgiveness. By describing the relationship between conscious and 
unconscious processes it may allow us to better understand how we can address 
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components of forgiveness which exist in one System versus the other, and how different 
components of forgiveness are likely to affect each other. To adequately measure these 
different components or types of forgiveness, it is important for authors to make explicit 
whether or not certain processes are conscious or unconscious. 
The Current Study 
The purpose of the proposed study is to investigate the relevance of dual-process 
theory to forgiveness research by establishing whether or not processing in each system 
plays a role in forgiveness. This represents a first step in a program of research that may 
help to create an understanding of differences in the definition of forgiveness, and to 
design effective practices involving forgiveness in clinical practice. 
How might one establish that both systems playa role in forgiveness? An 
individual with a strong interest in external validity might be tempted to immediately 
look for evidence of each of the systems in the experiences of individuals who have 
recently experienced a transgression in real life. However, if participants were asked to 
relate their thoughts and feelings about their actual experiences with forgiveness or non-
forgiveness it would be difficult or impossible to determine how System I and System 2 
processes played a role in these experiences. For example, during the delay in between 
the time they had this experience and their participation in the study, conclusions drawn 
from System 2 processing could have become ingrained in Systeml processing through 
automatization, and associations or behaviours created by System I processing may have 
been rationalized (resulting in confabulation) and/or reflected upon through System 2 
processing. Thus, it would be impossible to establish the origin of any thought, feeling, or 
behaviour. The argument that both implicit reactions (driven by System I processing), 
and analytic reasoning (through System 2 processing), were involved in a participant's 
account of how they came to forgive or not forgive could therefore be rebutted by the 
argument that both the reactions and reasoning may have actually originated from 
processing within a single system. 
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The alternative to working with individuals' actual experiences with forgiveness 
is to present them with a hypothetical scenario in which a transgression occurs at their 
expense. The challenge presented by this approach is that the majority of heuristics and 
associations used by System 1 processing that would normally exist in such a situation 
(what we might consider "System 1 content"), such as the individual's associations with 
the transgressor, would be absent, and any associations that did exist would be 
indistinguishable from a belief created through System 2 processing. 
The solution to this problem is to experimentally create associations for System 1 
processing to draw upon. Associations that are highly relevant to forgiveness might 
include a participant's associations with the offender. A potential confound would be 
introduced if an association was formed in such a way that it also caused participants to 
form corresponding beliefs that could direct System 2 processing. For example, if 
participants were to form a negative association with an offender by being assigned a 
poor grade on a joint task with the offender they might also believe that the offender was 
less competent, less valuable as a friend, and therefore not worth the effort required to 
forgive. Thus, a form of conditioning was used to create positive or negative associations 
with the offender. To remove any doubt that corresponding System 2 relevant content 
was not created simultaneously, this conditioning used subliminal stimuli. 
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Several studies have successfully conditioned attitudes or behaviours using 
subliminal stimuli (Bunce, et aI., 1999; De Houwer, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1994; De 
Houwer, Hendrickx, & Baeyens, 1997; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Krosnick, Betz, Jussim, & 
Lynn, 1992). The conditioning phase of the study will closely resemble the study 
conducted by Krosnick et aI. (1992). In the past this study has received criticism because 
participants were presented with only positive or negative unconditioned stimuli (US), 
rather than both, leaving open the possibility the researchers may have only primed 
mood, which in turn affects evaluation, rather than conditioned the participants 
(Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). For the current study this distinction is not of great 
consequence as both priming and conditioning may be considered System 1 processes. 
For half of the participants, photographs of a hypothetical transgressor will be 
paired with subliminal presentations of stimuli found to elicit positive affect. For the 
other half of the participants, the same photographs of the hypothetical transgressor will 
be paired with subliminal presentations of stimuli found to elicit negative affect. It should 
be kept in mind that even if the stimuli were not subliminal, there is no reason to believe 
that the conditioning process would result in System 2 generated beliefs. That is because 
there is no rational or otherwise rule-based reasoning that would result in the conclusion 
that someone is bad or less deserving of forgiveness because photographs of them were 
displayed shortly after viewing photographs of unpleasant stimuli. 
System 2 processing, but not System 1 processing, depends on working memory, 
thus researchers may use what is referred to as "working memory load" (WML) to isolate 
System 1 processes (Bargh & Tota, 1988; Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; De Neys, 
2006; Logan, 1979; Sloman, 1996). In studies using WML, participants are asked to 
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memorize a piece of information in order to keep the working memory occupied, such as 
the pattern of dots in a 3X3 grid, or a series of digits. Because System 2 processing 
requires working memory, System 2 processing will be attenuated to the extent that 
working memory is no longer available. Tasks that are successfully completed during 
WML can be assumed to have been performed largely through System 1 processing. 
In the current study, I will use WML to create a reliance on System 1 processing 
amongst half of the participants. Thus, half of the participants, in the WML condition, 
will be asked to consider forgiveness when they can only use System 1, and half of the 
participants, in the no-WML condition, would be able to consider forgiveness with both 
systems. The differences in the performance between participants with WML and 
participants without WML can then be attributed to System 2. Currently, there is no 
reason to believe that having the ability to fully use System 2 processing will lead 
individuals to be more or less forgiving. However, if System 2 has access to WML it 
would be able to regulate System 1 responses as suggested by researchers positing what 
Gilbert (1999) termed a "corrective design". Thus, participants in the no-WML condition 
may use System 2 processing to reason that forgiveness should not be determined by an 
impulse of unknown origin (the association created, unbeknownst to them through 
subliminal conditioning). Reasons to forgive or not to forgive are equally likely to be 
created by System 2 at this time, leaving less variance in forgiveness to be determined by 
System 1 processes. Thus, although we cannot test whether or not System 2 processes 
have direct effects on forgiveness in the current study, we can test the role of System 2 
processing as a moderator of System 1 processing's effects on forgiveness. 
46 
In the current study I used a GolNo-Go Association Task (GNAT; Nozek & 
Banaji, 2001) to implicitly measure attitudes towards the transgressor. This measure may 
act as an additional manipulation check for the conditioning phase of the study and help 
illuminate how System 1 processes relate to explicit measures of forgiveness. If 
conditioning operates, and affects forgiveness, by creating implicit associations, this 
should be observed as a difference in implicit attitude between affective conditions. The 
GNAT, like its predecessor the Implicit Association Test (lA T), is capable of assessing 
cognitive associations held by a participant without the need for the participant to be 
aware of either the associations or the purpose of the task. Thus, the task can assess 
attitudes activated through System 1, without interference from System 2. Unlike the 
lAT, the GNAT is capable of examining automatic attitudes towards a single target 
category free of context, rather than an attitude toward one target relative to a second 
target. For example, the GNAT can determine if someone has a positive attitude toward 
fruit, rather than that they simply have a better attitude towards fruit than they do towards 
insects, and thus has been recommended as an alternative to the lA T for use when a 
target has no obvious comparison group (Nosek et aI., 2007). 
The principle behind the GNAT is that if presented with three or four stimuli that 
one must respond to, it should be easier to remember to give the same response to two 
related stimuli, than to remember to give the same response to two unrelated stimuli. 
Here the category (e.g., fruit) that a researcher wishes to assess a participant's attitudes 
towards is referred to as the target category, and the traits (e.g., good and bad) that the 
researcher believes may represent the participant's attitude towards that target are called 
the attribute categories. Each GNAT generally requires two attribute categories that are 
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opposites of each other. During the GNAT, participants are rapidly presented with images 
or words from each category. In response to each stimulus the participant must give 
either a "Go" (e.g., pressing the spacebar) or a "No-Go" response (e.g., not pressing the 
spacebar). Participants are instructed to give their response to each stimulus as quickly as 
possible, and both reaction time and accuracy may be measured. Trials are divided into 
blocks allowing researchers to give different instructions for responses in each block, 
sometimes pairing the target category with one attribute together for a single response 
and other times pairing the target category with the opposite attribute. 
Shorter response times and better accuracy when the participant must give the 
same response to both the target and an attribute indicate a stronger association between 
the target and that attribute (usually the researcher will choose to examine just one: 
response time or accuracy). In the current study the target category was the transgressor, 
and the attribute categories were "Good" and "Bad." If participants took longer and made 
more errors when they were required to give the same response to both the transgressor 
and "Good" images as opposed to both the transgressor and "Bad" images this finding 
would indicate that the participants held negative associations with the transgressor. 
Summary of design and hypotheses. In sum, the current study investigates the 
roles of System 1 and System 2 in forgiveness using a 2 (positive vs. negative affect) X 2 
(WML vs. no-WML) between-subjects design. I designed the study based on three 
predictions derived from dual-process theory. These predictions can be understood at a 
conceptual and at an operational level. I will first outline these predictions conceptually, 
and then I will state my hypotheses at the operational level. 
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The implicit, unconscious processes of System I can have a direct impact on 
forgiveness (Hypothesis I below). Further, System 2 processing monitors System I 
responses, and inhibits them when necessary. When resources used by System 2 
processing are low, individuals will rely on automatic processing, allowing System I 
processing to contribute to the majority of variance in behavioural responses. However, 
when these same resources are plentiful, System 2 processing will reduce the impact of 
System I processing on behaviour when that impact is deemed inappropriate (Hypothesis 
2 below). Finally, the effects of System I processing can be determined by implicitly held 
associations, here created by conditioning (Hypothesis 3 below). Stated operationally my 
hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis I: There should be a main effect for affective condition (conditioning 
with positive valence vs. negative valence stimuli) such that those in the positive 
condition forgive more than those in the negative condition. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be an interaction in which WML condition will 
moderate the relationship between affective condition and forgiveness. Participants with 
WML in the positive affective condition will forgive more than those with WML in the 
negative condition. A smaller or non-significant difference in the same direction will be 
found between participants in the positive affective versus negative affective condition 
amongst those with no WML. Similarly, those in the positive affective condition with 
WML will forgive more than those in the positive affective condition with no WML, and 
those in the negative affective condition with WML will forgive less than those in the 
negative affective condition with no WML. 
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Hypothesis 3: Implicit attitude, as measured by the GNAT, will fully mediate the 
relationship between affective condition and forgiveness. If the relationship between 
affective condition and forgiveness is non-significant amongst participants without WML 
this hypothesis will be tested amongst participants in the WML condition alone. 
This mediation will be observed as follows. First, implicit attitude will correlate 
with affective condition such that those in the positive affective condition will have a 
more positive implicit attitude as compared to those in the negative affective condition. 
This will be indicated by shorter latencies in the positive affective condition when 
photographs of the offender and "good" stimuli require the same response, as compared 
to when photographs of the offender and "bad" stimuli require the same response 
(yielding higher residual R T or difference scores in the prior condition; see Method for 
details pertaining to this measure). Next, affective condition will correlate with 
forgiveness such that those in the positive affective condition will be more forgiving than 
those in the negative affective conditioning. Implicit attitude will also correlate positively 
with forgiveness after controlling for affective condition. After controlling for implicit 
attitude, however, the relationship between affective condition and forgiveness will no 
longer be significant. A Sobel test will then be used to test the significance of the indirect 
effect of affective condition on forgiveness via implicit attitude. 
In addition to evaluating these three hypotheses, exploratory analyses will also be 
used to examine the relationships between self-report (explicit) measures of the cognitive, 
affective, and behavioural components of attitudes towards the offender when 
considering forgiveness, and System 1 versus System 2 processing. It has been suggested 
that affect is more strongly related to System 1 processing, whereas System 2 processing 
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relies solely on cognition. As such we might expect that self-reported affective attitude 
towards the offender may correlate more strongly with implicit attitude than self-reported 
cognitive attitude would correlate with implicit attitude (which could potentially have a 
large System 2 component). 
Pilot Study 1 
The purpose of the fIrst pilot study was to select stimuli that could be used for the 
affective conditioning phase of the study. 
Method 
Participants. I recruited 24 participants through a psychology research 
participation website, through posters placed throughout a midsized university in Ontario, 
Canada, and by word of mouth (18 women, 6 men; Mage = 22.29, SD = 5.76, range = 
17-47). Participants received course credit or $5 for their time. 
Procedure and materials. I presented all questions by computer. Copies of all 
measures can be found in Appendix A. Responses could be entered by keyboard or 
mouse. I tested participants individually or in groups of 2 to 4. After they had read and 
signed the consent form I directed each participant to the next available computer. When 
participants arrived at the computers the following instructions were displayed on the 
screen: 
Welcome to the study. 
Please remember you may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. 
To skip an item hold down "Ctrl" and press the right arrow key. 
Please press the spacebar to continue. 
When the spacebar was pressed the following text was displayed on the screen: 
We are now going to show you some pictures of a woman going about her daily 
activities. Please watch these pictures in a relaxed but attentive manner. Each 
picture will be exposed for a very short interval. It is important that you keep your 
eyes on the center of the screen in between slides so that you can see as many 
details as possible when the next slide appears. The purpose of this slideshow is to 
get you to form a broad impression of the woman as though you have known her 
for some time. 
Please press the space bar to continue. 
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I adapted this description from Krosnick et al. (1992, p.155). The computers presented 
each participant with one set of 30 photographs of one woman performing various 
activities that are common in everyday life, and then a second nearly identical set of 30 
photographs of a second woman performing the same activities. In the conditioning phase 
of the main study, I used one of these sets of photographs to represent the offender in the 
hypothetical scenario also presented in the main study. I had participants rate the second 
set of photographs so that I could use it in place of the first set if the first set elicited 
extreme ratings from participants, or I could use it as a comparison group in the GNAT if 
required. The computers presented each photo for 2 seconds, followed by a 1 second 
interval. Following the presentation of each set of photographs, the computers presented 
participants with the following questions in a random order: 
Based on these photos, how LIKEABLE is the woman depicted? 
Based on these photos, how FAMILIAR is the woman depicted? 
Based on these photos, how ATTRACTNE is the woman depicted? 
Each question was accompanied by a 7 point rating scale, with the anchor ''Not [target 
trait] at all" at 1, and the anchor "Very [target trait]" at 7. After each set of ratings, the 
computer presented each participant with a photograph of the face of the woman depicted 
in the set of photograph they had just rated. This reference photo would be presented 
with, and referred to, in all questionnaires regarding the hypothetical offender during the 
main study. The computers instructed participants to rate this photo on the same three 
scales. 
Next participants rated 50 photographs that could potentially be used as pleasant 
and unpleasant affective stimuli for the main study: 25 I believed to be pleasant, and 25 I 
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believed to be unpleasant. The computers displayed these pleasant and unpleasant 
photographs in a single set in a random order. The computers instructed participants to 
rate each photograph based on their initial reaction as to how pleasant or unpleasant it 
was on a scale of 1, "Extremely Unpleasant", to 12, "Extremely Pleasant". Each 
photograph and rating scale remained on the screen until the participant rated the 
photograph or indicated that they wished to skip to the next item. I took the photographs 
that I used for the potential affective stimuli from a popular photo sharing website 
(www.flickr.com). I chose each photo based on two criteria: it contained either strongly 
pleasant or strongly unpleasant content, and it had a Creative Commons copyright 
license. 
Finally, the computers instructed participants to indicate their ages and sexes 
before being debriefed. 
Results 
For all studies (including the main study), I used mean scores on each scale in the 
analyses (rather than total scores) so that participants missing less than 10% of items on a 
scale could be retained without these missing items affecting their scores. The means and 
standard deviations for the ratings of the photographs of the women are displayed in 
Table 1. I selected the set of photographs of Woman 1 to be used to represent the 
offender in the main study. Mean pleasantness ratings for the 50 affective stimuli ranged 
from to 10.79 to 1.42. I initially selected stimuli based on two criteria. I chose those with 
the highest and lowest pleasantness ratings (rounded to the nearest integer) as the 10 
positive and 10 negative affect stimuli respectively. In the case that multiple stimuli had 
the same mean rating, I selected the stimulus with the smallest standard deviation. 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Trait Ratings of Offender Stimuli 
Woman 1 Woman 2 
Set of Photos Reference Set of Photos Reference 
Photo Photo 
Trait M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
Likeable 5.42 (0.93) 4.96 (0.91) 5.12 (1.08) 4.38 (1.06) 
Familiar 4.58 (0.93) 4.62 (1.14) 4.96 (1.08) 4.12 (1.36) 
Attractive 5.17 (0.96) 5.08 (0.78) 4.79 (1.02) 4.13 (0.95) 
Note. N= 24. 
During preparation for the subliminal conditioning phase of Pilot Study 2, one of 
the selected positive affective stimuli, showing a baby's face, appeared to be more easily 
identified when exposed for less than 50ms as compared to other stimuli. I therefore 
replaced this stimulus with one of the next highest rated stimuli. I chose the replacement 
stimulus over others with the same pleasantness rating because it was unambiguous and 
because it had no readily identifiable features when displayed for less than 50ms. The 
means and standard deviations of the pleasantness ratings for both initially and finally 
selected stimuli are provided in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations of Pleasantness Ratings for Affective Stimuli 
Stimulus 
Valence M (SD) 
Positivea 10.79 (1.47) 
Positive 10.54 (1.28) 
Positive 10.50 (1.62) 
Positive 10.38 (1.47) 
Positive 10.17 (1.99) 
Positive 9.96 (2.44) 
Positive 9.87 (2.38) 
Positive 9.79 (1.50) 
Positive 9.67 (2.62) 
Positive 9.50 (3.l3) 
Positiveb 9.17 (1.61) 
Negative 2.46 (1.53) 
Negative 2.42 (1.47) 
Negative 2.38 (1.56) 
Negative 2.21 (1.41) 
Negative 1.96 (1.30) 
Negative 1.83 (1.20) 
Negative 1.75 (1.22) 
Negative 1.62 (0.92) 
Negative 1.58 (1.02) 
Negative 1.42 (0.93) 
Note. N=24 
BExcluded from the final selection of affective stimuli because it was more easily identified as compared to 
other stimuli when exposed for under 50ms 
bReplaced stimulus referred to in note a in the final selection 
Pilot Study 2 
The initial purpose of the second pilot study was to test if the conditioning phase 
of the study would be effective. A second purpose for the second study arose from the 
development of the GNAT. Although I had considered a more traditional format for the 
GNAT, using two sets of target stimuli, I decided that the most appropriate format for the 
GNAT was the context-free format described in Nosek and Banaji (2001). This would 
mean that instead of using two sets of photographs of women, yielding a measurement of 
relative attitude to each woman, I used a single set of photographs representing the 
offender in our hypothetical transgression. This introduced a methodological issue. 
Initially, I had intended to use the same wordlists used in Nosek and Banaji 
(2001) to represent the attribute concepts of "good" and ''bad.'' However, I was 
concerned that if the only stimuli in the GNAT that were photographs were the stimuli 
representing the offender, participants would learn to discriminate between the stimuli 
based on whether each stimulus was a photograph or a word, not based on the content of 
the stimuli and what they represent. This would result in the GNAT measuring 
participants' attitudes towards photographs, as compared to words, rather than their 
implicit attitudes towards the offender. Thus, I had a set of photographs rated by the 
participants in the second pilot study so that they could be used to represent the concep :s 
of "good" and "bad" in the GNAT in the main study. 
In addition, I used the second pilot study to ensure that the programming for a 
forced choice identification task was running smoothly. The forced choice identification 
task is a task designed to determine the extent to which individuals are aware of and can 
identify stimuli that are exposed for a brief interval. Tasks such as this one have been 
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used in past studies involving conditioning with subliminal stimuli (e.g., Bunce et aI., 
1999; Krosnick et aI., 1992). 
Please note, to simplify instructions and make the hypothetical scenario used in 
the main study more personal, I gave the name "Patricia" to the woman depicted in the 
conditioning phase of the pilot studies and main study, and who was the offender in the 
hypothetical transgression in the main study. 
Method 
Participants. I recruited 42 participants through a psychology research 
participation website, through posters that I placed throughout a midsized university in 
Ontario, Canada, and byword of mouth (37 women, 5 men; Mage = 20.64, SD = 5.76, 
range = 17-47). Participants received course credit or $10 for their time. 
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Materials. I adapted scales measuring affective, cognitive, and general attitude 
towards the offender from Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty's (1994) multi-response checklist 
scales. These scales were designed by Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty to allow researchers to 
make direct comparisons between them and examine the relative effects of cognitive 
versus affective attitudes. For the general attitude scale the computers provided the 
instructions "Please indicate whether or not each word describes your general evaluation 
of PATRICIA by clicking on the corresponding number." The computers displayed the 
same instructions for the affective and cognitive scales, with the exception that the words 
"your general evaluation of PATRICIA" were replaced with the words "your feelings 
towards PATRICIA" and "traits belonging to Patricia," respectively. Example items from 
the general scale include "Bad" and "Positive," examples of items from the affective 
scale include "Hateful" and "Relaxed," and example items from the cognitive scale 
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include "Foolish" and "Valuable." The computers instructed participants to indicate if 
each item definitely described, slightly described, did not describe, or did not apply to 
Patricia or their feelings or attitudes towards her. On the display, these options 
corresponded to the labels 2, 1, ° or NA, however, I scored positively valenced items 2, 
1, 0, and 0, respectively, and negatively valenced items -2, -1, 0, and 0, respectively. 
Therefore, higher scores on each of these scales indicate a more positive attitude towards 
Patricia. Cronbach's alpha in the current sample was .78 for the general attitude scale, .83 
for the affective attitude scale, and .80 for the cognitive attitude scale. 
I used the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) to 
measure mood. The BMIS requires a participant to rate how well each word in a list of 16 
adjectives describes the mood that the participant is presently experiencing. The 
participant can select from the responses "DefInitely Do Not Feel," "Do Not Feel," 
"Slightly Feel," or "DefInitely Feel." These terms corresponded to the letters XX, X, V, 
and VV, respectively, on the display and I scored them 1 through 4 (negatively valenced 
items were reverse scored), respectively. Higher scores indicate a more positively 
valenced mood. Example items include "Content," "Grouchy," "Loving," and "Fed up." 
Cronbach's alpha in the current sample was .80. 
I used a single question to assess the extent to which participants attended to the 
affective stimuli during the conditioning phase of the study. This question read "If you 
found yourself in the distractor condition, were you able to dis attend to the images when 
they appeared on the screen, or did you find they grabbed your attention?" and 
participants could respond "I was not in the distractor condition," "Yes, I was able to 
ignore the distractor images," or ''No, I could not stop looking at the distractor images." I 
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reasoned that those participants who did not believe themselves to be in the distractor 
condition must not have consciously perceived the affective stimuli (described as 
distractor images in the instructions), and, therefore, were unable to attend to them. 
I used four items to assess participants' subjective awareness of the affective 
stimuli. Following the example of previous studies that used subliminal stimuli (De 
Houwer et aI., 1997; Dijksterhuis, 2004), the computers presented all participants with 
the question "Did you see anything strange during the slideshow?" (The conditioning 
phase of the study had been called a slideshow in the instructions.) Ifparticipants 
responded "Yes," the computer displayed the instructions "Please describe what you saw 
that was strange," so that it could be determined if participants were referring to the 
affective stimuli or another aspect of the study. Ifparticipants responded ''No,'' the 
computers immediately presented the next question. The next question, posed to all 
participants, was "Did you see any images flash on the screen before the target and the 
images of Patricia?" If participants responded "Yes" the computers prompted them to 
describe the images that they saw, and if participants responded ''No'' the computers 
immediately presented the next task in the study. Using both questions provided me with 
the ability to determine the amount of prompting required for participants to recall the 
appearance of affective stimuli. 
Procedure. I presented all questions by computer. Responses could be entered by 
keyboard or mouse. I tested participants individually or in groups of two to seven. After 
they had read and signed the consent forms, I directed each participant to a computer. 
The computers displayed the following instructions in the first three slides: 
This study will be examining the relationship between impression formation and 
mood. Many past studies have used stories or scenarios; however, the problem 
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with this is that they may be perceived as artificial. In this study, to make this 
more realistic, you will be watching a slideshow that simulates past experience in 
a relationship with an individual. The slide show will consist of photographs of a 
person, named PATRICIA, going about her daily activities. Please watch these 
pictures in a relaxed but attentive manner. 
Each slide will be exposed for a very short interval. It is important that you keep 
your eyes on the center of the screen between slides so that you can see as many 
details as possible when the next slide appears. A cross hair will appear on the 
screen between images to help you maintain focus. The cross hair will appear on a 
swirled background used to prepare your vision for the next slide (pictured 
below). You may ignore this swirled image. 
Since we are also interested in the role of attention some participants will be in 
what we call "the distractor condition." For these participants the slideshow will 
serve a second purpose: to test the effects of distractions. In this condition, various 
images will be randomly flashed for very short intervals during the slideshow. If 
you find yourself in this condition it is your task to ignore these images as best 
you can. Remember, the main purpose of this slide show is to get you to form a 
broad impression of Patricia as if you had known her for some time. 
Please press the spacebar to continue. 
When participants indicated their readiness, the computers displayed the 30 images 
selected to represent Patricia for 2 seconds each, with a 1 second interstimulus interval. 
An affective stimulus preceded each for 30ms (±4), depending on the refresh rate of the 
individual computer screen, followed by a 500ms exposure of the mask. I chose this 
display time for the affective stimuli because it was the minimum display time allowed 
by hardware and software limitations. It is within a 13-55ms rule of thumb used for 
display times for subliminal primes; however, the appropriate display time can vary by 
stimulus, mask, and participant (Epley, n.d.). For half of the participants, assigned to the 
positive affective condition, the computers displayed the pleasant affective stimuli, and 
for half of the participants, assigned to the negative affective condition, the computers 
displayed the unpleasant affective stimuli. 
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Next, participants completed the affective, cognitive, and general attitude 
questionnaires in random order. Then participants completed the mood scale, the 
attention questionnaire, and the subjective awareness questionnaire in this order. In the 
main study, the mood scale was to be used to determine if the effects of the conditioning 
phase on attitude towards Patricia or forgiveness was mediated by mood, and I would use 
the attention questionnaire to determine if attention moderated the effects of the 
conditioning phase of the study. I included a measure of sUbjective awareness in the main 
study because it could impact the development of theory, and because such measures are 
commonly used in studies involving subliminal conditioning (e.g., Bunce et aI., 1999; 
Dijksterhuis, 2004; Krosnick et aI., 1992). I included these last three questionnaires in the 
pilot studies to provide an opportunity to identify any potential problems with the scales 
(e.g., if participants found the wording of an item confusing, or if the computer did not 
properly record their responses), and therefore I did not analyze them. 
Participants then completed the forced choice identification task. Recall that this 
task was to be used to determine if the affective stimuli used during the conditioning 
phase of the main study could be identified by participants. It could be reasoned that if 
participants can correctly identify stimuli similar to the affective stimuli exposed for the 
same amount of time during this task, they are likely to have been able to identify the 
affective stimuli used during the conditioning phase of the study. During each trial of the 
task, the computers exposed one of two photographs (one of a kitten and one of a snake) 
for approximately 30ms (depending on the refresh rate of each individual computer 
screen; the same amount of time that each of the affective stimuli were exposed during 
conditioning phase of the study) and the computers prompted participants to guess which 
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photograph it was. Each time the computers exposed the photograph it was followed by a 
500ms exposure of the same mask used during the conditioning phase of the study. The 
computers displayed this mask before the forced choice identification task began and 
instructed participants to ignore its appearance on the screen. 
During the first stage, consisting of 20 trials, the computers only informed 
participants that one photograph was of a kitten and that the other photograph was of a 
snake by written instruction. Before the second 20-trial stage of the task, the computers 
displayed each of the two photographs and allowed participants to examine them for as 
long as the participants desired. I included this task in this pilot study only to ensure that 
the programming was running as intended and therefore did not analyze it. 
Next participants rated the potential attribute stimuli for the GNAT. The 
computers displayed each photograph one at a time and instructed participants to indicate 
the extent to which they could quickly and easily categorize it as "good" or "bad". The 
response scale, ranging from "Very Clearly Bad" at 1 to "Very Clearly Good" at 10, 
remained on the screen with each stimulus until the participant made their selection. 
Finally, the computers instructed participants to indicate their ages and sexes 
before I debriefed them. 
Results 
Participants in the positive and negative affective conditions did not significantly 
differ in their scores on any of the attitude scales; for cognitive attitude t(40) = -1.57,p = 
.124; for affective attitude t(40) = -1.14,p = .262; for general attitude t(40) = -0.67,p = 
.506 (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). 
Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Attitude Scales Across Condition in Pilot Study 2 
Condition 
Attitude Positive Negative 
Scale 
n=22 n=20 
M(SD) M(SD) 
Cognitive 0.41 (0.33) 0.55 (0.25) 
Affective 0.25 (0.32) 0.36 (0.26) 
General 0.47 (0.38) . 0.54 (0.31) 
Note. N = 42. Cognitive = cognitive attitude towards Patricia; Affective = affective attitude towards 
Patricia; General = general attitude towards Patricia. 
The majority of the participants indicated that they did not see or were unable to 
identify the affective stimuli. Several others mentioned images that were not shown or 
other things seen during the slideshow (e.g., images of Patricia, or the cross-hair). Five 
participants gave responses that could refer to an affective image. For example, one 
participant responded "thought i saw someone walking down the street" and a second 
participant responded "couples other strangers." One of the affective stimuli was an 
image of a couple walking down a street. 
Discussion 
As mean scores on the attitude scales did not significantly differ between 
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conditions I determined that the conditioning phase of the second pilot study, intended to 
manipUlate implicit associations, had failed. In order to correct this problem I adopted an 
alternative approach to creating conditioned associations for the third pilot study. Recall, 
that although using subliminal stimuli for the conditioning is the clearest approach to 
creating System 1 content, any effect of repeatedly pairing affective stimuli with 
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photographs of a hypothetical offender on forgiveness would have to occur through 
System I processing. This is because there is no rational or rule-based reason that one 
should choose (as System 2 processes are deliberate) to be more or less forgiving after 
seeing stimuli paired in this way. Therefore, I decided to attempt to create the required 
(for the purposes of the main study) associations using affective stimuli that could easily 
be observed at a conscious level. I conducted the third pilot study in order to determine if 
this alternate form of conditioning would be effective. 
Pilot Study 3 
Method 
Participants. I recruited 48 participants through a psychology research 
participation website, through posters that I placed throughout a midsized university in 
Ontario, Canada, and by word of mouth (38 women, 9 men, 1 did not indicate sex; Mage 
= 20.56, SD = 2.29, range = 18-28). Participants received course credit or $10 for their 
time. 
Procedure. The third pilot study followed the same procedure as the second with 
the following exceptions. First, the computers displayed the affective stimuli for 1 second 
each. Second, as these stimuli were no longer intended to be subliminal, no mask was 
used or mentioned in the instructions. Third, in Pilot Study 2, affective stimuli had been 
displayed before stimuli representing the offender to replicate Krosnick et al. 's (1992) 
methodology using subliminal stimuli; however, unconditioned stimuli more traditionally 
follow conditioned stimuli. Thus, computers displayed the affective stimuli in Pilot Study 
3 after the photos of the offender rather than before. Finally, participants did not rate 
stimuli intended for the GNAT. 
Results 
Participants in the positive and negative affective conditions did not significantly 
differ in their scores on any of the attitude scales; for cognitive attitude t( 46) = 0.14, p = 
.887; for affective attitude t( 46) = 0.22, p = .825; for general attitude t(46) = 0.50, p = 
.620 (see Table 4 for means and standard deviations). 
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations for Attitude Scales Across Condition in Pilot Study 3 
Attitude 
Scale 
Cognitive 
Affective 
General 
Condition 
Positive 
n=24 
M(SD) 
0.55 (0.28) 
0.37 (0.30) 
0.55 (0.21) 
Negative 
n=24 
M(SD) 
0.54 (0.30) 
0.35 (0.35) 
0.52 (0.29) 
Note. N = 48. Cognitive = cognitive attitude towards Patricia; Affective = affective attitude towards 
Patricia; General = general attitude towards Patricia. 
Discussion 
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The conditioning phase of Pilot Study 3 failed to produce the required effects. In 
an attempt to remedy this problem, I selected new affective stimuli, which had been 
standardized and rated in multiple previous studies, from the international affective 
picture system (lAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) for use in the main study. As 
these standardized stimuli were more likely to reliably evoke the same emotional 
reactions across participants as compared to stimuli only rated in a single pilot study (as 
our potential attribute stimuli for the GNAT had been), I chose stimuli from the lAPS for 
use as the attribute stimuli in the GNAT as well. I also decided to use the originally 
planned subliminal conditioning in the main study because the third pilot study failed to 
provide evidence that conditioning would be more effective with consciously accessible 
stimuli. 
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Due to time restrictions, the altered method for creating conditioned attitudes 
could not be piloted. I ran several volunteers through parts of the procedure to assist in 
final adjustments before recruiting participants for the main study. I used this informal 
testing to adjust the instructions, stimuli, and timing of the GNAT to avoid unnecessary 
ambiguity, and to adjust the procedure used for the WML manipulation to encourage 
those in the WML condition to rehearse the numbers as intended. I asked some of these 
volunteers to complete the conditioning phase of the study to determine the visibility of 
the affective stimuli. These volunteers indicated that, although they could occasionally 
see that something was being displayed on the screen between some images of Patricia 
during the conditioning phase, the affective stimuli were not identifiable. 
Main Study 
Method 
Participants. I recruited 217 participants through a psychology research 
participation website, and through posters that I placed throughout a midsized university 
in Ontario, Canada (185 women, and 32 men; Mage = 19.65, SD = 2.60, range = 17-37; 
one participant did not indicate her age). After preliminary screening (see Results 
section), the fmal sample contained 149 participants (130 women, and 19 men; Mage = 
19.34, SD = 1.56, range = 18-25). Of the participants in the fmal sample, 133 (89.26%) 
were completing their bachelor degree, 82 (61.65 %) of which were in their first year. All 
participants had graduated from high school or an equivalent program that allowed them 
to enrol in post-secondary education. When asked for their religious background, 72 
reported that they were Catholic, 17 Protestant, 4 Eastern Orthodox, 4 Sikh, 3 Buddhist, 2 
Jewish, 2 Muslim, 1 Hindu, 20 reported another religious affiliation, and 43 indicated no 
religious affiliation (15 participants indicated two religious affiliations, one participant 
indicated five religious affiliations, and one participant indicated 6 religious affiliations). 
Participants received course credit for participation or $10 for their time. 
Materials. Cronbach's alpha in the main study was .86 for the BMIS, .80 for the 
general attitude scale, .84 for the affective attitude scale, and .79 for the cognitive attitude 
scale. In addition to the attitude, mood, attention, and subjective awareness 
questionnaires described in Pilot Study 2, I used several additional questionnaires in the 
main study. 
I constructed a scale measuring how participants believed they would behave 
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towards Patricia using the same format as the affective, cognitive, and general attitude 
scales. I created this measure, which I will refer to as the behaviour scale, as a parallel to 
the affective and cognitive attitude scales so that the relative roles of affect, cognition, 
and behaviour in forgiveness as well as in each of the two systems could be explored. For 
this scale, the computers instructed participants to "please indicate whether or not each 
word describes your future behaviour toward P ATRlCIA by clicking on the 
corresponding number." Example items include "Warm," and "Avoidant". Participants 
could choose from the responses "Definitely Describes My Behaviour," "Slightly 
Describes My Behaviour," "Does not Describe My Behaviour," and ''Not Applicable." 
On the display, these options corresponded to the labels 2, 1, 0 or NA, however, I scored 
positively valenced items 2, 1, 0, and 0, respectively, and negatively valenced items -2, -
1,0 and 0, respectively. Higher scores on this scale indicate more positive behaviour, 
towards Patricia. Cronbach's alpha in the current sample was .80. 
I used the I8-item Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory 
(TRIM; McCullough, & Hoyt, 2002; McCullough, Root, & Cohen, 2006)), which I 
altered to place the item "I forgive her for what she did to me" first (and all other items in 
random order), to measure forgiveness. The scores on the first item constituted the main 
dependent variable of interest: forgiveness as defined by the participant. I placed this item 
first to keep the other items from influencing how participants defined forgiveness (or 
communicating to the participants that I wanted it to be defined a certain way) when they 
answered this question. I also used the entire TRIM and both its (5 item) Revenge and 
(13 item) AvoidancelBenevolence subscales (based on the factor analysis in McCullough, 
Root, & Cohen, 2006) in my main analyses so that my [mdings could be easily compared 
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to other research that has used these scales (I will refer to the Avoidance-Benevolence 
subscale as just the Avoidance subscale for the remainder of this paper). For these scales, 
the computers instructed participants to rate their agreement with each item on a scale of 
1 to 5, 1 being "Strongly Disagree," and 5 being "Strongly Agree." Example items 
include "I wish something bad would happen to her," from the revenge subscale, and "I 
am trying to keep as much distance between us as possible" and "Even though her actions 
hurt me, 1 have goodwill for her" from the Avoidance subscale. For each of these 
forgiveness scales, higher scores indicate more forgiveness (or less avoidance or 
revenge). In the current sample, Cronbach's alpha was .90 for the entire questionnaire, 
.79 for the Revenge subscale, and .87 for the Avoidance subscale. 
1 created the working memory load maintenance questionnaire to measure the 
degree of effort required and put into memorizing the digits by mentally rehearsing them. 
It consisted of two items to be analyzed separately. The first item asked "How hard was it 
to remember the numbers you were asked to memorize?" providing a response scale from 
1 to 5, I being "Very Easy," and 5 being "Very Hard." For participants in the WML 
condition the second question asked "Were you rehearsing the numbers in your mind as 
you completed the study?" Keeping the numbers within one's working memory should 
only affect our results when done concurrently with the measures of interest, and the 
computers prompted participants in the no-WML condition to recall the numbers before 
they had completed any of these measures, so 1 changed the wording of this second item 
slightly for these participants. For participants in the no-WML condition, computers 
displayed the question "Were you rehearsing the numbers in your mind as you completed 
the study, even after you were asked to recall the numbers?" This item could then be used 
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to identify participants in the no-WML who continued to rehearse these numbers while 
completing the subsequent measures, simulating the WML condition, without being 
asked to do so. Participants in both conditions could choose from the responses ''No, or 
hardly at all," "Yes, once in a while," and "Yes, constantly, or almost constantly." When 
used as an ordinal scale, 1 scored these responses 1,2, and 3 respectively. 
1 used the Tendency to Forgive Scale (TTF; Brown, 2003), to measure individual 
differences in forgivingness for use as a control variable. This four item scale asks 
participants to.rate their agreement to statements on a seven point scale, anchored by 
"Strongly Disagree" at 1, and "Strongly Agree" at 7. Example items include "I tend to get 
over it quickly when someone hurts my feelings" and "I have a tendency to harbour 
grudges". Higher scores on this scale indicate a greater tendency to forgive. Cronbach's 
alpha in the current sample was .74. 
To assist in screening participants, 1 constructed the transgression comprehension 
scale to identify individuals who did not fully read or comprehend the hypothetical 
transgression. It asked first "in the offence described, what did Patricia offer to do for 
you?" and second "What distracted Patricia from doing what she said she would do?" 
using an open-ended response format for each. 
1 constructed a final questionnaire to assess several variables related to 
forgiveness and the transgression. The first item asked "'Forgiveness' Means different 
things to different people. What does it mean to you?" and provided a space for 
participants to describe their personal definitions of forgiveness. This questionnaire also 
included a measure of attitude towards forgiveness itself and a measure of attitude 
towards the nature of the transgression. The inclusion of these items provided the 
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opportunity to use them as control variables if necessary. One item asked "Independent of 
circumstance, how good or bad would you say forgiveness is in general?" to measure 
attitude towards forgiveness itself. Participants responded on a scale of 1 to 7, with the 
-
anchor "Very Bad" at 1, and "Very Good" at 7. Further, I used five items to measure 
attitude towards the nature of the transgression, using the same response scale as the 
attitude towards forgiveness item. Example items from this scale include "In general, 
how good or bad is it when a friend breaks a promise?" and "In general how good or bad 
is it when you miss out on an opportunity?" (reverse scored). Higher scores on this scale 
indicate a more positive (or less negative) attitude towards the nature of the transgression. 
The Cronbach's alpha for this scale was .59. It should be noted that the scale should not 
have high internal consistency because each item assesses attitude towards different 
aspects of the transgression. 
As experiences with a similar transgression might create associations with the 
nature of the transgression, and therefore affect forgiveness, two items inquired into such 
experiences. The first asked "Have you ever experienced an offence similar to that 
described in the study (i.e. has anyone behaved towards you as Patricia did in the story)?" 
to which participants could respond "Yes" or "No," (a space to explain how the 
transgression was similar was also provided for those who responded "Yes"). Participants 
who responded "Yes" then rated how hurtful this experience had been on a scale of 1 to 
5, 1 indicating ''Not at all [hurtful]", and 5 indicating "Very hurtful." When scoring, I 
collapsed the two items together such that I gave a score of 1 to participants who had 
indicated that they had not had such an experience, and gave the remaining participants a 
score corresponding to how hurtful their experience had been. 
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The remaining items asked participants about their experiences with forgiveness 
for exploratory analysis and future research. Two of these items asked participants to 
describe the last time they forgave and why, and the last time they did not forgive and 
why. Several items addressed experiences with inner conflict during forgiveness. The 
computers instructed participants to indicate if they had ever believed they had forgiven 
someone but found that they were still angry from time to time. The computers then 
instructed those who had answered "yes" to describe the experience, including whether or 
not it surprised or troubled them, whether it made them doubt if they had actually 
forgiven, and if experiencing mixed thoughts and feelings when forgiving was a common 
experience for them, using an open-ended response format. The computers then presented 
the same questions regarding an experience in which the participant thought they had not 
forgiven, but still felt love or affection for the offender from time to time. Next, the 
computers presented participants with the questions "When you forgive, do you 
ALWAYS feel that every part of you has forgiven" and "Once you have made a decision 
as to whether or not you forgive, do you find that all your thoughts and feelings agree?" 
For of these questions participants could respond "Yes, certainly," "I am not sure," or 
''No.'' 
The feedback questionnaire consisted of three items assessing participants' 
thoughts and beliefs about the study. 1 used the first two items to determine if participants 
suspected the true nature of the study, including the purpose of the conditioning phase of 
the study. These questions asked "What do you think was the purpose of this study?" and 
"What do you think are the researchers' hypotheses for this study?" The third item was 
used to determine if any participant had misunderstood the instructions in the study, and 
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to obtain suggestions for future research. This item instructed participants "We appreciate 
the time you have taken to complete this study. As our methods are constantly being 
developed we would be interested to hear any comments you have on the study or your 
experience of forgiveness. Please let us know if you found any of the directions 
confusing or if you feel we could have improved the study in another way". 
The demographics questionnaire inquired into the age, sex, education, marital 
status, citizenship, ethnicity, religion, and religiosity of each participant. To explain the 
need for such personal information participants were told the following: 
Thank you for participating in this research. Scientific journals require researchers 
to provide basic descriptions of participants, so that other scientists can judge how 
generalizable the results are. We would therefore appreciate receiving the 
following information about you before the study is complete. 
Procedure. For a flow chart of the procedure see Figure 1. I presented all 
questions by computer. Responses could be entered by keyboard or mouse. I tested 
participants in groups of 4 to 8. After participants had carefully read and signed the 
consent form, I directed each participant to a computer. All of the remaining instructions 
were displayed on the computer monitor until the participant was ready to be debriefed. 
( Positive Affective Condition }r-----.::::.. ~---{, Negative Affective Condition) 
Condition wi positive affective stimuli I Condition wi negative affective stimuli 
~ 
( 'VML Condition }--___ ~ 
__ ---{ No-\Vl\1L Condition) 
e to maintain numbers in Continu 
m 
20 Second Interval 
emory until recall then numbers recalled 
~~ 
l Present Hypothetical Transgression I 
~ 
Measure forgiveness, explicit attitudes (general, cognitive, 
affective, and behavioural in random order), then mood. 
( \Vl\1L Condition 
( No-WML Condition ) I I < Recall numbers 
~ 
'v 
l Measure implicit attitudes through GNAT I 
~-
Measure attention to affective stimuli then subjective awareness 
J, 
I Measure awareness objectively through Forced Choice Identification Task J 
Remaining measures 
Figure 1. Procedure for main study. 
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The first set of instructions, including text that I adapted from Krosnick et al. 
(1992, p.155), provided explanations for some of the tasks that would be performed, as 
well as the appearance of the affective stimuli used in the conditioning phase of the study 
(which were more likely to be perceived than those displayed for a shorter interval in 
Krosnick et aI., 1992). The majority of these explanations were false, meant to obscure 
the actual nature of the study. The instructions, displayed one paragraph at a time, were 
as follows: 
This study will be examining the effects of memory and previous relationships on 
forgiveness. Many studies of forgiveness ask you to imagine a story or scenario-
we will be doing that too. However, the problem with this approach is that it may 
be perceived as artificial. Therefore we would like to try and make it more real by 
having you watch a slideshow that simulates past experience in a relationship with 
an individual named Patricia. The slide show will consist of photographs of 
Patricia going about her daily activities. Please watch these pictures in a relaxed 
but attentive manner. 
Please press the spacebar to continue. 
Each slide will be exposed for a very short interval. It is important that you keep 
your eyes on the center of the screen between slides so that you can see as many 
details as possible when the next slide appears. A cross hair will appear on the 
screen between images to help you maintain focus. The cross hair will appear on a 
swirled background used to prepare your vision for the next slide (pictured 
below). You may ignore this swirled image. 
Please press the spacebar to continue. 
Since we are also interested in the role of attention some participants will be in 
what we call "the distractor condition." For these participants the slideshow will 
serve a second purpose: to test the effects of distractions. In this condition, 
various images will be randomly flashed for very short intervals during the 
slideshow. If you fmd yourself in this condition it is your task to ignore these 
images as best you can. Remember, the main purpose of this slide show is to get 
you to form a broad impression of Patricia as if you had known her for some time. 
Please press the spacebar to continue. 
The conditioning phase of the study then proceeded as described in Pilot Study 2, using 
the selected lAPS as affective stimuli (#1601, #1602, #2070, #2091, #4597, #4599, 
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#5010, #5870, #7270, and # 8120 for the positive affective condition, and #1300, #2900, 
#3010, #3053, #3160, #3261, #3300, #3400, #3550, and #9300 for the negative affective 
condition). 
Following the conditioning phase of the study, the computers instructed all 
participants to memorize a series of 10 random digits (the same digits were used for all 
participants) : 
We are now going to show you a series of numbers. Please memorize them. After 
you have completed a few other activities within the study we will ask you to 
recall as many of these numbers as possible in the order that they were presented 
to you. You may fmd it challenging, but try your best. 
The computers displayed the digits for one second each with a one second interstimulus 
interval. When participants indicated that they were ready, the computers displayed the 
numbers a second time. The computers then displayed the instructions "it is VERY 
important that you not forget these numbers until we ask you to recall them later in this 
study. Your performance will be evaluated based on the number of digits you can 
remember correctly. If you find you have forgotten some numbers please continue to 
keep the remaining numbers in your memory as best you can." I added these prompts to 
the procedure when volunteers failed to rehearse the numbers during the informal testing 
conducted after Pilot Study 3. The computers prompted half of the participants 
(approximately evenly split across affective condition), placed in the no-WML condition) 
to recall these digits after a 20 second interval. The computers prompted the remaining 
participants, placed in the WML condition, to recall the numbers towards the end of the 
study. Until this time, after each of the questionnaires the computers reminded the 
participants in the WML condition to not forget the numbers. 
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At this time the computers displayed the reference photograph of the woman 
depicted in conditioning phase of the study on the screen with the instructions "this is a 
photograph of Patricia, whom you saw in the slide show earlier in the study. Please 
imagine that Patricia is your friend and the following narrative has recently happened to 
you." The computers presented the following hypothetical transgression, adapted from 
the Transgression Narrative Test of Forgiveness (Berry, Worthington, Parrott, O'Connor, 
& Wade, 2001), to all participants: 
Your friend Patricia offers to drop off a job application for you at the post office 
by the deadline for submission. A week later, you get a letter from the potential 
employer saying that your application could not be considered because it was 
postmarked after the deadline and they had a very strict policy about this. Patricia 
said that she met an old friend, went to lunch, and lost track of time. When she 
remembered the package, it was close to closing time at the post office and she 
would have to have rushed frantically to get there; she decided that deadlines 
usually aren't that strictly enforced so she waited until the next morning to deliver 
the package. 
The computers then presented the instructions "The following questions refer to 
PATRICIA. Please keep her and the recent offense described in mind as you complete 
these questions" before presenting the measures of forgiveness and attitude. The 
computers presented the forgiveness measure ftrst, followed by the affective, cognitive, 
general and attitude measures, and the behaviour measure in random order. Each of these 
measures were accompanied by the reference photo of Patricia. After these measures 
were complete, the computers administered the mood scale. 
The computers then prompted participants in the WML condition to recall the 
numbers they had memorized. 
Next, a measure of implicit attitude towards Patricia was obtained. Before the 
GNAT began, the computers presented the participants with a simple task to get them 
used to the mechanics of the GNAT, and to get a baseline rate of how quickly each 
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participant could respond. The computers presented the following instructions "We will 
now begin with a simple task. Once you press the spacebar pictures of two shapes will be 
rapidly displayed on the screen in turn: a picture of a triangle and a picture of a rectangle. 
In this round we would like you to press the spacebar as fast as you can if you see a 
picture of a rectangle, and press nothing if you see a picture of a triangle. The word 
'rectangle' will remain at the top of the screen to remind you what you are looking for." 
The computers displayed small copies of the image of the white rectangle on a gray 
background, and the image of the white triangle on a gray background below the 
instructions for the participants' reference. 
The task proceeded as described with 20 trials in which the participant was to 
press the spacebar (the "Go response") in response to the rectangle, before the computers 
instructed the participants to switch and respond instead to the triangle for 20 trials. 
Detailed information on this task, including the number oftimes items from each 
category is displayed can be found in Table 5. For both this baseline task and the GNAT, 
the computers displayed a green circle on the screen for 500ms each time a participant 
made the correct response and displayed a red "x" on the screen for 500ms each time a 
participant made the incorrect response. 
80 
Table 5 
Summary of Design for Baseline Task 
Block Stimulus Required response Response deadline (ms) No. 
presented trials 
Block 1 20 
Rectangle Go 1200 10 
Triangle No-Go 1200 10 
Block 2 20 
Triangle Go 1200 10 
Rectangle No-Go 1200 10 
Total 40 
The GNAT that followed consisted of three practice blocks and two critical 
blocks. During one practice block the computers instructed the participants to give the Go 
response to photographs of Patricia and used images of "Good" and "Bad" things as 
distractor images requiring the No-Go Response. In another block "Good" images 
required a Go response and the computer used "Bad" images as distractors, and in a third 
block "Bad" images required a Go response and "Good" images a No-Go response. In 
each of the practice blocks the word "Patricia," "Good," or "Bad" remained at the top 
left comer of the screen to remind the participant which category required a Go response. 
Although the practice blocks were always presented before the critical blocks, the order 
of the individual blocks and the trials within them was randomized. 
During the two critical blocks the task became slightly more complex. Rather than 
giving the Go response to one category and the No-Go response to two, the computers 
instructed the participants to give the Go response to two categories and the No-Go 
response to one. During one block the computer assigned the Go response to the Patricia 
and "Good" categories, and during the other block the computer assigned the Go 
response to the Patricia and "Bad" categories. To allow participants to become 
accustomed to giving the Go response to two categories, and therefore to reduce error 
variance, each block began with 21 practice trials, which would not be used to calculate 
reaction time. 
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For the practice block the stimulus used to represent Patricia on all trials was the 
reference image presented throughout the explicit attitude measures. During the critical 
blocks (including the practice trials), the images of Patricia going about her day used 
during the conditioning phase represented Patricia. The same 10 positive valence lAPS 
images and 10 negative valence lAPS images represented "Good" and "Bad" throughout 
the practice blocks (randomized such that an image would only appear no more than once 
per block). Similarly, the same six images of Patricia appeared in both sets of practice 
trials. The 15 negative and 15 positive valence IAPS images used during the practice 
trials were separate images from those used during the critical trials. 
Following the advice of Nosek and Banaji (2001), I set the response deadlines for 
critical trials requiring a Go response to twice the length as those trials requiring a No-Go 
response. This allowed for a larger range ofRT scores (by including slower Go 
responses), while encouraging participants to continue to respond as quickly as possible 
due to the speed of the No-Go response trials. Detailed information on the GNAT, 
including response deadlines, can be found in Table 6. 
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Table 6 
Summary of Design for GNAT 
Block Stimuli Required Response 
Trial Type presented response deadline (ms) No. trials 
Practice Block 1 20 
Patricia Go 1200 10 
Good No-Go 1200 5 
Bad No-Go 1200 5 
Practice Block 2 20 
Good Go 1200 10 
Bad No-Go 1200 10 
Practice Block 3 20 
Bad Go 1200 10 
Good No-Go 1200 10 
Critical Block 1 105 
Practice Trials Patricia Go 1200 6 
Good Go 1200 6 
Bad No-Go 600 9 
Critical Trials Patricia Go 1200 24 
Good Go 1200 24 
Bad No-Go 600 36 
Critical Block 2 105 
Practice Trials Patricia Go 1200 6 
Bad Go 1200 6 
Good No-Go 600 9 
Critical Trials Patricia Go 1200 24 
Bad Go 1200 24 
Good No-Go 600 36 
Total 270 
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Participants then completed the working memory load maintenance questionnaire, 
the attention questionnaire, the subjective awareness questionnaire, the forced choice 
identification task (described in Pilot Study 2), the tendency to forgive scale, the 
transgression comprehension questionnaire, and the final questionnaire on experiences 
and attitudes related to forgiveness, in the stated order. The computers prompted 
participants to indicate if they had ever known someone named Patricia before instructing 
participants to complete the feedback and demographics questionnaires. Finally, the 
computers instructed participants to report back to the researcher (myself) to be 
debriefed. Copies of all questionnaires can be found in Appendix A. 
I had the measures presented in this order to preserve the integrity of those 
measures most central to the study. For example, it is possible that the effects of the 
experimental manipulations would degrade over time. Thus, to increase the likelihood 
that these effects would still be captured by the forgiveness measure, which addresses the 
main questions posed by this research, the forgiveness measures were the first to be 
presented after the transgression. Further, by presenting the main dependent measures 
before the GNAT, I avoided the possibility that the GNAT would alter the effects of the 
conditioning phase of the study, as, much like the conditioning phase of the study, the 
GNAT involves presenting pleasant and unpleasant photographs and photographs of the 
transgressor in rapid succession. 
Results 
Please note that, as in the pilot studies, I used mean scores on each scale in all 
analyses (rather than total scores) so that participants missing less than 10% of items on a 
scale could be retained without these missing items greatly affecting their scores. 
84 
Preliminary analyses. Before performing the analyses of interest, I screened the 
data for cases that could potentially affect the accuracy of the results, and tested the 
assumptions required for these analyses. I have described this screening in the following 
sections. 
Univariate outliers. I screened relevant variables (the single-item forgiveness 
scale, the TRIM, the Revenge and Avoidance subscales of the TRIM, the BIS, the 
Tendency to Forgive Scale, the measure of experience with the transgression type, the 
attitude towards the transgression type measure, the measure of attitude towards 
forgiveness, the behaviour scale, and the measures of affective, cognitive and general 
attitude towards Patricia) for univariate outliers, separately for each of the four 
conditions, and across all conditions. I identified scores as potential outliers if they had z-
scores with absolute values larger than 3.3 and were at least one half standard deviations 
from the next furthest point from the mean. For single-item scales, I also required that a 
score be at least 2 response levels from the next nearest score to be considered a potential 
outlier. 
I identified one outlier on the BMIS within the negative affect and WML 
conditions which had a z-score of -3.41 and a mean of 1.38. I found no evidence to 
indicate that this participant did not belong in the current sample when I examined the 
comprehension scores, feedback, memorization practices, reported age, and other 
demographic information pertaining to this participant, nor did this participant have 
extreme scores on any other scale. I adjusted this outlier to a new score of 1.432. I 
2 Due to experimenter error this score was returned to its original value when screening for multivariate 
outliers and normality, however, it was again adjusted to 1.43 to screen for univariate normality and for the 
main and exploratory analyses. 
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selected this value because it maintained rank order of all scores on the BMIS across all 
conditions but is within 3.3 standard deviations (based on the original data) of the mean. 
I identified a second potential outlier for attitude toward forgiveness, which had a 
z-score of -3.6 and a mean of 1. As with the previous outlier, I found no evidence to 
indicate that the participant did not belong within the sample. I retained the outlier with 
its original value because scores on single-item scales can be expected to be less reliable 
and therefore more variable. I identified one final outlier on the measure of attitude 
towards characteristics of the situation, which had a z-score of 4.95 and a mean of 5.80. 
A careful examination of the participant's responses suggested that this response was 
invalid. In response to an unrelated question the participant expressed that the nature of 
the transgression was particularly harmful, in direct contrast with the positive attitude 
toward similar transgressions indicated by a score of 5.80. Further the participant, placed 
in the no-WML condition, indicated that she rehearsed the numbers displayed to her 
throughout the entire study. For these reasons I removed this participant from the sample 
for the remainder of the analyses. 
Comprehension and manipulation checks. Next, I screened the data for 
participants who did not comply with or understand instructions as expected. Participants 
who did not fully read or comprehend the transgression could not be expected to respond 
to any of the following measures in the same fashion as those who did. A large 
proportion of participants (63 of 217) were unable to correctly answer the question "in 
the offence described, what did Patricia offer to do for you?" suggesting that the question 
could be easily misunderstood, rather than that these participants did not read or 
understand the transgression. The fact that many participants had answered that Patricia 
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had offered them nothing, or had not apologized, led me to believe that it was possible 
that many of the participants were focused on what happened after the transgression, and 
may have forgotten that Patricia had offered to drop off the job application, rather than 
that the participant had asked. Further, many of these participants (48) were able to 
answer what had distracted Patricia from her task, implying that they knew what the task 
was. I removed the 15 participants who incorrectly answered both questions from the 
sample. These participants were approximately equally distributed across condition. 
There was also evidence that the WML task was not carried out as intended. 
When asked if they had rehearsed the numbers to be memorized in their mind as they 
completed the study, 23 of the 102 participants in the WML condition selected the 
answer "no, or hardly at all." When asked if they had rehearsed the numbers in their mind 
as they completed the study, even after they were asked to recall the numbers, 57 of the 
99 participants in the no-WML condition selected the answer "yes, constantly, or almost 
constantly" or "yes, once in a while." In order to ensure that those in the WML condition 
were more likely to be dividing their attention across multiple tasks, and therefore more 
likely to be using automatic processing, I removed the 21 participants who answered 
''yes, constantly, or almost constantly" in the no-WML condition, and the 23 participants 
who answered "no, or hardly at all" in the WML condition from the sample (for an 
evaluation of the effect of WML based on reported rehearsal with these participants 
retained see Additional Analyses)3. 
3 Removing these participants did not meaningfully affect the main results: when the main analysis is 
performed with these participants retained, using the single-item forgiveness scale as the dependent 
variable, there is no significant main effect for WML condition, t( 179) = 1.22, P = .225, or for affective 
condition, t(179) = 1.05, P = 293. The interaction between these conditions also fails to account for 
significant variance in forgiveness, t(178) = -1.86, P = .064. Within the WML condition, the forgiveness 
scores of those in the negative affective condition did not significantly differ from those in the positive 
affective condition, t(94) = -0.21, P = .832, with mean single-item forgiveness scores of 3.l3 (SD = 1.04) 
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I further analyzed the data to determine the proportion of participants who could 
correctly recall the 10-digit number used for the WML manipulation. In the no-WML 
condition, in which participants were asked to recall these digits 20 seconds after they 
were memorized, 24 participants in the final sample (or 32.43% of those in no-WML 
condition) correctly recalled alII 0 digits in the correct order. In the WML condition, in 
which participants were asked to recall these digits after completing the main measures of 
interest, 15 participants in the final sample (20.00% of those in WML condition) 
correctly recalled all 10 digits in the correct order. When I tested the difference between 
these two groups, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated. For Levene's 
Test for Equality of Variances, F(1, 147) = l2.l2,p =.001. Therefore, I used the Welch-
Satterthwaite method, adjusting the degrees of freedom from 147 to 143. The difference 
between these two groups was not significant, 1(143) = -1.73,p = .0854. 
I also calculated a continuous measure of recall accuracy allotting 1 point for 
every correct digit in the correct position, and one half points for every correct digit in a 
position directly adjacent to the correct position. This measure did not significantly 
correlate with reported rehearsal amongst participants in the WML condition, r = -.02, p 
= .812. Mean scores for the WML condition and the no-WML condition were 7.21 (SD = 
2.32) and 8.03 (SD = 1.90) respectively. When I tested the difference between these two 
and 3.08 (0.87). This difference was also not significant in the no-WML condition, t(92) = 1.66,p = .099. 
In the no-WML condition, the mean single-item forgiveness score for those in the negative affective 
condition was 3.06 (SD = 2.77, (SD = 0.86) and the mean single-item forgiveness score for those in the 
positive affective condition was 3.07 (SD = 0.87). When the same analysis is performed with the full TRIM 
there are no significant effects for WML, 1(179) = 0.95, p = .343, affective condition, t(179) = -0.75, P = 
.456, or the interaction t(178) = 0.14,p = .887. 
4 If those participants who rehearsed the digits in a manner other than intended are included in this count, 
30 (31.91 %) of the participants in the no-WML condition, and 22 (22.9%) of participants in the WML 
condition correctly recalled all ten digits in the correct order. When I tested the difference between these 
two groups, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated. For Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances, F(I, 188) = 7.71,p =.006. I therefore used the Welch-Satterthwaite method, adjusting the 
degrees of freedom from 188 to 185. The difference between these two groups was not significant, t(185) = 
1.39,p = .166. 
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groups, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated. For Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances, F(1, 147) = 4.24,p =.041. Therefore, I used the Welch-
Satterthwaite method, adjusting the degrees of freedom from 147 to 142. The difference 
between these two groups was significant, t(142) = -2.36,p = .020.5 
Responses to two probes were examined for indications of the extent to which 
participants could consciously and accurately perceive the images used for the 
conditioning stage of the study. When asked if they saw anything strange during the 
slideshow 108 (72.48%) of the participants responded yes. When asked to describe what 
they saw that was strange 8 responded that they could not tell or could not remember 
what the images were, 21 gave a response that did not provide information about the 
content of the image (e.g. "pictures"), 33 described another element of the study (e.g. an 
image from the GNAT), and 2 described images that did not appear at any point during 
the study (e.g. "subliminatal [sic] messages"). This left a total of 44 participants (29.53% 
of the entire sample) that provided an accurate descriptions of at least one of the photos6. 
Accurate descriptions of images included "teeth," "faces," "a couple," and "little boy." 
The majority of descriptions focused on the same images; the photograph of the little boy 
and of the dog (with exposed teeth) in the negative affect condition, and the photograph 
of the couple about to kiss and the infant in the positive affective condition. When asked, 
more specifically, if they had seen any images flash on the screen before the target and 
5 When those participants who rehearsed the digits in a manner other than intended are included in the 
analysis the mean combined recall scores for the WML condition and no-WML condition are 7.33 (SD = 
2.32) and 8.02 (SD = 1.89) respectively. When I tested the difference between these two groups the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated, F(I, 188) = 6.15, P = .014. I therefore used the 
Welch-Satterwaite method, adjusting degrees of freedom from 188 to 182. The difference between these 
two groups was significant, 1(182) = 2.23, P = .027. 
6 Several participants in the positive affect condition stated that they saw a bride and groom; although no 
photo of a bride and groom was included, I counted this answer as correct because the photo of the couple 
about to kiss could be perceived as a wedding photo. 
images of Patricia similar answers were provided; 119 (79.86%) of participants 
responded "yes," 86 of which (57.72% of the entire sample) could provide an accurate 
description. 
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I then analyzed the two-stage objective awareness measure. When participants 
were asked to indicate if a photo was of a kitten or a snake, without being provided with 
reference photos, 121 (81.21%) were able to accurately identify the images at a 
significantly above chance rate (defined as p < .05 for each individual). After being 
allowed to examine the photos for as long as they wanted, 124 (83.22%) of participants 
correctly identified the photos at a significantly above chance rate. Participants correctly 
identified the snake stimulus a significantly higher proportion of trials as compared to the 
kitten stimulus, 1(148) = -3.98,p < .001. During debriefing, several participants verbally 
reported that they were unable to distinguish the photographs of the snake and the kitten 
during the forced choice identification task and guessed randomly at each trial. One 
participant further indicated that he was only able to identify the photograph of the snake 
because he could see the colour green when it was displayed. 
The primary manipulation in the current study was of the affective content of the 
conditioning stage of the study. By manipulating attitude towards Patricia in the same 
manner that Krosnick et al. (1992) manipulated attitudes towards a target person, I hoped 
that a more positive attitude toward Patricia would in turn make a participant more 
forgiving. If I had successfully replicated Krosnick et al.'s study, significant differences 
by affective condition should be observed. Further, it is possible that WML condition 
would moderate this effect. To check that this manipulation was successful, I performed a 
2 X 2 factorial ANOV A. Affective condition and WML condition were the independent 
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variables, and general attitude was the dependent variable. There was no significant effect 
for affective condition or the interaction, F(1, 145) = 0.19,p = .667, and F(1, 145) = 0.75, 
P = .389 respectively, suggesting that our manipulation was ineffective. I found an 
unexpected main effect for WML, F(1, 145) = 4.76, p = .031 (see Table 7 for the means 
and standard deviations for each attitude scale in each condition). I observed similar 
findings when using affective attitude or cognitive attitude instead of general attitude, 
with the exception that the main effect for WML fell just short of significance. 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations for Attitude Scales by Condition 
Condition 
WML No-WML 
Positive Negative All Affective Positive Negative All Mfective 
n=33 n=42 Conditions n=35. n=39 Conditions 
Scale M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
General 0.24 (0.39) 0.21 (0.39) 0.24 (0.39) 0.05 (0.27) 0.13 (0.45) 0.09 (0.37) 
Cognitive 0.11 (0.33) 0.07 (0.33) 0.09 (0.33) -0.02 (0.24) 0.03 (0.31) 0.01 (0.28) 
Affective -0.02 (0.38) -0.06 (0.29) -0.04 (0.33) -0.17 (0.26) -0.10 (0.36) -0.13 (0.31) 
Note: N = 149. Higher scores indicate a more positive attitude towards the transgressor. General = general attitude towards Patricia; Cognitive = cognitive 
attitude towards Patricia; Affective = affective attitude towards Patricia. 
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Univariate normality. I also screened for signs of skewness and kurtosis amongst 
the same multiple-item measures that I screened for univariate outliers. I again examined 
the scores separately by condition and in a single distribution. The TRIM was 
significantly skewed in the WML and negative affect condition with a z-skewness of 
-3.48. The TRIM's Revenge subscale was also skewed in the same condition (z-skewness 
= -3.75), and across all conditions (z-skewness = -3.89). I used a square root 
transformation to transform the scores for each scale resulting in a z-skewness of 2.35 for 
the TRIM in the WML and negative affect condition, a z-skewness of2.61 for the 
Revenge subscale in the same condition, and a z-skewness of 2.09 for the revenge 
subscale across all conditions. Neither scale became significantly skewed in any other 
condition after transformation. I then reflected the scores so that larger values would 
indicate the same direction of effect as the original scales. See below for the exact 
calculations used. 
Correction for skewness: New TRIM score = ..J(6-original TRIM score) 
Reflection: Final TRIM score = 3 - New TRIM score 
Correction for skewness: New Revenge score = ..J(6-original Revenge score) 
Reflection: Final Revenge score = 3 - New Revenge score 
Multivariate outliers. To obtain measures of leverage, global and specific 
influence, and discrepancy, I used a regression identical to the one that I used in the main 
analysis (with the single-item forgiveness scale as the dependent variable). The criteria 
that I used for centered leverage values that would indicate a potential outlier was 3KIN 
(0.21), and the criteria that I used for Mahalonobis Distance was the critical value for X2 
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with 10 df and p<.OO 1 (31.26). I used Cook's D values larger than 1 to indicate potential 
cases of strong global influence and I used values larger than 4/n (0.0256) to indicate 
more minor cases of global influence. In accordance with the recommendation of 
Beckman and Cook (1983 cited in Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003), I used the 
Bonferroni procedure to determine the value ofstudentized deleted residuals (externally 
studentized residuals) that would indicate a potential outlier. Based on the assumption 
that all 156 scores could potentially be tested, I set alpha at .0032 producing at-critical 
value of 3.49. I used standardized DFBetas larger than an absolute value of one to 
indicate cases of potential specific influence. In addition to these rules of thumb, I plotted 
centered leverage values, Cook's D values, and standardized DFBeta values against 
participant numbers and examined each of these plots separately. 
No potential outliers were flagged by rule of thumb for studentized deleted 
residuals or standardized DF Betas. Two potential outliers, participant #82, and 
participant #28 were flagged by both centered leverage and Mahalanobis distance as high 
in leverage, with centered leverage values of.35 and .24 respectively. Although no 
Cook's D value was larger than one, seven potential outliers surpassed the more stringent 
criteria of .0256, one of which was participant #28. An examination of the 11 
standardized DFBeta plots revealed 13 potential outliers, including participants #82 and 
#28. 
The responses of participants #82 and #28 were typical in terms of their feedback, 
beliefs about the study, and number rehearsal habits, however participant #82 was the 
oldest participant in our sample, at age 37, and participant #28, at age 26, was well above 
our median age of 19. Only 4.48% of our population was above the age of25 (n=7). Six 
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of these seven older participants had one of the ten highest values for Mahalanobis 
Distance and stood out on at least one standardized DFBeta graph (as determined before 
they were identified by age). As our sample did not include enough participants above the 
age of 25 to determine the generalizability of our fmdings to other age groups, and 
because the variables in our analysis appear to relate to each other differently amongst 
these outliers, I removed participants above the age of 25 from the sample.7 
Multivariate normality and other assumptions of multiple regression. To obtain 
scatter plots, histograms, and P-P plots to test the assumptions of multiple regression, I 
used a regression identical to the one that I used in the main analysis, with the single-item 
forgiveness measure as the dependent variable. The Durbin Watson statistic for this 
regression, and for all regressions performed in the main analyses, was between our cut-
off values of 1.5 and 2.5, with a value of 2.1, indicating that the residuals were 
independent. In examining scatter plots with standardized predicted value as the x-axis, 
and standardized residual and studentized deleted residual alternately plotted on the y-
axis, I observed no pattern. This suggests that the residuals were fairly normally 
distributed, that no important predictor or interaction was missing from the model, and 
that the assumption ofhomoscedasticity had been met. Similarly a histogram and P-P plot 
of standardized residuals appeared approximately normal. 
Reaction Time Data Outliers and Normality. I screened the reaction time (RT) 
data, and indicators of accuracy obtained by the GNAT separately from the remaining 
data as this data was to be examined in separate analyses. I removed from the analyses of 
the R T data three individuals who had indicated in their feedback that they had found the 
7 The same coefficients were found to be significant when the main analyses were performed with these 
participants in the sample. 
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GNAT confusing, and who were therefore likely to give responses that more strongly 
reflected error and less strongly reflected their associations with Patricia. I created a 
measure of accuracy, d', by following the calculations described in the original paper on 
the GNAT by Nosek and Banaji (200 I), who originally adopted this measure from signal 
detection theory. Empty cells (cases where a participant never responds to a stimulus 
requiring no response, or never fails to respond to a stimulus requiring a response) make 
the calculation of d' impossible, therefore I applied the model-sensitive correction 
described by Banaji and Greenwald (1995). I removed from the analyses of the RT data 
one outlier whose accuracy during the "bad" block was just above chance level (d' = .98), 
with a z-score of -4.16. 
I used two measures of relative speed across critical blocks to indicate implicit 
attitude towards Patricia. The first was a difference score, subtracting median R T score 
(for a correct response to signal) in the block in which Patricia was paired with good 
stimuli from median RT score in the block in which Patricia was paired with bad stimuli. 
Higher raw R T scores indicate longer response time or slower responding. Therefore 
higher difference scores indicated slower responding in the block in which Patricia was 
paired with Bad stimuli than in the block in which Patricia was paired with Good stimuli, 
and therefore a more positive attitude towards Patricia. The second score was a residual 
score for median RT in the block in which Patricia was paired with bad stimuli, 
controlling for median RT in the block in which Patricia was paired with good stimuli. I 
obtained this measure by regressing RT scores from the Patricia-Bad block onto RT 
scores from the Patricia-Good block and saving the residual. Higher scores therefore 
indicate a greater delay in responding to stimuli in the block in which Patricia was paired 
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with Bad stimuli, or a more positive attitude towards Patricia. I will refer to these scores 
as the residual implicit attitude scores for the remainder of this report. For each of these 
measures, higher scores indicate a more positive attitude towards Patricia. 
I identified one outlier, at -179.50ms with a z-score of -5.33, amongst the implicit 
attitude difference scores. As the nearest z-score was -2.11, a larger distance away than 
found for previous outliers, I adjusted this score to be 3 standard deviations closer to the 
mean for a final score of -66.40. As with all adjustments to outliers in this report, I 
maintained rank order amongst all scores. I found two outliers amongst the residual 
implicit attitude scores. The first, which had a z-score of 3.54 and a mean of 118.25, I 
adjusted 0.5 standard deviations closer to the mean for a fmal score of 101.56. The 
second, which had a z-score of -3.53 and mean of -118.01, I also moved 0.5SD closer to 
the mean with a fmal score of -101.32. Neither of these scales were significantly skewed 
or kurtotic after adjustment to the outliers. The means and standard deviations for each of 
the final implicit attitude scales in each of the four conditions in the final sample are 
displayed in Table 8. 
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Table 8 
Means and Standard Deviations for Implicit Attitude Scales by Condition 
Condition 
WML No-WML 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
n= 33 n=42 n= 33 n= 37 
Scale M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
Implicit-D 15.03 (28.67) 21.58 (36.72) 28.65 (42.19) 23.97 (28.92) 
Implicit-R -5.21 (29.73) -2.60 (30.74) 3.36 (41.35) 4.61 (28.46) 
Note: N = 145. Implicit-D = implicit attitude difference score; Implicit-R = residual implicit attitude score. 
Descriptive statistics and exploratory analyses. The means and standard 
deviations for forgiveness are provided in Table 9, and the correlations amongst the 
primary variables of interest are provided in Table 10. All measures of forgiveness and 
explicit attitude towards Patricia were highly correlated. However, the measures of 
implicit attitude correlated with the single-item forgiveness measure and behaviour alone 
(see Table 10). Therefore, I could not test the relative strength of the correlation between 
implicit attitude and affect, and implicit attitude and cognition. In the interest of adding to 
the discussion of the relative importance of affect and cognition in forgiveness, I 
compared the correlation between the single-item forgiveness measure and affect, and the 
correlation between the single-item forgiveness measure and cognition, following the 
procedure recommended by Meng, Rosenthal, and Rubin (1992). Affective attitude was 
significantly more strongly correlated with the single-item forgiveness measure than was 
cognitive attitude, Z = 2.62, p = .004, one-tailed. However, the difference between the 
respective correlations with the full TRIM was not significant, z = 1.04, p = .149, one-
tailed. 
Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations/or Forgiveness Scales by Condition 
Condition 
WML No-WML 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
n = 33 n=42 n= 35 n= 39 
Scale M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
TRllvl01 3.03 (0.88) 3.07 (1.07) 2.97 (0.86) 2.79 (0.86) 
TRllvl 3.98a (0.43) 3.98a (0.63) 3.76a (0.33) 3.90a (0.46) 
Avoidance 3.76 (0.50) 3.76 (0.68) 3.58 (0.39) 3.72 (0.46) 
Revenge 4.52a (0.45) 4.46a (0.62) 4.20a (0.39) 4.33a (0.61) 
Note: N = 149. TRIMO 1 = Single-item measure of self-defined forgiveness, taken from the 
TRIM; TRIM = Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory; A voidance = 
Avoidance subscale of the TRIM; Revenge = Revenge subscale of the TRIM. 
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<1por Transformed scales, the mean of the transformed scores were taken and then converted back 
into the original units of the scale. SDs are of original scores. 
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Table 10 
Intercorrelations Amongst Main Variables 
Measure M(SD) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. TRIMOI 2.97 (0.93) .53*** .35*** .55*** .42*** .38*** .47*** .47*** .18* .05 .10 .16* .18* 
2. TRIM 1.56 (0.17) .80*** .97*** .56*** .47*** .53*** .57*** .18* -.09 .14* .09 .07 
3. Revenge 1.73 (0.20) .63*** .43*** .36*** .35** .38*** .10 -.05 .20** .13 .08 
4. Avoidance 3.71 (0.53) .55*** .47*** .54*** .59*** .17* -.08 .09 .06 .06 
5. General .16 (.39) .71 *** .67*** .66*** .29*** -.06 .16* .03 .05 
6. Cognitive .06 (.30) .67*** .56*** .21** -.03 .11 .13 .11 
7. Affective -.08 (.33) .62*** .23** -.03 .13 .07 .12 
8. Behaviour .27 (.37) .27*** -.08 .06 .13 .17* 
9. BMIS 2.74 (0.44) -.13 .03 .05 .03 
10. Conditioning -.03 -.01 -.03 
11. WML -.11 -.12 
12. Implicit-D 22.31 (34.55) .89*** 
13. Implicit-R 0.00 (32.62) 
Note. N= 145. As four participants were removed from the analysis ofRT scores, the correlations displayed here are based on four less degree of freedom than 
the main analysis. TRIMOl = Single-item measure of self-defined forgiveness, taken from the TRIM; TRIM = Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations 
Inventory; Revenge = Revenge subscale of the TRIM (higher scores indicate greater forgiveness); Avoidance = Avoidance subscale of the TRIM (higher scores 
indicate greater forgiveness); General = general attitude towards Patricia; Cognitive = cognitive attitude towards Patricia; Affective = affective attitude towards 
Patricia; Behaviour = behavioural attitude towards Patricia; BMIS = Brief Mood Introspection Scale; Conditioning = positive or negative affective conditioning 
condition {l = positive, 0 = negative); WML = working memory load condition (0 = no-WML, 1 = WML); Implicit-D = implicit attitude difference score; 
Implicit-R = residual implicit attitude score. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.OOl 
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In the interest of further exploring the relative importance of cognition, affect, 
behaviour, and implicit attitude in forgiveness, I used two simultaneous multiple 
regressions to determine if cognitive attitude, affective attitude, general attitude, 
behavioural attitude and implicit attitude could each uniquely predict forgiveness. In the 
first, I regressed the single-item forgiveness scale on each of the four explicit attitude 
scales and the residual implicit attitude scores, and in the second, I regressed the entire 
TRIM on the same measures. As can be seen from Table 11, affective attitude and 
behaviour alone accounted for unique variance in the single-item forgiveness scores, and 
general attitude and behaviour alone accounted for unique variance in the full TRIMs. 
Table 11 
Standardized Regression Coefficientsfor Attitude Variables Predicting Forgiveness 
Across Two Measures. 
Dependent Variable 
TRIMOI TRIM 
Predictor p p VIF 
General .09 .22* 2.70 
Cognitive .01 .03 2.38 
Affective .25* .17 2.29 
Behaviour .23* .31 *** 2.01 
Implicit-R .10 -.01 1.05 
Note. N= 145. TRIMOI = Single-item measure of self-defined forgiveness, taken from the TRIM; TRIM = 
Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory; General = general attitude towards Patricia; 
Cognitive = cognitive attitude towards Patricia; Affective = affective attitude towards Patricia; Behaviour = 
behavioural attitude towards Patricia; Implicit-R = residual implicit attitude score. 
*p<.05. **p<.Ol. ***p<.OOI 
8 When these analyses are performed without the general attitude scale the same pattern of significance 
is observed with one exception; when the full TRIM is used as the dependent variable the affective 
attitude scale accounts for significant variance in forgiveness, p = .22, P = .027. 
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Main analyses. I performed four hierarchical regressions to test the hypotheses 
that affective condition would predict forgiveness, and that WML would moderate this 
relationship between affective condition and forgiveness. Performing four separate 
regressions allowed for the use of four different measures of forgiveness as the dependent 
variable. The single-item forgiveness scale, taken from the TRIM, acts as a measure of 
self-defmed forgiveness, our main variable of interest; however, to allow for comparison 
to the broader literature on forgiveness, I used the full TRIM and its revenge and 
avoidance subs cales in the subsequent three regressions. In each regression, I entered 
eight control variables (importance of religion, tendency to forgive, education, sex, age, 
attitude towards forgiveness, attitude towards the situation, and experience with the name 
Patricia) at the first step, the two manipulated variables, affective condition and WML 
condition, at the second step, and the interaction between WML and affective condition 
at the third and final step. As can be seen from Table 12, my hypotheses regarding the 
conditioned affect and WML conditions, and the interaction between these conditions, 
were not supported. Further, against expectations, WML condition accounted for a 
significant proportion of variance in the revenge subscale of the TRIM. 
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Table 12 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Forgiveness on Four Scales From 
WML and Affective Condition. 
Dependent Variable 
TRIMOl TRIM Avoidance Revenge 
Step and variable p p p p 
Step 1 
Religion Importance .082 -.059 -.064 -.031 
Tendency to Forgive .214* .281 *** .280*** .260** 
Education .011 -.064 -.018 -.148 
Sex .169* .109 .112 .044 
Age -.057 -.008. -.077 .153 
Forgiveness Attitude .144 .122 .115 .047 
Situation Attitude .130 .011 .031 -.014 
Name .029 .048 .065 -.019 
Step 2 
Religion Importance .082 -.058 -.064 -.029 
Tendency to Forgive .215* .273*** .275*** .253** 
Education .004 -.057 -.011 -.149 
Sex .171 * .106 .109 .043 
Age -.047 -.018 -.087 .153 
Forgiveness Attitude .132 .104 .107 .012 
Situation Attitude .124 .023 .042 -.005 
Name .029 .033 .056 -.037 
WML Condition .055 .107 .050 .190* 
Affective Condition .044 -.044 -.046 -.002 
Continued on next page. 
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Table 12 
Continued from previous page 
Dependent Variable 
TRIMOI TRIM Avoidance Revenge 
Step and variable p p p p 
Step 3 
Religion Importance .072 -.053 -.059 -.019 
Tendency to Forgive .211* .276*** .276*** .257** 
Education .006 -.059 -.012 -.152 
Sex .188* .096 .101 .025 
Age -.054 -.014 -.083 .160 
Forgiveness Attitude .133 .103 .106 .010 
Situation Attitude .123 .024 .042 -.004 
Name .031 .032 .055 -.039 
WML Condition .132 .063 .015 .109 
Affective Condition .129 -.092 -.085 -.092 
WML X Affective -.140 .080 .065 .149 
condition 
Note: N= 149. 
*p <.05. **p<.Ol. ***p<.OO1 
Additional analyses. I performed several additional analyses examining potential 
alternative effects of our manipulations, as well as participants' actual experiences with 
forgiveness. 
It is possible that only those who actually consistently rehearsed the numbers the . 
were asked to memorize would have divided their attention across tasks and therefore 
were more likely to use automatic processing. Further, those who rehearsed the numbers 
throughout the entire study, despite being placed in the no-WML condition, may have 
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also divided their attention to complete this task, and therefore may also have been more 
likely to use automatic processing. Therefore, different, more pertinent results might be 
attained if reported rehearsal rather than assigned condition were used to determine 
WML. To test this hypothesis, I repeated the regression used in the main analysis, using 
the single-item forgiveness scale as the dependent variable, but replaced WML with 
reported rehearsal rate.9 Neither affective condition, t(179) = 1.06,p = .290, nor reported 
rehearsal rate, t(179) = -0.057,p = .955, accounted for significant variance in forgiveness. 
Further, there was no significant interaction between affective condition and reported 
rehearsal rate, t(178) = 0.99,p = .325.10 
Another potential variable that could moderate the effectiveness of the 
conditioning stage of the study was the extent to which participants were aware of and 
attended to the affective stimuli. Although all participants were informed that they may 
see images flashed on the screen, supposedly in an attempt to distract them, and were 
instructed to try their best to ignore these images, 36 reported that they were not in the 
9 The df is larger for this analysis as compared to the main analyses because those who had rehearsed 
reported that they rehearsed the numbers constantly or almost constantly in the No-WML condition, and 
those who reported that they did not rehearse in the WML condition were included in this analysis but not 
the main analyses. 
10 I performed a similar analysis to determine ifrecall accuracy might moderate the effects ofWML 
condition on forgiveness. To test this, I performed a hierarchical regression using the single-item 
forgiveness scale scores as the dependent variable. I entered the centered continuous recall accuracy scores, 
WML condition, and affective condition at the first step of the regression. I entered the three two-way 
interaction terms at the second step of the regression, and the three-way interaction term at the third step of 
the regression. Only the three-way interaction term was significant, 1(182) = -2.31, p =.022. I tested the 
simple slopes for affective condition at one standard deviation above and at one standard deviation below 
the mean recall accuracy score for each WML condition. Within the WML condition, the simple slope for 
affective condition was significant at one standard deviation above the mean recall accuracy, 1(92) = -7.35, 
P < .001, but was not significant at one standard deviation below the mean recall accuracy score, 1(92) = 
1.477, p = .071. At one standard deviation above mean recall accuracy, the predicted values for forgiveness 
in the negative and positive affective conditions were 3.29 and 2.83 respectively. In the no-WML condition 
there was also a significant simple slope for affective condition at one standard deviation above the mean 
recall accuracy score, 1(92) = 1.82, p = .036, but not at one standard deviation below the mean recall 
accuracy score, 1(92)-0.07,p=.527. At one standard deviation above the mean recall accuracy score, the 
predicted forgiveness scores for the negative and positive affective conditions were 2.69 and 1.82 
respectively. 
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"distractor condition" (suggesting they were unaware of the affective stimuli), 26 
reported that they were unable to ignore these images, and the remaining 87 were aware 
of these images but reportedly ignored them. I performed a 2 X 2 X 3 ANOVA with 
WML, affective condition, and reported attention to the affective stimuli as the respective 
independent variables, and scores on the single-item forgiveness measure as the 
dependent variable. I found no significant main effect or interaction. For affective 
conditionF(l, 137) = 0.06,p =.805, forWMLF(1, 137) = 3.37,p = .069, for attention 
F(2, 137) = 1.90,p = .154, and for the interaction F(2, 137) = 0.30,p = .740. 
In addition to allowing a mediational analysis, I collected the implicit attitude 
measures to allow for a second manipulation check for the effectiveness of the affective 
conditioning phase of the study. It is possible that this conditioning could create 
associations with the transgressor that result in positive or negative implicit attitudes 
towards the transgressor without in turn affecting explicit attitudes towards the 
transgressor. To test this, I performed two 2X2 factorial ANOV As with affective 
condition and WML as the independent variables, and each implicit measure as the 
dependent variable. I found no main effects or interactions for either the implicit attitude 
difference scores or the residual implicit attitude scores. For the difference score, the 
main effect for affective condition was F(l, 141) = 0.025,p = .871, the main effect for 
WML was F(1, 141) = 1.924,p = .168, and the interaction was F(l, 141) = 0.947,p = 
.332. For the residual score, the main effect for affective condition was F(l, 141) = 
0.125,p = .724, the main effect for WML was F(1, 141) = 2.090,p = .150, and the 
interaction was F(1, 141) = 0.015,p = .902." 
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In the absence of an effective conditioning procedure, it is likely that participants 
would nonetheless have an implicit attitude towards Patricia, based on experiences with 
similar persons or situations, and on associations with her physical characteristics. The 
impact of this attitude on forgiveness may have been moderated by WML. To test this 
hypothesis, I performed a regression using the single-item forgiveness scale as the 
dependent variable. I entered WML condition and the residual implicit attitude scores at 
the first step of this regression and the interaction between WML condition and the 
residual implicit attitude scores at the second step. Implicit attitude accounted for a 
significant proportion of variance in forgiveness, t(142) = 2.32,p = .022, and WML did 
not t(142) = 1.21,p = .145. However, the interaction term did not account for a 
significant proportion of variance in forgiveness, t(141) = 0.09,p = .843. 
It has been suggested that in the study that the conditioning stage of the current 
study was based upon (Krosnick et aI., 1992), the manipulation did not directly impact 
attitude toward the target, but instead affected attitude toward the target by altering the 
participants' moods (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). Although I found no main effect for 
forgiveness or attitude, it is possible that mood may have been affected, but not with 
enough strength to in turn affect attitude or forgiveness. To test this possibility. I 
performed a 2 X 2 factorial ANOV A with affective condition and WML as the 
independent variables, and scores on the BMIS (mood scale) as the dependent variable. 
No significant main effect or interaction was found. For affective condition F(1, 145) = 
2.20,p = .140, for WMLF(I, 145) = .48,p = .49, and for the interactionF(I, 145) = .64, 
p = .423. 
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Participants were asked about their actual experiences with forgiveness and 
internal conflict. When asked "After you believe you have forgiven a person, have you 
ever found that you still feel angry or upset from time to timeT' 131 (87.92%) responded 
"yes." These participants were asked to provide several details about this experience in an 
open-response format. Due to this format, only a fraction of these participants directly 
answered each of these follow-up questions. Out of the 58 who provided a clear response 
to the ftrst probe, 39 (67.24%) reported that they found the experience of internal conflict 
surprising or troubling. Out of the 91 who provided a clear response to the second probe, 
67 ( 73.63%) reported that the internal conflict made them doubt whether or not they had 
actually forgiven. Out of the 93 who provided a clear response to the third probe, 59 
(63.44%) reported that it was common for them to have mixed thoughts and feelings 
when forgiving. 11 
Similarly, when asked "have you ever believed that you had NOT forgiven a 
person but found you still feel love or affection for that person from time to timeT' 114 
(76.51 %) responded "yes." Again, participants were asked to answer several follow-up 
questions about this experience in an open-response format. Out of the 64 who directly 
answered the first follow-up question, 37 (57.81 %) reported that they found this 
experience of internal conflict surprising or troubling. Out of the 59 who directly 
answered the second follow-up question, 32 (54.24%) indicated that the experience of 
internal conflict made them doubt that they had not forgiven. Finally, 39 (58.21 %) out of 
11 Whenever possible, the participant's definition of "common" was used. When participants responded to 
this probe by reporting the number of times they had had this experience, 3 or more was coded as common. 
When participants responded by reporting the proportion of experiences with forgiveness that involved 
mixed thoughts and feelings, 25% or more was coded as common. If a participant responded that this 
experience was common for people in general, it was assumed that this response applied to the participant 
as well and was therefore coded as common. 
the 67 who provided a clear answer to the last follow-up question indicated that it was 
common for them to experience mixed thoughts and feelings when forgiving. 12 
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When asked "When you forgive, do you ALWAYS feel that every part of you has 
forgiven?" 15 (10.07%) responded "yes, certainly," 85(59.44%) responded "I am not 
sure," and 49 (32.89%) responded "no." When asked "once you have made a decision as 
to whether or not you forgive, do you find that all your thoughts and feelings agree?" 32 
(21.48%) responded "yes, certainly," 59 (39.60%) responded "I am not sure" and 58 
(38.93%) responded "no." 
12 See footnote 6. 
Discussion 
In the Introduction I laid out the argument that forgiveness can be better 
understood through the application of dual-process theory. Specifically, forgiveness may 
be composed of any number of interrelated processes each of which may occur 
independently or co-occur. Further, scholars and laypersons may regard different subsets 
of these processes as the core of forgiveness. Thus, as has been observed in the literature, 
the definitions of individual laypersons and scholars often conflict (DeCourville, Belicki, 
& Green, 2008; Enright, Eastin, Golden, Sarinopoulos & Freedman, 1992; Kanz, 2000; 
McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000; Mullet, Girard, & Bakhshi, 2004; Rye et al., 
2001; Stewart, DeCourville, & Belicki, 2010; Younger, Piferi, Jobe, & Lawler, 2004; 
Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). 
Further, the descriptions of forgiveness provided by scholars imply that each of 
the processes involved in forgiveness, such as changes in affect, cognition or behaviour, 
are likely to co-occur, whereas lay experiences with forgiveness tend to be more 
fragmented, or to involve more internal conflict. Laypersons frequently report 
experiencing some thoughts and/or feelings that are associated with forgiveness 
concurrently with others that are associated with unforgiveness (DeCourville et al. 2008; 
Kanz, 2000; Mullet et al. 2004; Stewart, et al., 2010; Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). I 
would argue that this conflict is often the result of processes originating from separate 
systems posited by dual-process theory (e.g., Stanovich, 2004). Some thoughts and 
feelings may be produced by the automatic, effortless, and largely unconscious 
processing of System 1 and its associative network, and others may be produced by the 
conscious, effortful, and rule-based processing of System 2. Such different forms of 
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processing are likely (as compared to multiple processes within the same system) to reach 
different conclusions in the form of thoughts, feelings, and behaviours. Thus, by taking a 
dual-process perspective we can better understand internal conflict regarding forgiveness, 
and the conflict that currently exists amongst the many deftnitions of forgiveness 
provided by scholars and laypersons. 
The study described here was designed to determine ifboth System 1 and System 
2 processing can playa role in forgiveness. Speciftcally, I tested the hypothesis that 
System 1 processing can directly impact one's likelihood to forgive and that System 2 
processing can moderate this relationship. To test this hypothesis, I attempted to create 
conditioned attitudes towards a hypothetical transgressor using subliminal stimuli. For 
half of the participants this conditioning was designed to create a positive affective 
association with the transgressor, and for half a negative affective association. Because 
System 1, but not System 2 processing, is sensitive to subliminal stimuli, any effect of 
conditioning on forgiveness could be attributed to System 1 processing. Furthermore, 
even if supraliminal stimuli were used to create the conditioned attitudes, any effects of 
this conditioning could be attributed to System 1 because no form of conditioning would 
provide any rational or rule based reasons to forgive or not forgive, and, therefore, any 
form of conditioning should have no effect on System 2 processing. 
In addition to the manipulation of conditioned attitudes, WML (working memory 
load) was induced and maintained by half of the participants when forgiveness and 
attitude towards the transgressor was measured. Because System 2 processing requires 
working memory but System 1 processing does not, any effect ofWML could be 
attributed to System 2 processing. I predicted no direct effect ofWML; however, I 
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hypothesized that System 2 processing would moderate the effects of the conditioning 
phase of the study such that it would have a weaker or non-existent effect amongst those 
in the no-WML condition. 
Unfortunately, because the manipulation checks indicated that the conditioning 
phase of the study was ineffective, no conclusion can be made with regard to the role of 
Systems I and System 2 processing in forgiveness. I included these manipulation checks 
in the study to make my hypotheses falsifiable. If I had found a significant difference for 
explicit and implicit attitude between affective conditions, with a large effect size, but 
forgiveness remained unaffected, this would have provided strong evidence that 
individuals do not use system 1 processing when considering forgiving. It would have 
shown that individuals are able to ignore associations with a transgressor in the absence 
of a clear reason for that association. However, without an effective conditioning phase, 
there is no reason to believe that System 1 processing would have created the 
hypothesized differences in forgiveness scores. Therefore, the question of whether or not 
System 1 directly affects forgiveness remains unanswered. Furthermore, given that a 
relationship between System 1 processing and forgiveness could not be established, it 
could not be determined if System 2 processing moderates this relationship. 
Methodological Issues in Subliminal Conditioning 
There are a few reasons why the conditioning phase might have failed to replicate 
the findings of Krosnick et al. (1992) and proved ineffective at creating a difference in 
attitude by condition. The first is that the affective stimuli were displayed for a longer 
interval in my study, approximately 30ms in my study, as compared to 17ms and 13ms in 
two studies reported in Krosnick et al. These authors found a larger effect size when 
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exposing the affective stimuli for a longer time, with a Cohen's d of .93 when the stimuli 
were exposed for 13ms, compared to a Cohen's d of .29 when the stimuli were exposed 
for 9ms (however, this difference falls just short of significance, z = 1.58, p = .057). 
However, it is possible that having some conscious perception of the affective stimuli (as 
discussed below) negated their effects. In Krosnick et al. 's study, none of the participants 
reported suspecting that pictures of anything other than the target person had been 
exposed. However, in my study nearly 60% of those in my sample were able to 
accurately describe an aspect of one or more of the affective stimuli. In Krosnick et al. 's 
study, any positive or negative affect that resulted from the affective stimuli might have 
been attributed to the target person. In my study, because the participants were aware that 
other images were being shown, they may have accurately attributed such affect to these 
photos and thereby avoided forming a positive or negative association with the 
hypothetical transgressor. 
A second difference between the conditioning phase of my study and the 
conditioning used in Krosnick et al. (1992) was that I used different stimuli. The stimuli 
used in Krosnick's study appeared dated when presented to colleagues (see Figure 2 for 
an example). I was concerned that these older images would not have the same effect on 
my participants as they did on Krosnick et al.' s participants prior to 1992. The stimuli 
used in my study were taken from the IAPS, which is specifically designed to provide 
standardized emotionally evocative stimuli. Across the 18 original studies referred to in 
Lang et al. 's (2008) technical manual for the IAPS each image was rated by 
approximately 100 participants. On a scale of 1 to 9, in which 9 indicates a positive 
valence and 1 indicates a negative valence, the stimuli selected for the positive affective 
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condition in my study had a mean valence rating of 7.18, and the stimuli selected for the 
negative affective condition had a mean pleasantness rating of 2.30. Similar ratings were 
obtained in at least two other studies (Ito, Cacioppo, & Lang, 1998; Libkuman et aI., 
2007). Krosnick et aI. 's stimuli had been selected based on pleasantness ratings from a 
single pre-test. It is therefore likely that the images used in my study were as effective, or 
more effective, at reliably evoking the desired affective response when perceived 
consciously. 
Figure 2. Sample positive affective stimulus from Krosnick et aI. (1992). 
However, it is possible that other aspects of the images affected the effectiveness 
of the emotional content when perceived at a subliminal or nearly subliminal level. For 
example, it is possible that simple images would be more effective at provoking 
emotional reactions when they are displayed for under 50ms. This might be the case if the 
unconscious is only (or more) capable of taking in simple stimuli, as is suggested by 
Baars (2002). Although I attempted to take complexity into account when I selected 
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images for my study, some might be judged by others as more complex than those used 
in Krosnick et aI. (1992; for example, compare Figure 3 to Figure 4). 
Figure 3. Sample negative affective stimulus from Krosnick et aI., 1992. 
Figure 4. Sample affective stimulus from the current study. 
115 
A third possible reason why the conditioning phase in my study was not effective, 
as it was in Krosnick et al.'s (1992) study, is that the participants in my study might not 
have attended to the images displayed (either the affective stimuli, or the images of the 
target person/offender) in the same way. There is already some evidence that participants 
in my study could not understand or did not comply with instructions as intended; more 
than 22 % of participants in the WML condition (though deleted from the final sample) 
made no apparent attempt to maintain the numbers in memory, and the majority of 
participants in the no-WML condition continued to rehearse the numbers after the 
temporary WML task was complete. It is possible that participants in my study did not 
comprehend or choose to follow the instructions to keep their eyes on the center of the 
screen in between slides. It is further possible that participants in my study, either 
because they had different motivations for participating in the study, or, for whatever 
reason, were more fatigued, were more likely to lose focus during the conditioning phase 
of my study than were the participants in Krosnick et al.'s study. 
Perception of "Subliminal" Stimuli 
Based on both participants' subjective accounts of the stimuli and the results of 
the forced choice identification task, it can be concluded that at least some of the 
affective stimuli were consciously perceived by many of the participants in the study. 
Recall that using subliminal stimuli simplified my argument that the effects of the 
conditioning phase would have to operate through System 1 processing; however, using 
subliminal stimuli was not necessary to make this argument. As previously noted, this is 
because there is no line of rational or otherwise systematic reasoning that would lead 
individuals to be more or less forgiving of a transgressor because they viewed 
116 
photographs of that transgressor shortly after viewing photographs of pleasant or 
unpleasant stimuli. However, in order to increase our understanding of methodological 
issues in subliminal conditioning it is interesting to discuss the extent to which the 
affective stimuli in my study were consciously perceived. 
According to my more liberal measure (which specifically prompted participants 
to describe any images seen before the images of Patricia), over half of the participants 
could accurately identify some feature of at least one of the affective stimuli. I say "some 
feature" because often the participants did not fully describe the photograph as a whole. 
For example, some of the participants reported that they saw teeth and I regarded this as 
an accurate description of a photo. However, it was not just teeth that were shown, but an 
image of a dog baring its teeth. It is likely that the participants simply reported "teeth" 
because they could not tell if it was an image of a dog or another animal. In support of 
this claim, two participants included a tiger in their descriptions of the photos, and one 
participant indicated that they saw ''teeth of an animal." 
It is further likely that only some of the affective stimuli were ever perceived 
consciously. In participants' subjective reports it was usually the same four or five 
images (2 per condition; an image of a boy crying, an image of a dog baring its teeth, a 
picture of a baby, two pictures of couples embracingl3) that were identified. Most 
participants only mentioned the content of one of the images. No participant described 
any feature of at least 10 of the 20 images (some of the references could apply to more 
than one of the stimuli), suggesting that these images were not consciously perceived. 
13 It cannot be determined if participants were seeing both images of couples embracing, or just one of 
them. 
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Indeed, although many participants indicated that they had seen the affective 
stimuli during the "slideshow" (conditioning phase of the study), many participants 
insisted during debriefing that they could see nothing during the forced choice 
identification task and were guessing randomly. This suggests that there was something 
about some of the photographs used as affective stimuli that made them more visible as 
compared to the stimuli in the forced choice identification task when displayed for the 
same amount of time. Similarly, participants were able to correctly identify the 
photograph of the snake during the forced choice identification task significantly more 
frequently than they were able to correctly identify the photograph of the kitten, 
suggesting that there is something about the photograph of the snake that makes it more 
visible than the photograph of the kitten. If some photographs are more visible than 
others when displayed for the same amount of time, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
participants would have been able to consciously perceive some of the affective stimuli 
but not others. 
By my own appraisal, when displayed for 34ms or less, the photograph of the 
kitten has no identifiable features; however, the photograph of the snake can be identified 
by a flash of green originating from the background of grass. One participant reported 
during debriefmg that he too identified the image of the snake by looking for the colour 
green. It is likely that other participants in my study were able to identify photographs by 
this or other low level features. This suggestion is further supported by the fact that 
participants performed the forced choice identification task with higher accuracy after 
being allowed to look at the photographs for as long as they wished as compared to the 
first set of trials. Having viewed the photographs for as long as they desired, participants 
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would have been able to use this time to identify which low level features belonged to 
which photograph, and to use these features to identify the two photographs in 
subsequent trials. However, it should be noted that this effect cannot be distinguished 
from the confound of practice because the trials after participants had been shown the 
photographs supraliminally necessarily had to occur after the trials that occurred before 
the participants had been shown the photographs supraliminally. 
It should be noted that the ability to discriminate between images during a forced 
choice identification task does not mean that participants were subjectively aware of the 
stimuli. In fact, it was the very goal of the conditioning phase of my study to use the 
stimuli to affect the participants' behaviour without their knowledge. Indeed, there is a 
large body of research on the effects of subliminal stimuli on behaviour, including such 
discrimination tasks (e.g., Marcel, 1983). However, it is interesting to note that studies 
such as Krosnick et al.'s (1992) second study suggest that one can use subliminal stimuli 
to create a disposition towards one behaviour (rating the target person as more or less 
good) without affecting another (correctly guessing which of two stimuli were 
displayed)14. This may indicate that there is a lower threshold for creating System 1 
processes that create associations or directly affect behaviour than there is for creating 
System 1 processes that inform System 2 processes, here, by creating an unexplainable 
suspicion that one had seen a stimulus before. Another possible way of distinguishing 
between the two effects is that the target ratings resulting from the association formed 
14 In Krosnick et al. 's (1992) study 2, as in our study, a forced choice identification task was performed 
separately from the conditioning phase of the study. Although subliminal stimuli in the conditioning phase 
of this study affected participants' ratings of the target person, participants were not able to discriminate 
with greater than chance accuracy between a colour photograph, and black text displayed on a white 
background when exposed for the same amount of time. This suggests that in a single task participants 
could be affected by a stimulus but be unable to guess which stimulus it was with above chance accuracy. 
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were potentially more emotional (e.g., participants may have "felt" they liked the person, 
and "felt" the person was good - the two ratings that formed the attitude scale) and the 
choice between the two possible stimuli was more cognitive. This could imply that there 
is a lower threshold for creating emotional System 1 processes than cognitive System 1 
processes. 
There are a few reasons why I used a 30ms (±4) exposure time for the affective 
stimuli in the conditioning phase of the study. Hardware and software limitations made 
this exposure time the shortest possible. This exposure time is below the common 55ms 
maximum exposure time rule of thumb used for subliminal primes (e.g., Epley n.d.), and, 
as previously discussed, some awareness of the stimuli would not invalidate the argument 
that the effects of these stimuli would have to operate through System 1 processes. 
Further, based on the trend towards larger effect sizes with longer exposures of 
subliminal stimuli in Krosnick et al. 's (1992) study, I had hoped that the increased 
exposure time would make the conditioning more effective. 
Moreover, a barely perceivable affective stimulus, as compared to a completely 
subliminal one, would more closely resemble the sorts of stimuli that individuals interact 
with and form associations with in the every day. For example, an individual might come 
to associate an acquaintance with an unfortunate life event, such as a death or loss of 
work, that occurred at the time at which the acquaintance was met. That individual would 
not be unaware of the death or loss of work, but would be unaware that an association 
between this event and the acquaintance had been formed. However, in the artificial 
environment of the psychology researcher's laboratory, knowledge of the existence of an 
affective stimulus could have a different effect than the knowledge of a natural affective 
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stimulus in real life. Participants in a study are likely to be anticipating the intentions of 
the experimenter, as evidenced by the large number of participants in the no-WML 
condition in my study who decided to continue to maintain the numbers in their memory 
in case they were asked again (see below for discussion). Although only two participants 
admitted any suspicion that the affective stimuli were intended to affect forgiveness, 
participants likely attended to the affective stimuli in the study in a way that is dissimilar 
to the treatment of affective stimuli in real life, 
WML and participant compliance 
Answers to the working memory load maintenance questionnaire indicated that 
participants did not understand and/or follow the directions regarding WML as intended. 
Nearly a quarter of the participants in the WML did not rehearse the memorized numbers 
to maintain them in their working memory despite frequent reminders that they should 
not forget the numbers. This may have been because these participants believed they 
could remember the numbers without rehearsing; however, only 14 of the 75 participants 
in the WML condition in the [mal sample correctly recalled all of the numbers, and some 
participants indicated in their feedback that they felt I should have used fewer numbers. 
An alternative explanation is that these participants thought it would be too difficult to 
memorize 10 digits and so did not try. However, during the pretesting, only 8 digits were 
used and volunteers indicated that they felt the task was too easy for them to feel the need 
to rehearse, and that they would be more likely to rehearse if there were more digits. 
Another potential explanation is that these participants did not genuinely wish to 
assist with the study and so they were attempting to complete it as quickly, and with as 
little effort, as possible. This possibility is supported by the finding that 15 participants 
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could not answer either of the two simple questions about the hypothetical transgression 
in my transgression comprehension questionnaire, and 63 were not able to answer the 
first. This suggests that participants were reading and following the instructions with 
some degree of carelessness. 
Surprisingly, the majority (57 out of 99) of the participants in the no-WML 
condition rehearsed the numbers they had been asked to memorize even after they were 
asked to recall them. In fact, more participants reported that they had rehearsed the 
numbers constantly or almost constantly in the no-WML condition than in the WML 
condition. These findings may be partially attributed to an error in which participants in 
both WML conditions were instructed "After you have completed a few other activities 
within the study we will ask you to recall as many of these numbers as possible in the 
order that they were presented to you." This instruction may have led some of the 
participants in the no-WML condition to be confused when they were asked to recall the 
numbers after only a 20 second delay. 
It is also possible that many of the participants came to the study with the 
expectation that it would involve deception, as studies in psychology (including mine) 
commonly do. As such, participants may have continued to rehearse the numbers so that 
they could perform especially well in recalling the numbers if I decided to "trick" them 
by asking them to recall the numbers a second time later in the study without informing 
them beforehand that I would do so. These findings should serve as a reminder that 
experimental studies create situations in which individuals may behave artificially in 
response to the artificial environmental conditions and task demands. Further, researchers 
should be mindful of the effects of recruiting participants by offering monetary awards or 
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course credit as such participants may be less motivated to read and follow instructions 
carefully. 
The Effects of WML on Hypothetical Forgiveness 
It is most likely that the fmding that WML condition accounted for significant 
variance in the revenge sub scale of the TRIM, was merely an artifact of the study; 
however, one alternative explanation can be provided. Recall that System 2 processing is 
responsible for hypothetical thinking. It is possible that those in the WML condition 
were not fully able to imagine themselves in the position of having just lost a potential 
job due to their friend's negligence. As such, they might have regarded the transgression 
as less severe than did participants in the no-WML condition. If the transgression was 
seen as less severe amongst participants in the WML condition, then these participants 
may have considered forgiveness a less difficult task than did those in the no-WML 
condition, and may have seen the transgressor as more deserving of forgiveness. 
Moreover, those in the WML condition may have been more likely to rely on a 
forgiveness heuristic in which they based their likelihood to forgive on their attitude 
towards forgiveness itself. That is to say, those in the WML condition who considered 
forgiveness to be good might have reasoned, forgiveness is good, therefore I should 
forgive and vice versa, rather than taking into account all the effects of forgiveness and 
unforgiveness. This would have led participants in the WML condition to be more 
forgiving than those in the no-WML condition because the mean forgiveness attitude 
score in the final sample was 5.79, where 1 indicates that forgiveness is "Very Bad" and 
7 indicates that forgiveness is "Very Good,". However, this explanation for this fmding 
should be regarded with some skepticism because it was created post-hoc. Future 
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research should use a priori hypotheses to investigate the effects of WML on participants' 
reactions to hypothetical events. One novel hypothesis that could be tested is that 
participants under WML would be less accurate in predicting their thoughts, feelings, or 
behaviours in hypothetical situations than participants not under WML. The accuracy of 
such predictions could then be determined based on previously established findings 
concerning how individuals react to certain types of situations. 
Exploring the Components of Forgiveness 
Although in my Introduction I have focused on incongruence between the 
components of forgiveness, it is not surprising that the affective, cognitive, general and 
behavioural components of attitudes examined here were strongly correlated. I have 
discussed how cognition and affect are differentially associated with System 1 and 
System 2. However, although the nature of the processes within each system differ, both 
systems work with many of the same stimuli, and work towards many of the same goals 
(Stanovich, 2004). System 1 is more closely associated with the goal of genetic 
proliferation, and System 2 is more closely associated with the goals of the individual; 
however, all of these ultimate goals require individuals to meet the more immediate goals 
of navigating their surroundings, avoiding injury, obtaining food and so on. Similarly, 
both cognition and affect are likely to be driven by many of the same stimuli and goals. 
I have focused instead on incongruence between cognition and affect in my 
Introduction because such incongruence is more practically and theoretically interesting 
than when cognition and affect are congruent. For example, clients are more likely to 
struggle with deciding if they forgive a person if cognition and affect are incongruent, 
and therefore incongruence is of greater interest to a clinician. Further, competing 
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cognitive and affective inclinations more strongly suggest that there are multiple 
underlying systems than thoughts and feelings that agree. The correlations between the 
attitude scales were not perfect, indicating some degree of independence between them. 
More importantly, it is my contention that some individuals may experience 
incongruence between these processes, not that all individuals on average experience this 
incongruence. Here we would expect that an individual might score relatively high on 
one or more attitude scales, and relatively low on another, not that on average those who 
tend to score high on one attitude scale would not also tend to score high on the 
remaining attitude scales. This intra-individual incongruence is reflected in participants' 
accounts of their experiences with forgiveness. 
Amongst the measures of explicit attitude, I found that affective attitude and 
behavioural attitude accounted for unique variance in self-defmed forgiveness but that 
cognitive and general attitude towards the transgressor did not. Further, when examining 
forgiveness as defined by the full TRIM, general attitude and behaviour predicted a 
significant proportion of unique variance in forgiveness, but affective and cognitive 
attitude did not. There are a few alternative explanations for these findings. First, there is 
a moderate degree of multicollinearity amongst each of the explicit measures of attitude 
(however VIF values are within an acceptable range; see Table 11). As such, some 
caution is necessary when interpreting the corresponding betas as a measure of relative 
importance because with multicollinearity we might not expect to find the same betas in a 
different sample. 
Further, the affective, cognitive, and general attitude measures were designed by 
Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty (1994) to be directly comparable. I attempted to create a 
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behaviour scale that would also be comparable, but it has not undergone the same 
analysis and reformulation as the other measures to ensure this. It may be the case that 
the behaviour scale accounted for unique variance in forgiveness due to properties of the 
scale other than the fact that it intended to measure behaviour. Moreover, it may be the 
case that behaviour is not a substantial predictor or component of forgiveness, but that 
participants felt obligated to indicate that they would behave amiably towards Patricia 
after having claimed that they forgave her. 
Similarly, it is possible that cognitive or general attitude once accounted for 
unique variance in self-defined forgiveness, but that an awareness of this cognitive or 
general attitude towards Patricia prompted a change in affective and behavioural attitude 
such that these two variables would then come to account for the same variance in 
forgiveness. However, why the variance in affective attitude and predicted behaviour that 
accounted for unique variance in forgiveness would not then prompt a similar change in 
cognitive and general attitude is unknown. It may simply be the case cognitive and 
general attitude did not inform participants' perceptions of whether or not they forgive 
beyond what could be accounted for by affective attitude and predicted behaviour. We 
would still, nonetheless, expect each of these variables to act as strong predictors of 
forgiveness on their own. 
The same arguments described above could be applied when explaining why 
general and behavioural attitude accounted for unique variance in the full TRIM but 
cognitive and affective attitude did not. If we are instead to accept these findings as 
representative of the relative importance of each of these components in both self-defIned 
forgiveness and forgiveness as defined by the TRIM, there is an important implication for 
126 
the continuing debate regarding the correct definition of forgiveness . This evidence 
suggests that forgiveness as defined by the layperson is uniquely affected by the 
individual's affective reaction to the transgressor, whereas forgiveness as it is defmed by 
the TRIM, and potentially by the many authors who use the TRIM as their operational 
definition of forgiveness, relies more heavily on a more general evaluation of the 
transgressor (which may itself covary with affective attitude). This suggestion is further 
supported by the fmding that affective attitude was significantly more strongly correlated 
with forgiveness than was cognitive attitude when the single-item measure of forgiveness 
was used as the measure of forgiveness, however this difference was not significant when 
the full TRIM is used. These fmding then support the argument that I outlined in the 
Introduction, that definitions of forgiveness may often differ based on which potential 
components are considered most integral. 
It is also interesting to note that implicit attitude did not account for unique 
variance in forgiveness over and above what was accounted for by their explicit attitudes 
towards Patricia. In the absence of effective conditioning, implicit attitudes towards 
Patricia might have reflected associations formed by experiences with similar situations 
or people, or implicit reactions to the characteristics of the transgressor suggested by the 
slideshow or hypothetical transgression. The current findings suggest that these 
components of the participants' attitudes did not affect forgiveness independent of 
participant's explicit attitudes towards the transgressor. However, it is also possible that 
an awareness of their implicit attitudes towards the transgressor, via their gut reactions or 
automatic thoughts, helped to form the participants' explicit attitudes. Without the 
unexplained presence of an implicit attitude created by subliminal conditioning, there is 
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no reason why an implicit attitude towards the transgressor would not become an explicit 
attitude towards the transgressor. 
Participants' Past Experiences With Forgiveness 
The data collected regarding participants' actual experiences with forgiveness 
supports the view of lay-forgiveness as fragmented that was developed from my review 
of lay experiences with forgiveness in the Introduction. In this view, individuals often 
experience internal conflict when forgiving, resulting from some of the processes that 
underlie forgiveness occurring in the absence of others. Whether or not this is due to 
incongruence between the two systems posited by dual-process theory, this multi-process 
perspective of forgiveness may help to explain the level of disagreement regarding the 
definition of forgiveness. Each scholar and lay-person may have selected a subset of 
several related processes as the core of what they consider forgiveness. Assigning 
multiple processes the same name may help foster the illusion that these processes are 
inseparable. Clients engaging in forgiveness in therapy may benefit from this more 
nuanced understanding of the construct. Making it explicit that they are attempting to 
engage in multiple independent processes may help quell frustration when these 
processes do not co-occur. 
Limitations 
Beyond the failed conditioning phase of the study, there are a few limitations that 
should be taken into account when examining the data presented here. First, the number 
of participants included in the analyses is inconsistent. Four participants, who did not 
respond to the GNAT as intended, were removed from any analysis involving implicit 
attitude scores, but were retained in the main analyses. Further, those participants that did 
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not rehearse the WML digits as expected were included in analyses examining potential 
moderators of the effects ofWML conditions, or alternatives to examining assigned 
WML condition. This means that these analyses involved slightly different samples and 
therefore cannot be directly compared. 
In interpreting my results one must also consider the possibility that participants' 
responses to some measures may have been influenced by those completed prior. For 
example, participants who indicated that they had forgiven Patricia may have been more 
likely to rate themselves as more forgiving. I chose to have participants complete tasks in 
an order that would give priority to those measures that would be used to answer the 
questions most central to my thesis. This means that we can assume that the responses to 
the forgiveness scales were not affected by exposure to the remaining measures but the 
effect of the order of the measures is unknown. 
A major limitation that must be considered when interpreting the analyses 
regarding potential components of forgiveness is that the study was designed for optimal 
internal validity rather than external validity. As such, participants were responding to a 
hypothetical transgression that may lead to less realistic forms of forgiveness. This choice 
was ideal for a first study examining the relevance of dual-process theory to forgiveness; 
however, it may be less appropriate when examining potential components of 
forgiveness. Future research may be used to determine if cognition, affect, behaviour, and 
implicit attitudes play different roles for individuals forgiving real transgressions, and if 
the importance of these potential components offorgiveness varies by situation. 
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Dual-Process Theory, "True Forgiveness," and the "True Self" 
As various models compete to define the core aspects of forgiveness, it is 
interesting to note the claims made concerning what we can accurately describe as 
forgiveness. In examining the literature one frequently encounters the term "true 
forgiveness" (e.g. Coleman & Byrd, 2003; Enright et aI., 1991, 1998; Freedman, 2008), 
or alternatively "false" or "pseudo forgiveness". Two different issues get conflated in this 
language. The first is the question of whether or not the phenomenon being referred to is 
a component of forgiveness. For example, does forgiveness include condonation or 
reconciliation, or are these differentiable from forgiveness? In this case the language of 
"true forgiveness", although arguably not the best choice of words, conveys the author's 
concern with sufficient accuracy. 
However, at times "false forgiveness" (or similar terms like "pseudo 
forgiveness") is used to refer to the existence of components of forgiveness either in the 
absence of phenomena that the author considers necessary for complete forgiveness, or 
accompanied by phenomena that the author sees as contradictory to forgiveness. This 
occurrence may better be described as incomplete or conflicted forgiveness. This may 
cause confusion; for example If a therapist were to assert that the forgiveness expressed 
by a client is not true forgiveness, a client may interpret this to mean that the changes, or 
processes, that occurred were false, rather than that other essential (by Enright's 
definition) changes, or processes, had not occurred. This distinction can only be made 
clear explicitly positing that forgiveness consists of multiple parallel processes. 
This is particularly troublesome in the case that the phenomena that are 
considered contradictory to forgiveness exist either outside the client's awareness or 
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beyond the client's control. In such a case the client may perceive the therapist as asking 
something of them that is beyond their understanding or control. Both therapist and client 
may be missing the vital point that one part of the individual has validly and truly 
"forgiven" (by an acceptable definition of forgiveness, whatever that might be), whereas 
otherpart(s) of the individual has not. Until the role of the unconscious is made explicit, 
we cannot confront any problems that may reside there. 
One important consideration is that System 1 and System 2 processes may also be 
thought to differentially represent the "true self'. For some the true selfis best 
represented by what individuals "feel in their hearts" and for others the true self is best 
represented by their conscious thoughts and intentions. Indeed, there is currently an 
ongoing debate with regard to whether or not some (or all) implicit associations should be 
considered a reflection of the true self (as personal associations), or merely an impersonal 
reflection of the cultural norms within which an individual is situated (as extra-personal 
associations; Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Gawronski, Peters, & LeBel, 2008). Gawronski et 
al. (2008) have argued that there may be no objective distinction between associations 
which do or do not truly reflect the self, but that instead the distinction between personal 
and extra-personal associations should be understood in terms of an individual's 
sUbjective sense of authorship. 
The debate as to which processes best defme "true forgiveness" may reflect this 
more fundamental debate regarding the nature of the true self. When someone asks "do I 
truly forgive?" they must determine what "I" refers to. If one's explicit mind (System 2) 
forgives, but their implicit mind (System 1) does not, then the two Systems are pitted 
against each other as determinants of one's true self. The answer as to which System best 
represents the individual, may have more to do with the individual's personal sense of 
ownership than with the nature of the processes themselves. 
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Individuals who define forgiveness by System 1 processes may be the same 
individuals who also regard implicit responses as those which best reveal an individual's 
true nature. Conversely, individuals who defme forgiveness by System 2 processes may 
be the same individuals who also regard explicit processes as those which best reveal an 
individual's true nature. Future research may test this hypothesis by examining if 
individual differences in conceptions of the true self do in fact co-vary with conceptions 
of forgiveness. This reasoning further suggests that when discussing the true nature of 
forgiveness with patients, clinicians must be aware of the impact of simultaneously 
communicating about the nature of the true self, as altering a patient's understanding of 
the self is likely to have effects that reach beyond the realm of forgiveness. 
Further Applications of Dual-Process Theory to Forgiveness Therapy and Research 
The theoretical background provided by dual-process theory may provide unique 
insights into other little understood findings within forgiveness research, and help to 
generate new hypotheses that can then be tested empirically using techniques already 
mastered by dual-process researchers. For example, forgiveness researchers have 
suggested that the way that an individual experiences forgiveness may have important 
implications for how it affects health and well-being (Rye et aI. 2001; Worthington, 
Witvliet, Pietrini, & Miller, 2007). Thus, aside from meeting different definitions of 
forgiveness, forgiveness that arises out of System 1 processing or System 2 processing 
may have different emotional consequences and implications for well-being (c.f. 
DeCourville et aI., 2008). Under some circumstances, forgiveness motivated by System 
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2, analytic decision making may lead to less congruent emotional effects and therefore 
fewer positive consequences for health and well-being than forgiveness that arises from 
implicit System 1 reactions and changes within the associative network that System 1 
processing draws upon. (However, see below for a scenario in which such forgiveness 
could hasten the improvement of well-being following a transgression). 
As discussed in the Introduction (see Models of Forgiveness), Worthington and 
his colleagues (2007) have distinguished between two types of forgiveness: decisional 
forgiveness and emotional forgiveness. Decisional forgiveness was defined as the 
decision to change behavioural responses to the transgressor, whereas emotional 
forgiveness was defmed as a transformation in which negative, ''unforgiving'' emotions 
are replaced with positive ones. They argue that decisional forgiveness may be related to 
health only by decreasing hostility and therefore increasing social support, whereas 
emotional forgiveness may be directly related to positive health outcomes by reducing 
negative affect and stress. Evidence for this assertion may be drawn from the fmding that 
those who have seen forgiveness as motivated by a sense of obligation (motivated by 
religious or social beliefs) have experienced more residual anger towards a transgressor 
and higher blood pressure as compared to those who have seen forgiveness as motivated 
by love for the offender (Huang & Enright, 2000). 
There are multiple ways we might understand this in terms of the two systems 
posited by dual-process theory. One interpretation would be that reasoning through 
System 2 processing led these individuals to the conclusion that forgiveness would be in 
accordance with their beliefs and therefore would be the correct choice. Alternatively, it 
is possible that individuals who see forgiveness as motivated by a sense of obligation, 
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would have a pre-existing association, or make use of an automatic, "must forgive in all 
situations" heuristic. This could then lead to post-hoc rationalizations through System 2 
processing, and the decision to forgive. It is unlikely that processes in either alternative 
would lead to changes in their associations with the offender or with their experiences of 
the transgression within the associative network, which is potentially a vital System 1 
process to relieve negative affect and stress. 
In a similar example, as discussed in the Introduction (see Models of 
Forgiveness), Trainer (1981) differentiates between three different types offorgiveness. 
Role-expected forgiveness and expedient forgiveness are externally motivated by social 
expectations and goals, as well as practical considerations, and are thus largely cognitive 
and behavioural. Intrinsic forgiveness, however, refers to forgiveness that is intrinsically 
motivated and involves not only cognitive and behavioural change, but affective change 
as well. Trainer found role-expected and expedient forgiveness to be associated with 
anxiety, fear, and hostility, each of which has been related to reduced well-being. On the 
other hand, Trainer found no such association with intrinsic forgiveness. However, future 
studies are required to determine if this is because System 1 versus System 2 processes 
regarding forgiveness lead to different levels of negative affect, or if fear or anxiety lead 
to role-expected or expedient forgiveness. 
Case studies have suggested that a conscious decision to forgive, made in the 
absence of the affective experience of forgiveness, may lead to a more holistic 
forgiveness within a short period oftime (DiBlasio, 1998; 2000). Reports of these case 
studies were based on forgiveness oriented therapy sessions at the time of the decision to 
forgive, and follow-up either by telephone or in person two or six years later, 
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respectively. If these findings can be replicated in future research, dual-process theory 
may help to elucidate this phenomenon by accounting for how the two systems interact. 
For example, if a conscious decision to forgive is made, often paired with a 
conscious effort to change cognitions, an offended party may choose to think of the 
benefits of the decision to forgive rather than focus on their hurt each time the 
transgressor comes to mind. This would result in repeated mental pairings of the 
transgressor with a more positive stimulus. This maY,change the offended party's 
associations with the offender, allowing emotions originating in System 1 to change with 
time. 
It is interesting to note that DiBlasio's findings seemingly contradict those of 
previous researchers who have found that affective change, and its consequences for 
well-being, do not follow from a cognitive decision to forgive motivated by social goals 
or pressures. It may be that these particular motivations are less likely to create an 
effective positive stimulus, or that the previous studies did not allow enough time for this 
affective change to occur. Dual-process theory provides a theoretical background that 
may be used to create and test hypotheses such as these. 
Recall that participants in the "unresolved forgiveness" factor in Stewart et al. 's 
(2010) study strongly agreed with statements indicating that they continued to feel anger 
and resentment towards the transgressor. It is of further interest that these same 
participants indicated stronger agreement with statements such as "I forgave the person 
who hurt me because I knew it would make me feel better" and "I forgave the person 
who hurt me to get rid of my feelings of anger and resentment for what s/he did" as 
compared to participants in the other two factors. Thus, it would seem that it is when 
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people are motivated to forgive by the desire to feel better that participants are less likely 
to feel better. 
This seemingly paradoxical fmding may be better understood from a dual-process 
perspective. If the reason that some individuals forgive is that they want to feel better, 
then these individuals must not have felt good prior to forgiving. This means that these 
individuals' decisions to forgive were not initiated by an implicit affective change, but 
instead occurred through conscious cognitive processing. Because emotions are largely 
the result of System 1 processing, these individuals do not have direct conscious control 
over their emotions and so a direct attempt to change this implicit affective level was 
ineffective. It would only be by creating new associations or by fmding new affectively 
laden reasons to forgive, which would act as natural stimuli to System 1 processing, that 
one could then proceed from deciding to forgive at a conscious cognitive level, to 
forgiving at an implicit affective level. If the other participants in Stewart et al. 's (2010) 
study had first found implicit affective reasons to forgive, such as out oflove or 
compassion, then these individuals would have already begun the affective changes that 
the participants that characterized the unresolved forgiveness factor had considered to be 
the benefit of forgiveness . 
Glucose acts as a primary fuel for effortful processing, and a lack of glucose has 
been shown to inhibit System 2, but not System 1 (Galliot & Baumeister, 2007; 
Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008). It is therefore interesting to note that those high in 
symptoms of type 2 diabetes, who are more likely to have low levels of glucose, have 
been shown to be less likely to forgive (DeWall, Pond, & Bushman, 2010). It may be 
that, with System 2 inhibited, many diabetics are unable to overcome residual anger or 
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hurt in cases where others would be motivated by situational factors to use System 2 to 
override unforgiving impulses. Future research may explore this hypothesis. 
In the Introduction I discussed three different ways of interpreting the many 
processes which underlie lay and scholarly definitions of forgiveness. We may see 
forgiveness as having a set of critical processes, as having a single core process with 
multiple correlates, or as taking many forms. Which answer we ultimately choose is 
perhaps but a matter of semantics; however, its implications for how we communicate 
with lay people and others within academia has real world consequences. 
In the clinical world, if clients are told that their current views of forgiveness are 
incorrect, it may change their approaches to forgiveness and how they feel about their 
experiences with what they considered forgiveness. It is yet unknown if clients would 
then be more likely to experience "true forgiveness", or if they would only find 
themselves less satisfied with their current states. For research and the advancement of 
theory, the consequences of disregarding alternative definitions of forgiveness are more 
predictable. 
Already there has been multiple calls for researchers to take note of the varying 
conceptions of forgi veness that may be held, as these conceptions will influence how 
participants will interpret and respond to forgiveness-related questions, and ultimately 
will influence the understanding of forgiveness and its consequences that is then derived 
from research (DeCourville et aI., 2008; Rye et al. 2001; Thompson & Snyder, 2004; 
Witvliet 2001). Those who fail to take this into account will find mixed results, or else 
results that differ from sample to sample. Even when explicitly instructed as to how to 
define forgiveness, participants are likely to disregard such instructions as past research 
has found that even after a four-week educational program, participants have retained 
conceptions of forgiveness that their teachers rejected (Hui & Ho, 2004). 
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For these reasons, whether scholars choose to accept only a single definition of 
forgiveness, accept all cases of forgiveness as identified by the forgiver as different forms 
of forgiveness, or decide to view each process as a component of forgiveness, care must 
be taken in dealing with the consequences. If scholars wish to maintain a single definition 
of forgiveness at least two steps must be taken. 
First, researchers must be conscientious of the diversity of conceptions of 
forgiveness that may be applied by lay persons when the term "forgiveness" is used in 
instructions or questionnaires. Second, those constructs and conceptions that the 
researcher distinguishes from true forgiveness must be assigned new terminology, and be 
studied separately. The experiences that have been termed pseudo-forgiveness or false 
forgiveness (e.g. Enright et aI., 1991) are equally unlikely to cohere to a single definition, 
and are just as common, if not more common, than what a researcher considers to be true 
forgiveness. Similar precautions must be taken if forgiveness is viewed as having varying 
degrees of completeness or different forms. Each component or form must be recognized, 
named, and its separate consequences and interactions with other components 
documented. Exploring dual-process theory in the context of forgiveness represents a first 
step in dealing with these challenges because it may allow us to better understand the 
multiple parallel processes that may be included in a definition of forgiveness, and 
provides new terminology through which the characteristics of these processes may be 
discussed. 
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There are many ways that dual-process theory may also help to inform therapeutic 
practices aimed at forgiveness. It is possible that when clinicians wish to create cognitive 
change, as in the case when a patient wants to forgive, they may have more success if 
they can identify whether this change needs to occur within System I or System 2 
processes and then use strategies for change that are tailored to that system. This would 
be consistent with the stimulus Smith and Neumann's (2005) suggestion that emotions 
originating from System 2 processing, that is to say those that are evoked by conscious, 
cognitive appraisal, may be affected by reappraisal, whereas those originating from 
System I processing may only be changed by altering input. 
Brewin (1989) has similarly provided therapists with recommendations for 
bringing about cognitive change that distinguish between creating change amongst 
verbally accessible knowledge (System 2 processing), creating change in the nature and 
intrusiveness of unconscious memories (System 1 processing), and creating change in 
conscious-strategies for self-regulation (how System 2 processes moderate System 1 
processes). Each of these strategies were designed to be compatible with the degree of 
consciousness and automaticity of each change and may be appropriate within the context 
of unwanted unforgiveness. Future research may build on Brewin's recommendations to 
create similarly tailored strategies that are specific to the types of change required to 
forgive. 
The Implications of Future Research for Clinical Psychology 
As previously noted, the literature on dual-process theory in cognitive and social 
psychology is vast. Dual-process theory has been slower to enter the clinical domain, but 
a modest number of dual-process models now exist within clinical psychology (e.g. 
139 
Beevers, 2005; Brewin, 1989; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Epstein, 1994; 1998; 
Haeffel et aI., 2007). Continued research on dual-process theory and forgiveness may, by 
its contribution, encourage the continued development of dual-process theory within 
clinical psychology. Thus, research in dual-process theory and research in forgiveness 
should mutually profit from combined research. 
As dual-process theory becomes better understood within the clinical context, 
therapists may find it useful to describe a simple dual-process theory of mind to patients. 
Many lay persons are likely to be unaware of automatic mental processes, and are likely 
to be sceptical of the assertion that their behaviour is affected by automatic processes 
because this assertion likely does not reflect their sUbjective experiences. Moreover, an 
overly deterministic depiction of human nature could foster an external locus of control 
and its associated consequences for well-being (e.g., Presson & Benassi, 1996). Yet, 
individuals may benefit from knowing that some of their thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviours may be determined by processes outside of their awareness. They may feel 
less frustration when their thoughts and feelings are mixed, or when they react differently 
to a situation than they had predicted if they can understand why they feel that way. A 
basic knowledge of dual-process theory may help individuals to understand how 
automatic processes can exist despite their conscious experiences, and, by positing the 
coexistence of System 2, may do so without undermining a healthy sense of self-control. 
Just as the effects of internal and external locus of control have been studied, future 
research should examine the effects of knowing and/or accepting a dual-process theory of 
mind. 
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One might speculate that the reason why dual-process theory has been slower to 
enter clinical psychology, as compared to cognitive and social psychology, is because of 
the deeply personal nature of psychotherapy. In this context, one might be particularly 
reluctant to "reduce" individuals to products of evolution whose behaviours can be 
determined by the environments that act on them (as in the stimulus-response patterns of 
System 1). !fa dual-process theory of mind, such as that posited by Evans (2009), is to be 
accepted, it is highly unlikely that an individual has two minds when making social 
judgements, and has two minds when making decisions, but only has one mind when in a 
therapist's office. Clinicians, who must frequently address internal conflict, are no doubt 
familiar with this fact. However, it would appear that they continue to rely on older, 
psychoanalytic, models to explain this phenomenon. 
Psychoanalytic theory has had many years to convince clinicians that, as both 
mechanistic and humanistic processes playa significant role in determining human 
behaviour, the mechanistic (at least as depicted in psychoanalytic theory) is human. 
Clinicians may be hesitant to accept yet another mechanistic explanation for human 
behaviour before it has been demonstrated that dual-process theory is as clinically 
relevant as psychoanalytic theory. By pursuing research on dual-process theory in the 
highly humanistic field of forgiveness, and determining if dual-process theory can better 
explain human behaviour and generate more effective clinical practices, we can assist 
clinicians, researchers, and lay persons to reconcile this impersonal view of mental 
processes with the desire to see people as human. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
I made three main hypotheses for the research presented here. I predicted that 
there would be a main effect on forgiveness scores for affective condition, that this effect 
would be moderated by WML condition, and that the relationship between affective 
condition and forgiveness would be mediated by implicit attitude. If these hypotheses 
were supported, it would suggest that System 1 processes can playa role in forgiveness, 
and that System 2 processes can inhibit the impact of System 1 processes on forgiveness. 
Each of these 1}ypotheses hinged on the assumption that the conditioning phase of the 
study would be effective. All evidence indicates that this phase of the study was not 
effective. As a result no conclusions could be drawn regarding these hypotheses. 
My findings did, however, support the view that forgiveness is often experienced 
as fragmented. My correlational data suggested that on average those who tend to have a 
positive affective attitude towards someone will also tend have a positive cognitive 
attitude towards that individual. However, the majority of participants indicated that they 
had on at least one occasion experienced conflicting thoughts and feelings after forgiving 
or not forgiving a real transgression. Although this does not provide direct support for my 
main hypotheses, it does suggest that continued research on potential sources of 
incongruence between thoughts and feelings in forgiveness is warranted. For example, 
given my correlational fmdings, this future research may be used to determine when an 
individual is likely to experience such internal conflict. 
As research within psychology continues to proliferate, it will become 
increasingly important to create work that is integrative. In creating this thesis I have 
sought to bring a well-known and well-supported theory to an area of psychology where 
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it is unknown. With future research we may see both the fields of forgiveness and dual-
process theory benefit. 
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Appendix A 
Measures 
Ratings of Potential Transgressor Stimuli 
Each item was displayed in random order and appeared as depicted in Figure AI. 
Based on these photos, how ATTRACTIVE is the woman depicted? 
(press Ctrl + Right Arrow to skip) 
Not 
attractive at 
all 
I 2 3 4 5 
Based on these photos, how FAMILIAR is the woman depicted? 
(Press Ctrl + Right Arrow to skip) 
Not familiar 
at all 
I 2 3 4 5 
Based on these photos, how LIKEABLE is the woman depicted? 
(Press Ctrl + Right Arrow to skip) 
Not likeable 
at all 
I 2 3 4 5 
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6 
6 
6 
Very 
Attractive 
7 
Very 
Familiar 
7 
Very 
likeable 
7 
Based on these photos, how ATIRACTIVE is the woman deptcted? 
(Press Ctrf + Right Arrow to skip) 
Not 
attractive 
at all 
Very 
attractive 
Figure AI. Example rating prompt displayed after potential transgressor stimuli. 
Ratings of Potential Transgressor Reference Photographs 
154 
The same items as used to obtain ratings of the potential transgressor stimuli for 
the conditioning phase of the main study were used to obtain ratings of the potential 
reference photographs that could be used to accompany the dependent measures in the 
main study. An example of how these items appeared is depicted in Figure A2. 
Based on this photo, how LIKEABLE Is the woman depk:ted? 
(Press CbI + Right Anow 10 skip) 
Notftkeable 
at all 
~ . 
Figure A2. Example display with potential transgressor reference photograph and rating prompt. 
Ratings of Potential Pleasant and Unpleasant Stimuli 
The instructions were displayed as depicted in Figure A3. 
Please rate the folowlng plclllres based on your INITIAl reaction as 10 how pleasant or unpIeasanlthey are. 
1 Will indicate extJemely unpIeasanl and 12 willndlcate extremely pleasant. 
Please press the spaubar to continue. 
Figure A3. Pleasantness rating instructions. 
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The same rating scale, displayed below, accompanied each potential pleasant or 
unpleasant stimulus for the conditioning phase of the main study, which were displayed 
in random order. These items appeared as depicted in Figure A4. 
156 
Please rate the following picture based on your INITIAL reaction as to how pleasant or 
unpleasant it is. 
(press Ctrl + Right Arrow to skip) 
Extremely 
Unpleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
_ rtU lilt '_09 pI(U'+_ "".,.., "lfIlAI. rooeIi"""1O hOI; pIH~ 0( IJIIPIH~ ~ 1\ 
IPnmQo!' RI!1tAmlwloskpt 
7 8 9 
Figure A4. Example display with potential pleasant stimulus and rating prompt. 
Cognitive Attitude Towards The Transgressor 
10 
Extremely 
Pleasant 
11 12 
Participants were instructed "Please indicate whether or not each word describes a 
trait belonging to PATRICIA by clicking on the corresponding number. 
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Press the spacebar to continue." The items below, each accompanied by the reference 
photo of the transgressor, were displayed in a random order. An example item is depicted 
in Figure A5. 
1) Useful 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
Patricia Patricia Describes Patricia N/A 
0 1 2 0 
2) Wise 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
Patricia Patricia Describes Patricia N/A 
0 1 2 0 
3) Safe 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
Patricia Patricia Describes Patricia N/A 
0 1 2 0 
4) Beneficial 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
Patricia Patricia Describes Patricia N/A 
0 1 2 0 
5) Valuable 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
Patricia Patricia Describes Patricia N/A 
0 1 2 0 
6) Perfect 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
Patricia Patricia Describes Patricia N/A 
0 1 2 0 
158 
7) Wholesome 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
Patricia Patricia Describes Patricia N/A 
0 1 2 D 
8) Useless 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
Patricia Patricia Describes Patricia N/A 
0 1 2 D 
9) Foolish 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
Patricia Patricia Describes Patricia N/A 
0 1 2 D 
10) Unsafe 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
Patricia Patricia Describes Patricia N/A 
0 1 2 D 
II)Harmful 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
Patricia Patricia Describes Patricia N/A 
0 1 2 D 
12) Worthless 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
Patricia Patricia Describes Patricia N/A 
0 1 2 D 
13) Imperfect 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
Patricia Patricia Describes Patricia N/A 
0 1 2 D 
14) Unhealthy 
Does Not Describe 
Patricia 
o 
Slightly Describes 
Patricia 
1 
Definitely 
Describes Patricia 
2 
Does this word describe a trait belonging to Patricia? 
Does not Describe 
Patricia 
Slightly Describes 
Patricia 
Imperfect 
Definitely Describes 
Patricia 
Figure A5. Example display with cognitive attitude rating prompt. 
Affective Attitude Towards the Transgressor 
Not Applicable 
N/A 
D 
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Participants were instructed "Please indicate whether or not each word describes 
your feelings toward PATRICIA. Press the spacebar to continue." The affective attitude 
items below followed the same format as the cognitive attitude items, depicted in Figure 
A5, and were displayed in random order. 
1) Love 
Does Not Describe 
My Feelings 
o 
Slightly Describes 
My Feelings 
1 
Definitely 
Describes My 
Feelings 
2 
N/A 
D 
160 
2) Delighted 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
My Feelings My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
3) Happy 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
My Feelings My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
4) Calm 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
My Feelings My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings 
0 I 2 D 
5) Excited 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
6) Relaxed 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
7) Acceptance 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
161 
8) Joy 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
9) Hateful 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
10) Sad 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
11)Annoyed 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
12) Tense 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
13) Bored 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
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14) Angry 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
15) Disgusted 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
16) Sorrow 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Feelings Describes My N/A 
Feelings Feelings 
0 1 2 D 
General Attitude Towards the Transgressor 
For this measure participants were instructed "Please indicate whether or not each 
word describes your general evaluation of PATRICIA by clicking on the corresponding 
number. Press the spacebar to continue." The general attitude items below followed the 
same format as the cognitive attitude items, depicted in Figure A5, and were displayed in 
random order. 
1) Positive 
Does Not 
Describe My 
Attitude 
toward Patricia 
o 
Slightly Describes 
My Attitude 
toward Patricia 
1 
Definitely 
Describes My 
Attitude toward 
Patricia 
2 
N/A 
D 
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2) Like 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Attitude Describes My N/A 
Attitude toward Patricia Attitude toward 
toward Patricia Patricia 
0 1 2 D 
3) Good 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Attitude Describes My N/A 
Attitude toward Patricia Attitude toward 
toward Patricia Patricia 
0 1 2 D 
4) Desirable 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Attitude Describes My N/A 
Attitude toward Patricia Attitude toward 
toward Patricia Patricia 
0 1 2 D 
5) Negative 
Does Not Describe Slightly Describes Definitely 
My Attitude My Attitude Describes My N/A 
toward Patricia toward Patricia Attitude toward 
Patricia 
0 1 2 D 
6) Dislike 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Attitude Describes My N/A 
Attitude toward Patricia Attitude toward 
toward Patricia Patricia 
0 1 2 D 
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7) Bad 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Attitude Describes My N/A 
Attitude toward Patricia Attitude toward 
toward Patricia Patricia 
0 1 2 D 
8) Undesirable 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Attitude Describes My N/A 
Attitude toward Patricia Attitude toward 
toward Patricia Patricia 
0 1 2 D 
Behaviour Towards the Transgressor 
For this measure participants were instructed "Please indicate whether or not each 
word describes your future behaviour toward PATRICIA by clicking on the 
corresponding number. Press the spacebar to continue." The behaviour items below 
followed the same format as the cognitive attitude items, depicted in Figure A5, and were 
displayed in random order. 
1) Aggressive 
Does Not 
Describe My 
Behavior 
toward Patricia 
o 
2) Avoidant 
Does Not Describe 
My Behavior 
toward Patricia 
o 
Slightly Describes 
My Behavior 
toward Patricia 
1 
Slightly Describes 
My Behavior 
toward Patricia 
1 
Definitely 
Describes My 
Behavior toward 
Patricia 
2 
Definitely 
Describes My 
Behavior toward 
Patricia 
2 
N/A 
D 
N/A 
D 
3) Malevolent 
Does Not 
Describe My 
Behavior 
toward Patricia 
0 
4) Unfriendly 
Does Not 
Describe My 
Behavior 
toward Patricia 
0 
5) Cold 
Does Not 
Describe My 
Behavior 
toward Patricia 
0 
6) Gentle 
Does Not 
Describe My 
Behavior 
toward Patricia 
0 
7) Attentive 
Does Not 
Describe My 
Behavior 
toward Patricia 
o 
Slightly Describes 
My Behavior 
toward Patricia 
1 
Slightly Describes 
My Behavior 
toward Patricia 
I 
Slightly Describes 
My Behavior 
toward Patricia 
I 
Slightly Describes 
My Behavior 
toward Patricia 
1 
Slightly Describes 
My Behavior 
toward Patricia 
1 
Definitely 
Describes My 
Behavior toward 
Patricia 
2 
Definitely 
Describes My 
Behavior toward 
Patricia 
2 
Definitely 
Describes My 
Behavior toward 
Patricia 
2 
Definitely 
Describes My 
Behavior toward 
Patricia 
2 
Definitely 
Describes My 
Behavior toward 
Patricia 
2 
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N/A 
D 
N/A 
D 
N/A 
D 
N/A 
D 
N/A 
D 
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8) Benevolent 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Behavior Describes My N/A 
Behavior toward Patricia Behavior toward 
toward Patricia Patricia 
0 1 2 D 
9) Friendly 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Behavior Describes My N/A 
Behavior toward Patricia Behavior toward 
toward Patricia Patricia 
0 1 2 D 
lO)Wann 
Does Not Slightly Describes Definitely 
Describe My My Behavior Describes My N/A 
Behavior toward Patricia Behavior toward 
toward Patricia Patricia 
0 1 2 D 
Potential GNAT Attribute Stimuli Ratings 
For this measure participants were instructed: 
We would now like to know what you consider good and bad. Please rate the 
following items based on how quickly and easily you can categorize each as 
representing "good" or "bad." 
1 will indicate Very Clearly Bad, and 1 0 will indicate Very Clearly Good. 
Please press the spacebar to continue. 
The potential GNAT attribute stimuli were presented in random order. The same rating 
scale accompanied each potential stimulus: 
Very 
Cleary 
Bad 
1 2 
Clearly 
Bad 
3 4 5 6 7 
See Figure A6 for an example of how these items appeared. 
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Figure A6. Example display for potential GNAT attribute stimuli ratings. 
Brief Mood Introspection Scale 
Clearly 
Good 
8 9 
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Very 
Clearly 
Good 
10 
For the BMIS (Mayer, J. D., & Gaschke, 1988), participants were instructed "Please 
select the response on the scale below that indicates how well each adjective or phrase 
describes your present mood." The items appeared in the following order, on a single 
screen with a scrollbar (see Figure A7). 
1. Lively 
xx 
Definitely 
Do Not Feel 
x 
Do Not Feel 
v 
Slightly Feel 
vv 
Definitely 
Feel 
168 
2. Happy 
XX X V VV 
Definitely Definitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
3. Sad 
XX X V VV 
Definitely Definitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
4. Tired 
XX X V VV 
Definitely Definitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
5. Caring 
XX X V VV 
Definitely Definitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
6. Content 
XX X V VV 
Definitely Definitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
7. Gloomy 
XX X V VV 
Definitely Definitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
8. Jittery 
XX X V VV 
Definitely Definitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
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9. Drowsy 
XX X V VV 
Definitely DefInitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
10. Grouchy 
XX X V VV 
Definitely Definitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
11. Peppy 
XX . X V VV 
Definitely Definitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
12. Nervous 
XX X V VV 
Definitely Definitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
13. Calm 
XX X V VV 
DefInitely Definitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
14. Loving 
XX X V VV 
DefInitely Definitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
15. Fed up 
XX X V VV 
Definitely Definitely 
Do Not Feel Do Not Feel Slightly Feel Feel 
16. Active 
xx 
Definitely 
Do Not Feel 
x 
Do Not Feel 
Overall, my mood is: 
Very 
Unpleasant 
v 
Slightly Feel 
vv 
Definitely 
Feel 
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Very 
Pleasant 
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Figure A7. Initial display of the BMIS. 
Attention to Affective Stimuli 
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The extent to which participants attended to affective stimuli during the 
conditioning phase of the study was measured with the following item: 
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If you found yourself in the distractor condition, were you able to dis attend to the 
images when they appeared on the screen or did you find they grabbed your 
attention? 
DYes, I was able to ignore the distractor images 
D No, I could not stop looking at the distractor images 
Subjective Awareness Of The Affective Stimuli 
To assess if participants were subjectively aware of the affective stimuli during 
the conditioning phase of the study they were ftrst asked: 
Did you see anything strange during the slide show? 
DYes DNo 
Participants who responded "Yes" were instructed "Please describe what you saw that 
was strange." The following item was then displayed to all participants. 
Did you see any images flash on the screen before the target and the images of 
Patricia? 
DYes DNo 
Participants who responded "Yes" were then asked, "Please describe the image(s) that 
you saw." 
Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory (TRIM) 
All items from the TRIM (McCullough et aI., 2006), except for the fIrst, were 
displayed in random order. The fIrst of the following items, which was used as the 
measure of forgiveness as dermed by the participant, was always displayed before the 
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others. Each item was accompanied by the reference photo of the transgressor as were the 
attitude items (see Figure A5). 
I) I forgive her for what she did to me. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
I 
Disagree 
2 
2) I'll make her pay. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
I 
Disagree 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Neutral 
3 
Agree 
4 
Agree 
4 
3) I am trying to keep as much distance between us as possible. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree 
Disagree 
I 2 3 4 
4) Even though her actions hurt me, I have goodwill for himlher. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree 
Disagree 
I 2 3 4 
5) I wish that something bad would happen to her. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree 
Disagree 
I 2 3 4 
6) I am living as if she doesn't exist, isn't around. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree 
Disagree 
I 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
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7) I want us to bury the hatchet and move forward with our relationship. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
8) I don't trust her. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
9) Despite what she did, I want us to have a positive relationship again. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
10) I want her to get what she deserves. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
11) I am rmding it difficult to act warmly toward her. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
12) I am avoiding her. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
13) Although she hurt me, I am putting the hurts aside so we could resume our 
relationship. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Disagree 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Agree 
4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
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14) I'm going to get even. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
15) I cut off the relationship with her. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
16) I have released my anger so I can work on restoring our relationship to health. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
17) I want to see her hurt and miserable. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
18) I withdraw from her. 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
Working Memory Load Maintenance 
To assess if the memorized digits were maintained in working memory 
participants were asked the following questions in the stated order. 
1) How hard was it to remember the numbers you were asked to memorize? 
Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 
Very Hard 
5 
2) Were you rehearsing the numbers in your mind as you completed the study? 
DYes, constantly or almost constantly 
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DYes, once in a while 
o No, or hardly at all 
Tendency To Forgive 
The Tendency To Forgive scale (Brown, 2003) was displayed on a single screen 
with a scroll bar and contained the following instructions and items in the stated order. 
Please use the following scale to rate your agreement/disagreement with each statement: 
1. I tend to get over it quickly when someone hurts my feelings. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2. If someone wrongs me, I often think about it a lot afterwards 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. I have a tendency to harbor grudges. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
4. When people wrong me, my approach is just to forgive and forget. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
Agree 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
7 
Transgression Comprehension Questionnaire 
The following questions were displayed individually in the stated order. 
Participants were provided with a text field where they could type the answer for each 
question (see Figure A8). 
1) In the offence described, what did Patricia offer to do for you? 
2) What distracted Patricia from doing what she said she would do? 
In the offence described. what did Patricla offar to do for you? 
Press ENTER when you have typed your answer 
Figure AB. Example display for comprehension questions. 
Remaining Items Regarding Forgiveness and Transgressions 
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Each of the following items were displayed individually in the stated order 
(except when otherwise indicated). Open-ended questions were accompanied by a large 
text field (for an example see Figure A9). 
1) "Forgiveness" means different things to different people. What does it mean to 
you? 
2) Independent of circumstance, how good or bad would you say forgiveness is in 
general? 
Very 
Bad 
1 2 3 4 
Very Good 
5 6 7 
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3) In general, how good or bad is it when a friend is irresponsible about things that 
affect you? 
Very 
Bad 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
4) In general, how good or bad is it when friend breaks a promise? 
Very 
Bad 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very Good 
7 
Very Good 
7 
5) In general, how good or bad is it when a friend does not live up to an agreement? 
Very 
Bad 
1 2 3 4 
Very Good 
5 6 7 
6) In general, how good or bad is it when you miss out on an opportunity? 
Very 
Bad 
1 2 3 4 
Very Good 
5 6 7 
7) In general, how good or bad is it to get a new job? 
Very 
Bad 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Good 
6 7 
8) a. After you believe you have forgiven a person, have you ever found you still 
feel angry or upset from time to time? 
DYes DNo 
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Participants w.ho answered "No" to question 8a were immediately given question 9a and 
those who answered "Yes" were given the following instructions and questions b through 
d on a single screen. 
You have indicated that you have previously found that you were still angry or 
upset from time to time after forgiving a person. Please tell us about your 
expenence. 
b. Did it surprise or trouble you? 
c. Did it make you doubt whether you have actually forgiven? 
d. How common is it for you to have such mixed feelings and/or thoughts when 
forgiving someone? 
[In order to protect the identity of others involved in the transgression please do 
not provide identifying information, such as names, classes they have attended etc.] 
9) a. Have you ever believed that you had not forgiven a person but found you still 
feel love or affection for that person from time to time? 
DYes DNo 
Participants who answered "No" to question 9a were immediately given question 10 and 
those who answered "Yes" were given the following instructions and questions b through 
d on a single screen. . 
You have indicated that you have previously found that you still loved for felt 
affection for someone that you had NOT forgiven. Please tell us about your 
expenence. 
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b. Did it surprise or trouble you? 
c. Did it make you doubt whether you have actually forgiven? 
d. How common is it for you to have such mixed feelings and/or thoughts when 
forgiving someone? 
[In order to protect the identity of others involved in the transgression please do 
not provide identifying information, such as names, classes they have attended etc.] 
10) When you forgive, do you ALWAYS feel every part of you has forgiven? 
D Yes, certainly D I am not sure DNo 
11) Once you have made a decision as to whether or not you forgive, do you fmd that 
all your thoughts and feelings agree? 
D Yes, certainly D I am not sure DNo 
12) We are also interested in learning more about why people forgive or don't forgive. 
Please think of the last time you forgave someone. Why did you forgive her or 
him? [In order to protect your identity and the identity of others involved in the 
transgression please do not provide any identifying information (e.g. names, 
classes attended etc.) ] 
13) Please think of a time when you did NOT forgive. Why did you not forgive? In 
order to protect your identity and the identity of others involved in the 
transgression please do not provide any identifying information (e.g. names, 
classes attended etc.) 
14) Have you ever experienced a transgression similar to that described in the study 
(i.e. has anyone behaved towards you as Patricia did in the story)? 
DYes DNo 
Participants who answered "Yes" to question 14 were given the following instructions 
and question. Participants who answered "No" were shown the next questionnaire. 
Please describe how the transgression was similar. [In order to protect 
your identity and the identity of others involved in the transgression please 
do not provide any identifying information (e.g. names, classes attended 
etc.)] 
Not at all 
1 
How hurtful was this experience? 
2 3 4 
Very Hurtful 
5 
1. "Forgiveness" Means different things to different people. What does it mean to you? 
Please click "continue" when you are finished writing your answer. 
Figure A9. Display for open-ended item requesting the participant's personal definition of forgiveness. 
Experience With The Name Patricia 
All participants were asked the following. 
In your reallife, have you ever known someone named Patricia? 
DYes DNo 
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Feedback Questionnaire 
Participants were asked the given the following instructions and questions 
individually and in the order stated. 
The study is almost complete. We would now like some feedback about your experience 
participating in this study. 
1. What do you think was the purpose of this study? 
Please click "continue" when you are finished writing your answer. 
2. What do you think are the researchers' hypotheses for this study? 
3. We appreciate the time you have taken to complete this study. As our methods are 
constantly being developed we would be interested to hear any comments you have on 
the study or your experience of forgiveness. Please let us know if you found any of the 
directions confusing or if you feel we could have improved the study in another way. 
Demographics 
Participants were shown each of the following items individually and in the 
following order (unless otherwise specified). 
1) Biological Sex: 
(please specify) 
2) How old are you? 
oFemale oMale 
3) Are you currently completing a Bachelor's degree? 
oOther 
Participants who responded "Yes" were asked questions 4 and 5, participants who 
responded ''No'' were asked question 6. All participants were then asked questions 7 
through 10. 
4) In what year of post-secondary education are you currently enrolled? 
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 Other 
182 
5) What is your Major? 
6) What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
7) 
8) 
D Some high school or less 
D Graduated high school 
D Some college/university 
D Completed Bachelor's degree 
DCompleted associate or technical degree 
D Graduate or professional degree 
DOther (Specify) 
Citizen status: 
oAboriginal 
oLanded Immigrant 
Relationship Status: 
oCanadian 
oVisitor/Student Visa oOther 
o Single o In a relationship 
o Married or live together o Separated 
o Divorce o Widowed 
9) To which cultural/ethnic/racial group do you belong? 
10) What is your religious background? 
oNo religious affiliation 
oEastem Orthodox 
oBuddhist 
oOther (please specify) 
9) Do you consider yourself religious? 
oCatholic 
oJewish 
oHindu 
oProtestant 
oMuslim 
oSikh 
oYes, defInitely o Yes, somewhat oNo, not at all 
Participants who responded "Yes, defInitely" or "Yes, somewhat" were asked the 
following question. 
How important is your religion to you? 
Not 
Important 
At all 
1 2 3 
Very Important 
4 5 
Positive Affective Stimuli 
Appendix B 
Visual Stimuli 
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Figure B3. Positive Affective Stimulus. 
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Figure B5. Positive Affective Stimulus. 
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Figure B7. Positive Affective Stimulus. 
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Figure BIO. Positive Affective Stimulus. 
189 
Negative Affective Stimuli 
Figure BII. Negative Affective Stimulus. 
--
Figure B12. Negative Affective Stimulus. 
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Figure BJ3. Negative Affective Stimulus. 
Figure Bl4. Negative Affective Stimulus. 
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Figure B15. Negative Affective Stimulus. 
Figure B16. Negative Affective Stimulus. 
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Figure Bl7. Negative Affective Stimulus . 
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Figure BiB. Negative Affective Stimulus. 
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Figure B19. Negative Affective Stimulus . 
• 
.. 
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Figure B20. Negative Affective Stimulus. 
GNAT Stimuli 
Transgressor stimuli. 
Figure B2l. Transgressor stimulus used in practice block (the reference photo of the transgressor). 
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Figure B23. Transgressor stimulus used in practice trial of critical block. 
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Figure B24. Transgressor stimulus used in practice trial of critical block. 
Figure B25. Transgressor stimulus used in practice trial of critical block. 
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Figure B29. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B32. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B33. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B34. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B35. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B36. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B37. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B40. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B41. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B42. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B43. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B44. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B45. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B47. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B48. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B49. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B45. Transgressor stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Good Stimuli. 
Figure B52. Good stimulus used in practice block. 
Figure B53. Good stimulus used in practice block. 
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Figure B56. Good stimulus used in practice block. 
Figure B57. Good stimulus used in practice block. 
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Figure B58. Good stimulus used in practice block. 
Figure B59. Good stimulus used in pmctice block. 
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Figure B60. Good stimulus used in practice block. 
J 
Figure B61. Good stimulus used in practice block. 
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Figure B62. Good stimulus used in practice trial of critical block. 
Figure B63. Good stimulus used in practice trial of critical block. 
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Figure B64. Good stimulus used in practice trial of critical block. 
Figure B65. Good stimulus used in practice trial of critical block. 
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Figure B66. Good stimulus used in practice trial of critical 
Figure B67. Good stimulus used in practice trial of critical block. 
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Figure B71. Good stimulus used in practice trial of critical block. 
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Figure E73, Good stimulus used in practice trial of critical block. 
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Figure B76. Good stimulus used in practice trial of critical block. 
-Figure Bn. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B78. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B79. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B80. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B8l. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B82. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B83. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B84. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B85. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B86. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B87. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B90. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B91. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B93. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B94. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B95. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B97. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B98. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B99. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B101. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure BI02. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical b lock. 
.. 
Figure BI03. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure Bl 05. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
237 
Figure BI06. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure BI07. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure BI08. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure BI09. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure BllO. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure Blll. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B112. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B 113. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B114. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B115. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure Bl J 7. Gooosti.nuJus 
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Figure B 118. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure Bl19. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B120. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B 121. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure Bi22. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure Bi23. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B126. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B127. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B129. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B130. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure Bl33. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure B134. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
Figure B135. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Figure BI36. Good stimulus used in critical trial of critical block. 
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Bad Stimuli. 
Figure B13 7. Bad stimulus used in practice block. 
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Figure B139. Bad stimulus used in practice block. 
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Figure B144. Bad stimulus used in practice block. 
Figure B145. Bad stimulus used in practice block. 
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Figure B147. Bad stimulus used in practice trial in critical block. 
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Figure B14B. Bad stimulus used in practice trial in critical block. 
Figure BJ49. Bad stimulus used in practice trial in critical block. 
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Figure B150. Bad stimulus used in practice trial in critical block. 
Figure B 151. Bad stimulus used in practice trial in critical block. 
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Figure BI55. Bad stimulus used in practice trial in critical block. 
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Figure B156. Bad stimulus used in practice trial in critical block. 
Figure BJ 57. Bad stimulus used in practice trial in critical 
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Figure B158. Bad stimulus used in practice trial in critical block. 
Figure B159. Bad stimulus used in practice trial in critical block. 
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Figure B160. Bad stimulus used in practice trial in critical block. 
Figure B 161. Bad stimulus used in practice trial in critical block. 
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Figure B162. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
267 
Figure B163. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure B164. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure B169. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure B 170. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure B17I. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure BI72. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure BJ73. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure B174. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
f 
Figure B 175. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure B176. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure E178. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure B179. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block . 
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Figure B1BO. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure BI8I. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure BI82. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure B183. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure B 184. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure B 185. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure B186. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure BiB7. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure BIBB. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure B189. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure B190. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure Bi9i. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure Bi92. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure BI93. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure BI94. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure B196. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in 
Figure B197. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure B198. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure B199. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure B202. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure B203. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure B204. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure B205. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure B206. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure B207. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
• Figure B209. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical 
block. 
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Figure E2l o. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure E2ll. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure E212. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure E213. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure B214. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure B215. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
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Figure B216. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
294 
295 
Figure E220. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block. 
Figure E221. Bad stimulus used in critical trial in critical block 
Appendix C 
Consent and Debriefing Letters 
Note: Original consent and debriefing letters used narrow margins to create 
appropriate pagination. 
Pilot 1 Consent Letter 
Consent Letter 
Date: October 6,2011 
Project Title: Pleasant and Unpleasant Images 
Principal Investigator (PI): Kathryn Belicki, professor 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University . 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 3873, kbelicki@brocku.ca 
Student Principal Investigator (SPI): Alicia Rubel, MA candidate 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 5456, ar10hd@brocku.ca 
INVITATION 
You are invited to participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is to select stimul i 
for a future study. 
WHAT'S INVOLVED 
As a participant, you will be asked to rate the attractiveness,likeableness, familiarity, or pleasantness of 
different photographs. Participation will take approximately 15 minutes of your time. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS 
By completing this study you will be helping to create well designed research and will witness some of the 
work that goes into research design. There also may be risks associated with participation as you may find 
some of the images you will be rating unpleasant. While we believe that the risk of you finding this study 
upsetting is small, at the end of this letter we have provided a list of resources for counseling should you 
feel upset after the study and wish to obtain help. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included or, in any other way, 
associated with the data collected in the study. Once your participation is complete the researchers will have 
no way of determining which responses belong to you. Furthermore, because our interest is in the 
average responses of the entire group of participants. you will not be identified individually in any 
way in written reports of this research. Your consent form will be stored in a locked lab room and 
destroyed 10 years after your participation. Consent forms will be stored separately from the data obtained 
from your responses. Electronic data files, which contain no reference to your identity, will be kept 10 year 
after publication. Access to these data will be restricted to the researchers associated with the forgiveness 
lab, Dr. Antonia Mantonakis, and Dr. Michael Busseri. For PSYC 1 F90 students: Dr. Kathryn Belicki will not 
be directly involved in assigning grades for PSYC 1 F90. She will not have access to consent forms (which 
contain participant names) until after PSYC 1 F90 grades are filed. Thus, your participation in this study or 
your choice not to participate in this study will have no effect on your PSYC 1 F90 grades. 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you wish, you may decline to answer any questions or participate in 
any 
component ofthe study. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time and may do so 
without any 
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penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. Once you have submitted your responses they will be 
anonymous and therefore cannot be destroyed should you wish to withdraw your data after your 
participation is complete. 
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS 
Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. If you would 
like feedback about the results of the study the student investigator may provide these results by email if 
contacted after August 1st 2012. 
CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact Kathryn Belicki or 
Alicia Rubel using the contact information provided above. This study has been reviewed and received 
ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock University [insert file #]. If you have any 
comments or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics 
Office at (905) 688-5550 Ext. 3035, reb@brocku.ca. 
If you find participation in this study emotionally distressing and this emotional distress continues several 
hours after completion of the study we encourage you tb contact one of the resources for counseling on the 
attached sheet. 
Thank you for your assistance in this project. Please keep a copy of this form for your records. 
The inside of every Bell phone book lists emergency and crisis numbers, including those for 
phone help lines, women's centres, sexual assault centres, etc. 
For Niagara, those numbers are: 
Distress Line (Distress Centre of Niagara, St. Catharines number) 905-688-3711 
Niagara Region Sexual Assault Centre 905-682-4584 
Women's Place (St. Catharines) 905-684-8331 
To see a Counsellor, here are some local resources: 
Brock University Personal Counselling Services 905-688-5550 
Ext 4750 (to book an 
appointment) 
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Ext 3240 (in a crisis situation) 
St. Catharines General Hospital 
Mental Health Outpatient 
Sexual Assault Treatment 
905-684-7271, Ext. 46440 
905-684-7271, Ext. 45300 
The Yellow Pages list many other psychotherapists with varying training and area of specialty, 
and also lists some of the major resources for community support and self-help support. There 
are a number of categories in the Yellow Pages that are relevant. If you look under "Counselling 
Services" you will find a list of the various categories. If you would like to see a registered 
psychologist in private practice, most are listed in the Yellow Pages under "Psychologists". 
Student Copy 
CONSENT FORM 
I agree to participate in this study described above. I have made this decision based on the information I 
have read in the Information-Consent Letter. I have had the opportunity to receive any additional details I 
wanted about the study and understand that I may ask questions in the future. I understand that I may 
withdraw this consent at any time. 
Name: ________________________________________________________ _ 
D I would like to receive $5 
OR 
D I would like to receive ~ course credit towards the following course: 
Signature: __________________________________________ Date: 
Researcher Copy 
CONSENT FORM 
I agree to participate in this study described above. I have made this decision based on the information I 
have read in the Information-Consent Letter. I have had the opportunity to receive any additional details I 
wanted about the study and understand that I may ask questions in the future. I understand that I may 
withdraw this consent at any time. 
Name: __________________________________ _ 
D I would like to receive $5 
OR 
D I would like to receive ~ course credit towards the following course: 
Signature: _________________________ Date: 
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Pilot 1 Debriefing Letter 
Debriefing Letter: 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you very much for your participation in this study. Research such as this 
depends on participants like you to further the field of psychology. 
Background and Purpose of the Study: 
300 
By participating in this pilot study you helped to select stimuli for a future study. The 
future study will be examining unconscious processes that may be involved in 
forgiveness. For this future study participants will be conditioned to associate a 
transgressor with either positive or negative attributes. For this we need to select 
pleasant and unpleasant stimuli. We have asked you to rate photos so that we can 
determine which best evoke positive and negative emotional reactions. To measure 
each participant's association with the transgressor participants will be asked to 
perform a computerized sorting task with pictures of the transgressor and a control 
woman. For this we need to ensure that the two women are equally attractive so that 
attractiveness does not affect the test. This is why we have asked participants in this 
pilot study to rate the attractiveness of each woman. 
If you have any questions about this study, please feel free to contact us at any time. 
The principal student investigator is Alicia Rubel, a graduate student in the 
Department of Psychology. Alicia Rubel may be reached at arlOhd@brocku.ca. The 
faculty supervisor is Kathryn Belicki, in the Department of Psychology. Dr. Belicki 
can be reached at kbelicki@brocku.ca, 905-688-5550 (ext. 3873), office MCB306. 
If you have found participation in this study emotionally distressing and this emotional 
distress continues several hours after completion of the study we encourage you to 
contact one of the Counselling resources on the sheet we have provided you. 
Thank you again! 
Pilot 2 Consent Letter 
Consent Letter 
Date: October 6, 2011 
Project Title: Impression Formation and Mood 
Principal Investigator (PI): Kathryn Belicki, professor 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 3873, kbelicki@brocku.ca 
Student Principal Investigator (SPI): Alicia Rubel, MA candidate 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 5456, ar10hd@brocku.ca 
INVITATION 
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You are invited to participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
relationship between impression formation and mood. 
WHAT'S INVOLVED 
As a participant, you will be asked to watch a slide show, fill out surveys and complete two short 
computerized tasks. Participation will take 15 to 30 minutes of your time. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS 
Possible benefits of participation include enjoying trying out the computerized tasks and an opportunity to 
learn about how psychological research is performed. You may also help society benefit from a better 
understanding of how the mind works. There also may be risks associated with participation as you 
experience a depressed mood. You may also find some of the images we show you unpleasant. While we 
believe that the risk of you finding this study upsetting is small, at the end of this letter we have provided a 
list of resources for counseling should you feel upset after the study and wish to obtain help. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included or, in any other way, 
associated with the data collected in the study. Once your participation is complete the researchers will have 
no way of determining which responses belong to you. Furthermore, because our interest is in the 
average responses of the entire group of participants, you will not be identified individually in any 
way in written reports of this research .. Your consent form will be stored in a locked lab room and 
destroyed 10 years after your participation. Consent forms will be stored separately from the data obtained 
from your responses. Electronic data files, which contain no reference to your identity, will be kept 10 year 
after publication. Access to these data will be restricted to the researchers associated with the forgiveness 
lab, Dr. Antonia Mantonakis, and Dr. Michael Busseri. For PSYC 1 F90 students: Dr. Kathryn Belicki will not 
be directly involved in assigning grades for PSYC 1 F90. She will not have access to consent forms (which 
contain participant names) until after PSYC 1 F90 grades are filed. Thus, your participation in this study or 
your choice not to participate in this study will have no effect on your PSYC 1 F90 grades. 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you wish, you may decline to answer any questions or participate in 
any 
component of the study. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time and may do so 
without any 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. Once you have submitted your responses they will be 
anonymous and therefore cannot be destroyed should you wish to withdraw your data after your 
participation is complete. 
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS 
Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. If you would 
like feedback about the results of the study the student investigator may provide these results by email if 
contacted after August 1 st 2012. 
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CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact Kathryn Belicki or 
Alicia Rubel using the contact information provided above. This study has been reviewed and received 
ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock University 11-080. If you have any comments 
or concems about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 
688-5550 Ext. 3035, reb@brocku.ca. 
If you find participation in this study emotionally distressing and this emotional distress continues several 
hours after completion of the study we encourage you to contact one of the resources for counseling on the 
attached sheet. 
Thank you for your assistance in this project. Please keep a copy of this form for your records. 
The inside of every Bell phone book lists emergency and crisis numbers, including those for 
phone help lines, women's centres, sexual assault centres, etc. 
For Niagara, those numbers are: 
Distress Line (Distress Centre of Niagara, St. Catharines number) 905-688-3711 
Niagara Region Sexual Assault Centre 905-682-4584 
Women's Place (St. Catharines) 905-684-8331 
To see a Counsellor, here are some local resources: 
Brock University Personal Counselling Services 
905-688-5550 
Ext 4750 (to book an 
appointment) 
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Ext 3240 (in a crisis situation) 
St. Catharines General Hospital 
Mental Health Outpatient 
Sexual Assault Treatment 
905-684-7271, Ext. 46440 
905-684-7271, Ext. 45300 
The Yellow Pages list many other psychotherapists with varying training and area of specialty, 
and also lists some of the major resources for community support and self-help support. There 
are a number of categories in the Yellow Pages that are relevant. If you look under "Counse"ing 
Services" you wi" find a list of the various categories. If you would like to see a registered 
psychologist in private practice, most are listed in the Yellow Pages under "Psychologists". 
P2 
Student Copy 
CONSENT FORM 
I agree to participate in this study described above. I have made this decision based on the information I 
have read in the Information-Consent Letter. I have had the opportunity to receive any additional details I 
wanted about the study and understand that I may ask questions in the future. I understand that I may 
withdraw this consent at any time. 
Name: ________________________________________________________ _ 
o I would like to receive $1 0 
OR 
o I would like to receive % hour course credit towards the following course: 
Signature: ___________________________________________ Date: 
Researcher Copy 
CONSENT FORM 
I agree to participate in this study described above. I have made this decision based on the information I 
have read in the Information-Consent Letter. I have had the opportunity to receive any additional details I 
wanted about the study and understand that I may ask questions in the future. I understand that I may 
withdraw this consent at any time. 
Name: ________________________________________________ _ 
o I would like to receive $10 
OR 
o I would like to receive % hour course credit towards the following course: 
Signature: ______________________________________ Date: 
304 
305 
Pilot 2 Debriefmg Letter 
Debriefing Letter (For Pilot Study 2): 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you very much for your participation in this study. Research such as this depends 
on participants like you to further the field of psychology. 
Background and Purpose of the Study: 
This study tests ideas from dual-process theory. Dual-process theory puts forth that the 
human mind operates using two systems: one which operates quickly, effortlessly, and 
largely outside one's awareness, and a second which operates slowly at the conscious 
level using rules such as logic. Dual-process models are now common throughout 
cognitive and social psychology, but have been slow to enter the clinical field. The main 
hypothesis of the current research is that subconscious processing can influence your 
impressions about a person. 
As you watched the slideshow, between the slides that you could consciously see, we 
flashed very quickly, so quickly you probably could not see them consciously, either 
pleasant or unpleasant photos. This will allow us to test whether subconscious 
processing of pleasant vs. unpleasant photos will affect your mood and your judgments 
of Patricia. For the purpose of future studies, we also wanted to make sure that 
participants would not be able to consciously perceive the images we intend to be 
subliminal. 
If you have any questions about this study, please feel free to contact us at any time. 
The principal student investigator is Alicia Rubel, a graduate student in the Department 
of Psychology. Alicia Rubel may be reached at arlOhd@brocku.ca. The faculty 
supervisor is Kathryn Belicki, in the Department of Psychology. Dr. Belicki can be 
reached at kbelicki@brocku.ca, 905-688-5550 (ext. 3873), office MCB306. 
If you have found participation in this study emotionally distressing and this emotional 
distress continues several hours after completion of the study we encourage you to 
contact one of the Counseling resources on the sheet we have provided you. 
Thank you again! 
Pilot Study 3 Consent Letter 
Consent Letter 
Date: October 6, 2011 
Project Title: Impression Formation and Mood p2 
Principal Investigator (PI): Kathryn Belicki, professor 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 3873, kbelicki@brocku.ca 
Student Principal Investigator (SPI): Alicia Rubel, MA candidate 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 5456, ar10hd@brocku .ca 
INVITATION 
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You are invited to participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
relationship between impression formation and mood. 
WHAT'S INVOLVED 
As a participant, you will be asked to watch a slide show, fill out surveys and complete a short computerized 
task. Participation will take 15 to 30 minutes of your time. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS 
Possible benefits of participation include enjoying trying out the computerized tasks and an opportunity to 
learn about how psychological research is performed. You may also help society benefit from a better 
understanding of how the mind works. There also may be risks associated with participation as you 
experience a depressed mood. You may also find some of the images we show you unpleasant. While we 
believe that the risk of you finding this study upsetting is small, at the end of this letter we have provided a 
list of resources for counseling should you feel upset after the study and wish to obtain help. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included or, in any other way, 
associated with the data collected in the study. Once your participation is complete the researchers will have 
no way of determining which responses belong to you. Furthermore, because our interest is in the 
average responses of the entire group of participants, you will not be identified individually in any 
way in written reports of this research. Your consent form will be stored in a locked lab room and 
destroyed 10 years after your participation. Consent forms will be stored separately from the data obtained 
from your responses. Electronic data files, which contain no reference to your identity, will be kept 10 year 
after publication. Access to these data will be restricted to the researchers associated with the forgiveness 
lab, Dr. Antonia Mantonakis, and Dr. Michael Busseri. For PSYC 1 F90 students: Dr. Kathryn Belicki will not 
be directly involved in assigning grades for PSYC 1 F90. She will not have access to consent forms (which 
contain participant names) until after PSYC 1 F90 grades are filed. Thus, your participation in this study or 
your choice not to participate in this study will have no effect on your PSYC 1 F90 grades. 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you wish, you may decline to answer any questions or participate in 
any 
component of the study. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time and may do so 
without any 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. Once you have submitted your responses they will be 
anonymous and therefore cannot be destroyed should you wish to withdraw your data after your 
participation is complete. 
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS 
Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. If you would 
like feedback about the results of the study the student investigator may provide these results by email if 
contacted after August 1st 2012. 
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CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact Kathryn Belicki or 
Alicia Rubel using the contact information provided above. This study has been reviewed and received 
ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock University 11-080. If you have any comments 
or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 
688-5550 Ext. 3035, reb@brocku.ca. 
If you find participation in this study emotionally distressing and this emotional distress continues several 
hours after completion of the study we encourage you to contact one of the resources for counseling on the 
attached sheet. 
Thank you for your assistance in this project. Please keep a copy of this form for your records. 
The inside of every Bell phone book lists emergency and crisis numbers, including those for 
phone help lines, women's centres, sexual assault centres, etc. 
For Niagara. those numbers are: 
Distress Line (Distress Centre of Niagara, St. Catharines number) 905-688-3711 
Niagara Region Sexual Assault Centre 905-682-4584 
Women's Place (St. Catharines) 905-684-8331 
To see a Counsellor, here are some local resources: 
Brock University Personal Counselling Services 
905-688-5550 
Ext 4750 (to book an 
appointment) 
308 
Ext 3240 (in a crisis situation) 
St. Catharines General Hospital 
Mental Health Outpatient 
Sexual Assault Treatment 
905-684-7271, Ext. 46440 
905-684-7271, Ext. 45300 
The Yellow Pages list many other psychotherapists with varying training and area of specialty, 
and also lists some of the major resources for community support and self-help support. There 
are a number of categories in the Yellow Pages that are relevant. If you look under "Counselling 
Services" you will find a list of the various categories. If you would like to see a registered 
psychologist in private practice, most are listed in the Yellow Pages under "Psychologists". 
P2 
Student Copy 
CONSENT FORM 
I agree to participate in this study described above. I have made this decision based on the information I 
have read in the Information-Consent Letter. I have had the opportunity to receive any additional details I 
wanted about the study and understand that I may ask questions in the future. I understand that I may 
withdraw this consent at any time. 
Name: ________________________________________________________ _ 
o I would like to receive $10 
OR 
o I would like to receive ~ hour course credit towards the following course: 
Signature: ___________________________________________ Date: 
Researcher Copy 
CONSENT FORM 
I agree to participate in this study described above. I have made this decision based on the information I 
have read in the Information-Consent Letter. I have had the opportunity to receive any additional details I 
wanted about the study and understand that I may ask questions in the future. I understand that I may 
withdraw this consent at any time. 
Name: ____________________________________________________ _ 
o I would like to receive $10 
OR 
o I would like to receive ~ hour course credit towards the following course: 
Signature: __________________________________________ Date: 
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Pilot Study 3 Debriefing Letter 
Debriefing Letter (For Pilot Study 2 p2): 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you very much for your participation in this study. Research such as this depends 
on participants like you to further the field of psychology. 
Background and Purpose of the Study: 
This study tests ideas from dual-process theory. Dual-process theory puts forth that the 
human mind operates using two systems: one which operates quickly, effortlessly, and 
largely outside one's awareness, and a second which operates slowly at the conscious 
level using rules such as logic. Dual-process models are now common throughout 
cognitive and social psychology, but have been slow to enter the clinical field. The main 
hypothesis of the current research is that subconscious processing can influence your 
impressions about a person. 
As you watched the slideshow, between the slides of "Patricia", we flashed very 
quickly, either pleasant or unpleasant photos. This will allow us to test whether 
exposure to pleasant vs. unpleasant photos will affect your mood and your judgments of 
Patricia. 
If you have any questions about this study, please feel free to contact us at any time. 
The principal student investigator is Alicia Rubel, a graduate student in the Department 
of Psychology. Alicia Rubel may be reached at arlOhd@brocku.ca. The faculty 
supervisor is Kathryn Belicki, in the Department of Psychology. Dr. Belicki can be 
reached at kbelicki@brocku.ca, 905-688-5550 (ext. 3873), office MCB306. 
If you have found participation in this study emotionally distressing and this emotional 
distress continues several hours after completion of the study we encourage you to 
contact one of the Counseling resources on the sheet we have provided you. 
Thank you again! 
Main Study Consent Letter 
For Main Study 
Consent Letter 
Date: October 6, 2011 
Project Title: Forgiveness, Memory, & Past Relationships 
Principal Investigator (PI): Kathryn Belicki, professor 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 3873, kbelicki@brocku.ca 
Student Principal Investigator (SPI): Alicia Rubel, MA candidate 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 5456, ar10hd@brocku.ca 
INVITATION 
311 
You are invited to· participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
forgiveness process in the context of past relationships, and investigate the role that memory plays in 
forgiveness. . 
WHAT'S INVOLVED 
As a participant, you will be asked to watch a slide show, memorize numbers, fill out surveys and complete 
computerized tasks. Participation will take approximately 1 hour of your time. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS 
Possible benefits of participation include learning about how you feel about forgiveness, enjoying trying out 
the computerized tasks and an opportunity to learn about how psychological research is performed. You 
may also help society benefit from a better understanding of forgiveness. There also may be risks 
associated with participation as you may be reminded of previous times you have experienced a 
transgression and feel a depressed mood. You may also find some of the images we show you unpleasant. 
While we believe that the risk of you finding this study upsetting is small, at the end of this letter we have 
provided a list of resources for counseling should you feel upset after the study and wish to obtain help. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included or, in any other way, 
associated with the data collected in the study. Once your participation is complete the researchers will have 
no way of determining which responses belong to you. If your written response to any question is quoted In 
a report or publication of this study it cannot be associated with your name and any other identifying 
information will be removed. Your consent form will be stored in a locked lab room and destroyed 10 years 
after your participation. Consent forms will be stored separately from the data obtained from your responses. 
Electronic data files, which contain no reference to your identity, will be kept 10 year after publication. 
Access to these data will be restricted to the researchers associated with the forgiveness lab, Dr. Antonia 
Mantonakis, and Dr. Michael Busser!. For PSYC 1 F90 students: Dr. Kathryn Belicki will not be directly 
involved in assigning grades for PSYC 1 F90. She will not have access to consent forms (which contain 
participant names) until after PSYC 1 F90 grades are filed. Thus, your participation in this study or your 
choice not to participate in this study will have no effect on your PSYC 1 F90 grades. 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you wish, you may decline to answer any questions or participate in 
any 
component of the study. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time and may do so 
without any . 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. Once you have submitted your responses they will be 
anonymous and therefore cannot be destroyed should you wish to withdraw your data after your 
participation is complete. 
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS 
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Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. If you would 
like feedback about the results of the study the student investigator may provide these results by email if 
contacted after August 1 st 2012. 
CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact Kathryn Belicki or 
Alicia Rubel using the contact information provided above. This study has been reviewed and received 
ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock University 11-080. If you have any comments 
or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 
688-5550 Ext. 3035, reb@brocku.ca. 
If you find participation In this study emotionally distressing and this emotional distress continues several 
hours after completion of the study we encourage you to contact one of the resources for counseling on the 
attached sheet. 
Thank you for your assistance in this project. Please keep a copy of this form for your records. 
The inside of every Bell phone book lists emergency and crisis numbers, including those for 
phone help lines, women's centres, sexual assault centres, etc. 
For Niagara, those numbers are: 
Distress Line (Distress Centre of Niagara, St. Catharines number) 905-688-3711 
Niagara Region Sexual Assault Centre 905-682-4584 
Women's Place (St. Catharines) 905-684-8331 
To see a Counsellor, here are some local resources: 
Brock University Personal Counselling Services 905-688-5550 
Ext 4750 (to book an 
appointment) 
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Ext 3240 (in a crisIs situation) 
St. Catharines General Hospital 
Mental Health Outpatient 
Sexual Assault Treatment 
905-684-7271, Ext. 46440 
905-684-7271, Ext. 45300 
The Yellow Pages list many other psychotherapists with varying training and area of specialty, 
and also lists some of the major resources for community support and self-help support. There 
are a number of categories in the Yellow Pages that are relevant. If you look under "Counselling 
Services" you will find a list of the various categories. If you would like to see a registered 
psychologist in private practice, most are listed in the Yellow Pages under "Psychologists". 
Main Study 
Student Copy 
CONSENT FORM 
I agree to participate in this study described above. I have made this decision based on the information I 
have read in the Information-Consent Letter. I have had the opportunity to receive any additional details I 
wanted about the study and understand that I may ask questions in the future. I understand that I may 
withdraw this consent at any time. 
Name: ________________________________________________________ _ 
D I would like to receive $10 
OR 
D I would like to receive 1 course credit towards the following course: 
Signature: _____________________________________________ Date: 
Researcher Copy 
CONSENT FORM 
I agree to participate in this study described above. I have made this decision based on the information I 
have read in the Information-Consent Letter. I have had the opportunity to receive any additional details I 
wanted about the study and understand that I may ask questions in the future. I understand that I may 
withdraw this consent at any time. 
Name: ________________________________________________________ _ 
D I would like to receive $10 
OR 
D I would like to receive 1 course credit towards the following course: 
Signature: _____________________________________________ Date: 
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Main Study Debriefmg Letter 
Debriefing Letter (For Main Study): 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you very much for your participation in this study. Research such as this 
depends on participants like you to further the field of psychology. 
Background and Purpose of the Study: 
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This study tests the relevance of Dual Process Theory to forgiveness. Dual-process 
theory puts forth that the human mind operates using two systems: one which operates 
quickly, effortlessly, and largely outside one's awareness, and a second which operates 
slowly at the conscious level using rules such as logic. Dual-process models are now 
common throughout cognitive and social psychology, but have been slow to enter the 
clinical field. The main hypothesis of the current research is that both conscious and 
subconscious thinking can influence forgiveness. The findings may help to guide 
counsellors working with people who are having troubles forgiving and may help 
explain such puzzles as why some people report that even after they have forgiven 
they occasionally still feel angry. 
As you watched the slideshow, between the slides that you could consciously see, we 
flashed very quickly, so quickly you probably could not see them consciously, either 
pleasant or unpleasant photos. This will allow us to test whether subconscious 
processing of pleasant vs. unpleasant photos will affect the likelihood that the 
participant will forgive. If it does, we can conclude that a system operating outside of 
one's awareness plays a part in forgiveness. The computerized sorting task you 
performed gave us a second way of gauging the associations you built up between the 
pleasantness or unpleasantness of the subliminally displayed photos and the individual 
depicted in the slide show. 
In addition, all of the participants in this study were asked to memorize a series of 
numbers. Half of the participants were asked to recall these numbers almost 
immediately, while the other half had to hold the numbers in memory until after they 
had answered all the questions about Patricia. Previous research has shown that when 
your conscious mind is occupied with trying to remember numbers, people are less 
likely to reason logically about a problem. We therefore will be examining whether 
this too affects forgiveness. 
If you have any questions about this study, please feel free to contact us at any time. 
The principal student investigator is Alicia Rubel, a graduate student in the 
Department of Psychology. Alicia Rubel may be reached at arlOhd@brocku.ca. The 
faculty supervisor is Kathryn Belicki, in the Department of Psychology. Dr. Belicki 
can be reached at kbe1icki@brocku.ca, 905-688-5550 (ext. 3873), office MCB306. 
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If you have found participation in this study emotionally distressing and this emotional 
distress continues several hours after completion of the study we encourage you to 
contact one of the Counselling resources on the sheet we have provided you. 
Thank you again! 
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